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crisis prevention at the country's level, and the impact of taxation and financial regulation on
entrepreneurship at the agent's level. In the first chapter, debt crises arise from the incompleteness of
sovereign debt markets: the government cannot credibly commit to repay or default in certain states of the
world and this gives way to non-fundamental debt crises. In a strategic default environment, I show that
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theoretical literature that had struggled to explain why countries hold reserves while indebted. The results are
consistent with previous empirical results that had shown countries with greater reserve holdings faced lower
spreads in the sovereign debt markets, which is at odds with the previous theories. In the second chapter, a
small open economy faces an aggregate borrowing constraint and the agents fail to internalize how their
private borrowing decisions push the total debt towards the limit, making the current account adjustment
more severe. We model the decentralized and planner’s problem and find the optimal capital control policies,
these are very effective to move the economy to the first-best scenario but also very hard to implement, given
their state contingent nature. We then address the effectiveness of simpler policy rules, and find that they can
bring welfare gains but had to be carefully designed. Finally, in the third chapter, the competition among
investors for the most promising entrepreneurs, under adverse selection and limited liability, leads to an
excessive entry into entrepreneurship activity and allocates resources to socially inefficient projects. We solve
the optimal contracting problem and show that the inefficiency disappears if at least one of the next three is
missing: competition in financial intermediation, adverse selection or limited liability. We also show that a
small cost or fee per contract, like red-tape requirements, is enough to restore efficiency, making a case for
financial regulation.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMICS WITH FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
Juan M. Hernandez
Enrique G. Mendoza
How can governments design policies that alleviate the macroeconomic impli-
cations of financial frictions? This dissertation contributes to answer this ques-
tion focusing on two aspects: international borrowing and crisis prevention at
the country’s level, and the impact of taxation and financial regulation on en-
trepreneurship at the agent’s level. In the first chapter, debt crises arise from
the incompleteness of sovereign debt markets: the government cannot credibly
commit to repay or default in certain states of the world and this gives way to
non-fundamental debt crises. In a strategic default environment, I show that in-
ternational reserve holdings help to reduce the probability of these market-driven
debt crises, advancing the theoretical literature that had struggled to explain why
countries hold reserves while indebted. The results are consistent with previous
empirical results that had shown countries with greater reserve holdings faced
lower spreads in the sovereign debt markets, which is at odds with the previous
theories. In the second chapter, a small open economy faces an aggregate bor-
rowing constraint and the agents fail to internalize how their private borrowing
decisions push the total debt towards the limit, making the current account ad-
justment more severe. We model the decentralized and plannerŠs problem and
find the optimal capital control policies, these are very effective to move the econ-
omy to the first-best scenario but also very hard to implement, given their state
contingent nature. We then address the effectiveness of simpler policy rules, and
find that they can bring welfare gains but had to be carefully designed. Finally,
vi
in the third chapter, the competition among investors for the most promising en-
trepreneurs, under adverse selection and limited liability, leads to an excessive
entry into entrepreneurship activity and allocates resources to socially inefficient
projects. We solve the optimal contracting problem and show that the inefficiency
disappears if at least one of the next three is missing: competition in financial
intermediation, adverse selection or limited liability. We also show that a small
cost or fee per contract, like red-tape requirements, is enough to restore efficiency,
making a case for financial regulation.
vii
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Introduction
Financial frictions arise from market incompleteness have been found to severely
affect macroeconomic outcomes. Three different frictions at different levels are
studied here: lack of commitment by a government in the sovereign debt mar-
kets, a negative externality private borrowing entails when the economy faces an
aggregate borrowing constraint, and adverse selection together with limited lia-
bility in the competition among financial intermediaries. In each case a policy
response is proposed: international reserve holdings as a mechanism to prevent
market-driven debt crises, capital controls to make agents internalize the social
cost of their indebtedness and red-tape financial regulation to prevent excessive
entry into entrepreneurship.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, “How International Reserves reduce the Proba-
bility of Debt Crises" I provide a model to explain why many emerging economies
maintain significant positions in both external sovereign debt and foreign re-
serves, paying spreads of over 250 basis points on average. Arguments advanced
in empirical work and policy discussions suggest that governments may do this
because international reserves play a role in reducing the likelihood of sovereign
debt crises, improving a country’s access to debt markets. I propose a model that
justifies that argument.
The government makes optimal choices of debt and reserves in an environment in
which self-fulfilling rollover crises a-là Cole-Kehoe and external default a-là Eaton-
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Gersovitz coexist. This allows for both fundamental and market-sentiment-driven
debt crises. Self-fulfilling crises arise because of a lender’s coordination problem
when multiple equilibria are feasible. Conditional on the country’s Net Foreign
Asset position, additional reserves make the sovereign more willing to service its
debt even when no new borrowing is possible, which enlarges the set of states in
which repayment is the dominant strategy and, hence, reduces the set of states
that admit a self-fulfilling crisis. From an ex-ante perspective, reserves reduce the
probability of crises in the future which lowers current sovereign spreads.
The result depends on the existence of roll-over risk and debt not being limited
to one period debt. This framework advances existing models by accounting
not only for the self-insurance role of reserves against self-fulfilling crises but
also for their part in reducing the probability of such events. My findings are
in line with the empirical literature on vulnerability measures to sovereign debt
crisis that shows the connection between international reserves, the probability of
debt crises and sovereign spreads. Quantitatively the model can explain 50% of
Mexico’s international reserves holdings, while accounting for key cyclical facts.
The second chapter, joint work with Enrique Mendoza, is titled “Optimal v. Simple
Financial Policy Rules in an Equilibrium Model of Credit Booms and Crashes". There
we evaluate the effectiveness of optimal versus simple financial policy rules in a
model of a small open economy with production, liability dollarization and “un-
conventional shocks" in the form of global liquidity shifts and news about future
fundamentals. In our model, both tradable and nontradable goods are produced
using intermediate goods traded in world markets. Debt is denominated in units
of tradables, and a collateral constraint limits debt to a fraction of the market value
of total income. The optimal policy has a macroprudential or ex-ante component:
a debt tax levied at date t only when the collateral constraint is not currently
binding but may do so at t+ 1, as well as an ex-post component: sectoral pro-
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duction taxes/subsidies used when the collateral constraint binds. The optimal
policy, although complex, is very effective at reducing the magnitude and sever-
ity of financial crises. Simple policies can be effective but need to be constructed
carefully otherwise they can be welfare reducing.
The third and final chapter is titled “Fighting for the Best, Losing with the Rest:
On the Desirability of Competition in Financial Markets" and was developed with
Daniel Wills. Our inquiry was motivated by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) act of 2012, which aimed at increasing funding access for young firms by
easing securities regulation. We ask if there is a role for the regulation of the
market of funds for firms that lack collateral and have a large uncertainty about
their ability to generate profits. To answer that we characterize optimal financial
contracts in a competitive environment with risk, adverse selection and limited
liability. We find that competition among financial intermediaries always forces
them to fund projects with negative expected returns both from a private and
from a social perspective. Intermediaries use steep payoff schedules to screen
entrepreneurs, but limited liability implies this can only be done by giving more
to all entrepreneurs. In equilibrium competition for the profitable entrepreneurs
force intermediaries to offer better terms to all customers, there is cross subsi-
dization among entrepreneurs and intermediation profits are nil. The three main
features of our framework (competition, adverse selection and limited liability)
are necessary in order to get the inefficient laissez-faire outcome and a role for
financial regulation. Our result remains robust when firms can collateralize some
portion of the credit as long as there is still an unsecured fraction.
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Chapter 1
How International Reserves Reduce
the Probability of Debt Crises
1.1. Introduction
Several emerging economies have both foreign currency denominated debt out-
standing and international reserve holdings. This coexistence is costly for the
government, since it pays a higher interest rate on its debt than what it earns on
its reserves holdings. This suggests there should be some extra benefit of reserve
holdings.
The right panel of Table 1 presents the foreign debt stock and reserves holding
as a percentage of GDP in 2015 for a panel of emerging economies. The median
country held 16.9% of GDP in reserves while owing 14.9% in foreign currency and
paying a spread of 238 basis points over the return on reserves. The numbers from
2015 are not only a product of the recent trend in emerging economies reserves
accumulation. The left panel on Table 1 shows the 15 year average, between 2001
and 2015, of debt, reserves and sovereign spreads for the same countries. The data
shows that the concurrence of debt and reserves is not a short-term phenomenon.
The main reason cited for emerging markets reserve holdings is known as the
4
Table 1: External Debt, Reserves and Spreads
Averages (2001-2015) Latest (2015)
Country Reserves 1Debt 1Spread 2Reserves1Debt1Spread 2
Argentina 9.8 31.3 1478 6.0 18.7 458
Brazil 11.5 7.0 391 23.2 4.4 446
Bulgaria 31.7 18.1 196 45.5 11.9 68
Chile 15.2 2.9 147 16.8 2.8 226
Colombia 10.7 13.1 298 18.3 16.6 332
Indonesia 12.0 21.0 282 12.1 17.0 317
Lithuania 15.0 20.9 228 6.5 31.1 122
Mexico 10.1 12.0 187 16.3 18.7 216
Peru 24.3 21.2 268 32.9 11.1 235
Philippines 23.4 24.0 298 28.3 10.8 121
Poland 16.5 26.6 73 20.1 29.4 51
South Africa 10.1 9.2 214 16.8 16.7 406
Turkey 12.0 13.3 356 16.1 13.1 322
Ukraine 16.0 15.3 712 6.6 30.3 1621
Median 15.1 14.3 248 16.9 14.9 238
precautionary motive: reserves are a liquidity buffer that protects the sovereign
against adverse developments in financial markets. This motive for holding re-
serves has been adopted by the mainstream policy institutions, as the following
excerpt from the reserves definition in the 6th edition of the IMF’s Balance of
Payments Manual shows:
”external assets . . . controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of
payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets . . . , and for
other related purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency
and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing)."
Other explanations, like intergenerational wealth transfers and exchange rate
management, have been suggested to account for the holding of reserves, but
they are still problematic. Although some of those countries with high interna-
tional reserves have positive Net Foreign Asset (NFA) positions -like China-, the
majority of emerging economies are still indebted vis-a-vis the rest of the world,
which precludes the wealth transfer motive. Similarly, several of those countries
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have floating exchange rate regimes, weakening the case for an export promotion
or currency management motive.
This paper focuses on the precautionary motive for holding reserves, in particular,
in their role in preventing debt crises, maintaining confidence in the economy,
and enhancing foreign borrowing conditions. Empirical evidence supports this
case: Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2013) and
Tavares (2015) have found that reserves are correlated with smaller spreads and a
lower probability of sudden stops, defined as large current account reversals.
Figure 1: Scatter diagram of spreads and reserves
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Each dot represents a country-quarter pair for each economy in the sam-
ple and quarter between 1994-Q1 and 2015-Q4. A linear relationship
between the reserves to GDP ratio and the EMBI spread (in basis points)
was added. Additional information about the data and sample used can
be found in the data appendix A.3.
Figure 1 hints at the effect of reserves in reducing spreads. The scatter plot shows
reserves-to-GDP ratio and sovereign spreads where each point represents a coun-
try and quarter in the dataset, described in Appendix A.3. A simple linear relation
fitted between the two variables shows a negative correlation.
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Tavares (2015), Gumus (2016), and Levy Yeyati
(2008) among others, 1 build country panels and estimate the effect of reserves on
1See Petrova, Papaioannou, and Bellas (2010) for a survey of papers assessing the effect of reserves and
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the sovereign spreads under different specifications. They find estimates for the
coefficient of the reserves-to-GDP ratio on sovereign in the range [-8.0, -2.5] which
indicates that for each percentage point increase of the reserves-output ratio the
sovereign spread falls between 2.5 and 8 basis points. Table 2 presents estimates
of a common panel data regression specification regressing spreads on lagged
reserves, debt, current account, output growth, an exchange rate regime dummy
and the aggregate EMBI+ spread. The results are in line with previous studies, in
particular, the point estimate of the spread reduction, after a 1% increase in the
reserves-to-GDP ratio, is between 5.5 and 7.6 basis points.
In a similar setting, Calvo et al. (2013) use a panel of emerging and developed
countries to assess the impact of international reserves in the cost and probability
of sudden-stops, and find that reserves holdings reduce both of them. 2 Gour-
inchas and Obstfeld (2012) find that international reserve holdings significantly
reduce the probability of future crisis (default, currency and banking) on emerg-
ing economies, in particular they report a marginal effect of the reserves-to-GDP
ratio on the default probability of -0.59.
On the theoretical side, however, sovereign debt models with strategic default
struggle to incorporate reserves. International reserves are protected by the sove-
reign immunity clause, which means they are not pledgable and cannot be seized
by creditors in case of a default. This makes more challenging for these models to
sustain both debt and reserve holdings since reserves make default more attrac-
tive. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) showed that if the sovereign is allowed to accumu-
late assets after default, reputation costs are not enough to support lending since
other fundamental variables on sovereign spreads. For a survey of the literature on reserves and the proba-
bility of crises see Bussière, Cheng, Chinn, and Lisack (2015).
2Calvo et al. (2013) assume that the probability of sudden stops comes from a Probit model including
reserves, the output cost of default is linear in reserves, and there is a constant cost of holding reserves. The
first order condition for reserves is obtained analytically. Then they proceed to estimate the Probit model
for the likelihood of sudden-stops and the linear model for the output cost, and include those estimates in
their first order condition. Given the specification uncertainty, they assume the sovereign chooses the most
conservative model, which is the one yielding larger reserves. For Mexico, they find the optimal reserve to
GDP ratio to be 15% in 2007 and 22% in 2010.
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Table 2: Effect of reserves on spreads
Pooled OLSRandom EffectsFixed Effects
L. Reserves/GDP -7.559*** -5.512*** -5.561**
(1.141) (2.032) (2.260)
L. Debt/GDP 2.964** 6.911*** 7.797***
(1.226) (1.930) (2.059)
L. Agg. EMBI+ 0.369*** 0.324*** 0.313***
(0.080) (0.069) (0.069)
L. Current Account/GDP -3.807* -10.397*** -10.907***
(2.095) (2.045) (2.072)
L. Exchange rate regime 205.070*** 136.424*** 124.703***
(23.888) (34.515) (36.439)
L.GDP growth -71.471*** -62.485*** -62.371***
(7.186) (5.968) (5.987)
Cons. 186.433*** 131.684* 152.143**
(40.297) (70.990) (62.884)
R2 0.313 0.280 0.304
N 650 650 650
Notes: EMBI spread (basis points) as dependent variable. All ratios are calculated
using the current GDP; the Reserves to GDP ratio and Debt to GDP is calculated
as the variable divided by four times the quarterly GDP (annualized). Exchange
rate regime corresponds to a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries with a
fixed exchange rate regime. Additional information about the data used can be
found in the appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. The R2 statistic of the
random effects model (column 2) corresponds to the overall R2. * Significance at
the 10 percent level. ** Significance at the 5 percent level. *** Significance at the
1 percent level.
default happens when debt is at its highest. With reserves, a front-loaded ver-
sion of this mechanism applies, since the sovereign can increase its debt quickly
and default on it in the next period, keeping the proceeds from debt issuance as
reserves.
Recent developments in quantitative models of sovereign debt and international
reserves have had some success in explaining the coexistence of debt and reserves
by stressing the hedging properties of international reserves in the event of a
sudden stop. Jeanne and Rancière (2011) highlight the insurance role of reserves
against rollover crises in a simple model with switching exogenous collateral con-
straints. With those insights in mind, Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2012)
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added exogenous rollover crises to an Eaton-Gersovitz style model of long-term
sovereign debt. Their model can fully explain reserves accumulation in Mexico
while keeping track of standard cyclical moments, but the probability of those
exogenous crises has to be introduced as a function of reserves. 3
While these papers are able to represent the empirical facts, they model the link
between the probability of sudden stops and the reserves as an exogenous ob-
ject, which does not allow the authors to assess if those holdings are useful for
preventing sovereign debt crises. This contrasts sharply with the findings of em-
pirical studies suggesting that international reserves help to prevent debt crises.
Those empirical regularities have been used to build several measures of inter-
national reserves adequacy, assess optimal reserve holdings, and even prescribe
policy, but there is little understanding of the mechanism that drives them.
In the model developed in this paper, self-fulfilling debt crises as developed by
Cole and Kehoe (2000) are introduced. Reserves affect the probability of a sudden
stop generated from a self-fulfilling debt crisis via an endogenous mechanism.
In choosing the share of international reserves in the sovereign’s portfolio, the
government takes into account that the frequency of those crises is determined by
the extent to which reserves can move the economy in and out of states of nature
in which the coordination problem may give way to a self-fulfilling debt crisis.
This provides an explanation for reserves accumulation that does not depend on
ad-hoc assumptions about their effect on the dynamics of the sovereign’s economy
or on other debt market participants.
One fact that is indicative of the potential empirical relevance of self-fulfilling
debt crises is the observation of several periods in which countries with differ-
ent fundamentals all face spread widening and current account reversals. Figure
2 shows the percentage of countries with spread two standard deviations above
3In their latest version Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2016b) drop the exogenous rollover crises and
instead use a risk aversion shift on the lenders’ side, exogenously tied to the sovereign’s income shock. They
mention that this link accounts for half of the reserves holdings explained by their numerical exercise.
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Figure 2: Countries with spread 2 s.d. above mean
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This figure shows the percentage of countries from the sample whose
EMBI spread is more than two times the standard deviation above its
corresponding mean. Additional information about the data and sample
used can be found in the data appendix.
their corresponding means in each month over the 1994-2015 period. By construc-
tion, when multiple countries are facing an unusually high spread, the aggregate
spread must be higher as well. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2008) identified and
named these events Systemic Sudden Stops (3S): periods with high aggregate
spreads and where multiple countries face simultaneous current account rever-
sals. These 3S periods suggest a driving external financial factor. Other recent
studies have presented evidence in the same line: Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole, and
Stangebye (2016b) found a common exogenous factor driving spreads for a panel
of emerging markets. Tavares (2015) includes a time effect in his empirical speci-
fications for the sovereign spread. In Table 2, the coefficient on the EMBI+ spread,
which is the same across all countries, captures this effect.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by setting up a model that not
only can quantify the impact of international reserves on the probability of self-
fulfilling debt crises but also produces an endogenous mechanism linking both.
In the proposed environment self-fulfilling crises arise as a coordination failure
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in the financial markets but only when fundamentals allow for doubts about repayment
by the sovereign.
The intuition for the mechanism is that, conditional on a Net Foreign Asset po-
sition (NFA), additional reserves make the sovereign more willing to service its
debt even if there is an episode of market panic and no new borrowing is pos-
sible. This reduces the set of states that admit a self-fulfilling crises. Seen from
an ex-ante perspective, the additional holdings of international reserves reduce
the probability of a self-fulfilling debt crisis in the future which in turn decrease
current sovereign spreads.
The quantitative implications of the model are studied in a numerical exercise cal-
ibrated to Mexico. The model can account for 50% of the country’s international
reserve holdings, while matching the average outstanding debt, the volatility of
the sovereign spread and Mexico’s default frequency. The model also features the
negative correlation between spreads and reserves observed in the data.
The model can be used to quantify the optimal portfolio of reserves and external
debt for the sovereign. Additionally, this framework can explain empirical regu-
larities regarding reserves holdings and measures of crises vulnerability used in
policy circles. The Guidotti-Greenspan rule, which links the probability of sudden
stops to the ratio of reserves to short term debt, is the most popular reserve ade-
quacy metric among policymakers but not the only one. 4 This paper proposes a
micro-founded explanation for that and other empirical regularities, by endoge-
nously tying the probability of crises to economic fundamentals. Finally the setup
is able to assess the effectiveness of contingent lending policies put in place by the
IMF and developed countries’ central banks aimed at preventing confidence crises.
5
4Other measures include ratios of reserves to several variables like: monthly imports, current account
deficit, total debt and short term debt. In addition, according to the IMF’s survey of reserve managers,
countries approach to assess reserve adequacy usually include a mixture of these ratios.
5IMF’s Flexible Credit Line(FCL) is one of those contingent credit facilities. This was aimed at countries
with strong fundamentals for crisis-prevention and crisis-mitigation lending. It allows the sovereign to draw
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1.1.1. Related literature
This paper relates to the sudden stops literature which has been able to explain
reserve holdings as self-insurance against the risk of sudden reversal in financing.
Jeanne and Rancière (2011) highlight the insurance role of reserves against sud-
den stops in a simple model in which an exogenous collateral constraint suddenly
switches preventing new borrowing. Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009b)
present a model in which a planner internalizes how the choice of reserves affects
the probability and magnitude of sudden stops driven by the deflation mecha-
nism. 6 However, these papers abstract from modeling sovereign default and the
behavior of lenders while this paper models sovereign default and the response
of lenders to reserves accumulation, which is key for the role of reserves in pre-
venting crises.
This paper builds on the long strain of strategic sovereign default models pi-
oneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and further developed by Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) whose work highlighted the quantitative
relevance of that setup by replicating key business cycle statistics for emerging
market economies. 7 In these models however, the sovereign was not allowed to
simultaneously hold assets and debt.
The first attempt to model both debt and reserves in a setup with default was
proposed by Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). They found that reserves are too costly
to hold in equilibrium. With only one-period debt, the net position (reserves
on the credit line at any time (within a pre-specified period) which turned those funds into contingent
reserves without imposing additional conditions for disbursement. Three countries: Colombia, Mexico and
Poland used the FCL but none of them withdrew any funds. However it is still believed that at the peak of the
global financial crisis in 2009 the mere existence of this arrangement injected confidence in the markets. Given
our endogenous self-fulfilling crises framework, our model is in a better position to address the impact of
this instrument in precluding the possibility of such events. Bocola and Dovis (2015) use a similar framework
to evaluate the ECB’s promise to buy European sovereign bonds (Draghi’s "whatever it takes") on European
spreads.
6Durdu et al. (2009b) do not model the portfolio choice of debt and reserves, the latter arise as a higher
NFA position. Also their model is not of sovereign default but one of private debt crises driven by Fisherian
deflation.
7A comprehensive review of the literature that followed can be found in Aguiar et al. (2016b).
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minus debt) is the relevant state after the sovereign chooses to repay. But after de-
fault, reserves can compensate the direct output costs and allow for consumption
smoothing, making exclusion from financial markets more bearable. Hence, con-
ditional on a NFA, more reserves make the sovereign less likely to repay. Lenders
react to this by increasing spreads and in equilibrium debt stocks fall. In this
paper, reserves still make default more attractive for the sovereign, but allow-
ing for long-term debt and self-fulfilling crises makes the gross portfolio position
relevant after repayment, allowing a role for reserves.
More recently, Bianchi et al. (2012) set up a model of endogenous default, long-
term debt and exogenous roll-over crises, which can explain Mexico’s reserves
holdings . In their model the probability of roll-over crises is assumed to be
a decreasing function of reserves. In contrast, the framework developed here
endogenously ties the probability of crises to the fundamentals of the economy,
and in particular to reserves holdings, which allows for them to play a role in
crisis prevention.
This paper also draws from the self-fulfilling debt crises literature which has two
main branches: the first one pioneered by Calvo (1988), features multiple current
debt prices consistent with future consumption and default decisions. Recent pa-
pers on the Calvo tradition are Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) and Nicolini, Teles,
Ayres, and Navarro (2015). In a setup similar to bank run, Cole and Kehoe (2000)
develop a framework in which both repayment and default can be equilibrium
actions depending on the lenders’ decision to roll over debt or not. Recently Chat-
terjee and Eyigungor (2012) introduce this setup in their Eaton-Gersovitz model
of long term debt to make its issuance a superior alternative to short-term bonds.
The self-fulfilling debt crises environment has also been used to assess the role of
an International Lender Of Last Resort (ILOR): Roch and Uhlig (2016) introduce
an ILOR and determine the minimal intervention needed to rule out self-fulfilling
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crises. Bocola and Dovis (2015) measure the role of self-fulfilling crises in recent
European debt crises and the impact of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT) announcement. This paper complements that literature, as reserves
emerge as an alternative to the insurance and crisis prevention role of the ILOR.
Other attempts have given reserves different roles to explain their coexistence with
debt. Tavares (2015) gathers empirical evidence that confirms reserves reduce
sovereign spreads, then proposes a model in which reserves are necessary after a
default to make a settlement on a fraction of the stock of defaulted debt. Building
on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run framework, Hur and Kondo (2013)
set up an optimal contracting problem to find a role for reserves as a collateral
that prevents runs on the sovereign debt. In this paper reserves are not given any
additional role besides being a non-seizable cash buffer, which makes the task of
explaining their coexistence more challenging.
This paper is also related to the credit card puzzle literature of Telyukova (2013)
and Telyukova and Wright (2008). In these models, the existence of certain goods
that cannot be purchased with credit cards can explain the coexistence of cash
balances and credit card debt in households portfolios. This is similar to the
sudden stop literature in which the reserves balances of the sovereign can be
explained by the existence of certain states where credit is not available. However
the legal environments for the two problems differ substantially. Bankruptcy laws
prevent households and corporations from holding assets after a default event
while international reserves are protected by the Sovereign Immunity clause and
cannot be seized by lenders. Hence, cash makes the household credit safer while
reserves make the sovereign riskier.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical facts.
In Section 3 the model is specified and its theoretical properties are discussed.
Section 4 presents the quantitative analysis and results. Finally, Section 5 con-
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cludes and states directions of further research.
1.2. The Model
The model is based on the classic sovereign default model proposed by Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) with the modifications to introduce long-term debt and self-
fulfilling debt crises incorporated by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). The main
addition is the introduction of foreign reserves (an asset that the sovereign can
hold) and the portfolio choice of debt and reserves.
1.2.1. The Sovereign
Preferences, endowments, choices
The sovereign seeks to maximize the representative agent’s utility:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
,
where u(·) is a twice-continuously differentiable utility function, ct is consump-
tion and β < 1 is the discount factor.
The model can be thought of as a benevolent government maximizing private util-
ity subject to resource constraints, or as the government’s own utility considering
its own expenditures and revenues. As is common in the literature, the former is
assumed here.
The resource constraint faced by the government varies depending on whether
it chooses to repay or not, and on whether there is a self-fulfilling debt crises
preventing it from accessing credit markets. Below, the resource constraints un-
der each scenario and the corresponding recursive maximization problem are de-
scribed.
In all of these scenarios, the government draws a realization of endowment in-
come process denoted yt. The log-income (log(yt)) follows an AR(1) process.
The sovereign has access to two financial instruments. First, a reserve asset, de-
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noted at, that earns an exogenous world-determined real rate of return r. Second,
long-term bonds specified as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012).
In particular, the government issues long-term bonds described by two parame-
ters: their coupon z and their maturity 1λ . Only one fixed type of (z, λ) bond can
be issued. Each period a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the bond matures. The remaining
(1− λ) pays the coupon z and is automatically rolled over. By keeping (z, λ) fixed,
the model only needs to keep track of current outstanding debt. Remaining bonds
look exactly like newly issued bonds. Hence the law of motion of the outstanding
debt law of motion is: 8
b ′ = (1 − λ)b+ current.issuance
The government has the option to default on previous obligations and default en-
tails two different costs: first, the government loses access to credit markets, with
the standard exogenous probability of re-entry ε ∈ (0, 1); second, the govern-
ment loses a fraction of the income φ(yt) while it remains excluded from credit
markets. As Arellano (2008) shows, this is necessary for the model to be able to
generate debt stocks consistent with the observed levels and to make default oc-
cur at low income realizations. When the government defaults, it is immediately
excluded from borrowing in the same period the decision is made. Upon re-entry,
all previous obligations are void.
The Government’s Problem
The timeline of decisions is as follows: the government enters the period with
reserve holdings a and a stock of outstanding debt b if it was not in default
state the previous period. First the exogenous shocks are realized: income y, the
8Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) also incorporate long term
bonds in similar environments but with bonds limited to be a geometrically declining series of coupons,
which is the special case of the setup developed by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) when z = 1. Here z
is set to be equal to the spread plus the risk-free rate, such that on average bonds are issued at par, as is
common practice, and nominal and face values are roughly the same which facilitates comparisons.
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sunspot variable ω and the reentry shock if the government was in default. After
that, if the government has access to financial markets the state of the economy
is s = (y,a,b,ω) and the value for the government as a function of the state is
denoted W(y,a,b,ω). The government then chooses whether to repay (δ = 0)
or default (δ = 1), and the portfolio for next period (a ′,b ′). Simultaneously the
lenders decide whether to enter the bond auction or not. When lenders enter the
auction and the government repays, the value for the government is V+(y,a,b,w);
if the government repays but lenders do not enter the auction, the value for the
government is V−(y,a,b,ω); and when the government defaults, its debt obliga-
tions are void and the value is X(y,a,ω), which is the same value achieved by a
government that was in default state the previous period and did not gain access
to the market in the current period.
When the sovereign chooses to repay in the current period, it has access to the
international capital markets and hence it can choose next period debt b ′, reserves
a ′ and current consumption c taking as given current income y, reserve holdings
a and debt outstanding b. It faces a pricing schedule for debt q(y,a ′,b ′,ω) that
depends on future debt and reserves, and on current income y and a sunspot
variable ω ∈ {0, 1}. When ω = 1 the best equilibrium price schedule is offered by
the lenders, and when ω = 0 they coordinate on the worst possible pricing sched-
ule and a self-fulfilling crisis may arise (see section 1.2.2). This sunspot variable
follows a two-state Markov process to mimic the tranquil and panic regimes in
the global financial markets.
Let V+(y,a,b,ω) be the value function corresponding to the sovereign problem
in case it has access to international capital markets, then:
V+(y,a,b,ω) = max
a ′,b ′,c
{
u(c) + Ey,ω
[
βW(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′)
]}
,
s.t. c = y+ a−
a ′
1 + r
−
[
λ+ (1 − λ)z
]
b+ q(y,a ′,b ′,ω)
[
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
]
.
(1.1)
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Under repayment, consumption equals the income realization plus the net re-
sources generated by reserves and debt, which are equal to the economy’s bal-
ance of trade. The resources generated by reserves are given by a− a
′
1+r , where
a is the payout on reserves carried over from the previous period and a
′
1+r is the
resource cost of buying reserves a ′ at the price 11+r . The term
[
λ + (1 − λ)z
]
b
captures the debt service cost, which includes the fraction of outstanding debt
maturing λb and the coupon payment on the non-maturing part z(1 − λ)b. Fi-
nally, current issuance of new bonds is
[
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
]
and the revenue collected
is q(y,a ′,b ′,ω)
[
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
]
.
Note bond prices are forward looking but because of the persistence of the sto-
chastic processes of y and w, their current realizations provide information that
is relevant for forecasting their future realizations, which is in turn relevant for
expectations of future utility and prices.
When the government has chosen default and is outside the international markets
it takes as given its income, stock of reserves and sunspot variable, s = (y,a,w).
In this caseω has no contemporaneous effect on consumption and there is no debt
issuance, but it helps to predict ω ′ which matters for the continuation values W
and X next period. Let the value function in this situation be X(y,a,ω):
X(y,a,ω) = max
c,a ′
{
u
(
c) +β(1 − ε)Ey,ω
[
X(y ′,a ′,ω ′)
]
+βεEy,ω
[
W(y ′,a ′, 0,ω ′)
]}
,
s.t c = y−φ(y) + a− (1 + r)−1a ′.
(1.2)
Under default, consumption equals the income realization plus the net resources
generated by reserves. Income in this case is y− φ(y) where φ(·) is the direct
income cost of default. The resources generated by reserves are given by a− a
′
1+r ,
where a is the payout on reserves carried over from the previous period and a
′
1+r
is the resource cost of buying reserves a ′ at the price 11+r .
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The value function V− represents the value the sovereign obtains in states in
which it chooses to repay but it cannot issue new debt because lenders refused to
enter the auction. It is very similar to the function V+ but with an extra constraint
forbidding new bond issuance b ′ 6 (1 − λ)b.
V−(y,a,b,ω) = max
a ′,b ′
{
u(c) + Ey,ω
[
βW(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′)
]}
,
s.t. c = y+ a−
a ′
1 + r
−
[
λ+ (1 − λ)z]b+ q(y,a ′,b ′,ω)
[
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
]
.
b ′ 6 b(1 − λ).
(1.3)
To complete the formulation of the sovereign’s problem, it is needed to define the
unconditional value function W which is determined by the default decision.
Given the equilibrium in the default rollover game (defined in the next section),
the sovereign’s default decision is:
δ∗(y,a,b,ω) =

0 if X(y,a,ω) 6 V−(y,a,b,ω)
1 if X(y,a,ω) > V+(y,a,b,ω)
0 o/w if V−(y,a,b,ω) < X(y,a,ω) 6 V+(y,a,b,ω), ω = 1
1 o/w if ,ω = 0,
(1.4)
where δ(·) = 1 indicates default and δ(·) = 0 repayment. The unconditional value
(W(·)) of the sovereign before the default decision is made, implied by the default
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decision above is:
W(y,a,b,ω) =

V+(y,a,b,ω) if X(y,a,ω) 6 V−(y,a,b,ω)
X(y,a,ω) if X(y,a,ω) > V+(y,a,b,ω)
V+(y,a,b,ω) o/w if ,ω = 1
X(y,a,ω) o/w if ,ω = 0
(1.5)
This function encompasses the default decision δ(·). Whenever W(·) = X(·) the
sovereign is optimally choosing to default δ∗(·) = 1, and it is choosing to repay
in the other cases. In the first case X 6 V− 6 V+, repayment is better no matter
if there is new lending or not. In the second X > V+ 6 V− and default is the
dominant strategy. But when V− < X < V+ multiplicity arises and the choice
depends on ω. The next section presents the auction game and the reasoning
behind this value function and the default-repay decision.
1.2.2. Rollover crises
Self-fulfilling crises are introduced as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). In
every period, the sovereign and the lenders make simultaneous decisions. The
sovereign chooses between default and repaying and the lenders choose whether
to enter the auction for newly issued bonds or not. Multiplicity will arise when
the government finds it better to repay if it can issue new bonds, but rather de-
faults if there is no new lending.9
The Game of Default and Rollover
The government and the lenders will play a default-rollover game every period.
The government has two actions, default or repay. The payoffs for the sovereign
come from the value functions defined in the previous section. If the government
9Recent work by Auclert and Rognlie (2016) established uniqueness of equilibrium in the Eaton-Gersovitz
type of models under very mild conditions. However, they acknowledge that multiplicity exists when long-
term debt is present (as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)) and when the sovereign savings are unbounded,
both of which are true in this setup.
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defaults, it earns X(y,a,ω) no matter what the lenders do. This assumes that in
the case of a default, the sovereign does not receive the funds set aside by the
lenders that entered the auction. When the government repays and all lenders
enter the auction, the sovereign gets V+(y,a,b,ω), but if instead no lender enters
the auction, the sovereign obtains V−(y,a,b,ω).
There is a continuum of risk-neutral and symmetric lenders each endowed with
a finite amount of funds. New lenders are always available each period. Pre-
vious bondholders cannot limit the actions of new lenders unless the country is
excluded from the financial markets after a default event. Lenders have two pos-
sible actions, enter the bond auction and lend, or stay out and not lend. Lenders
form beliefs on what other lenders and the government are doing and at equilib-
rium those beliefs are consistent with the actions of the players. When a lender
choose not to lend she will earn zero no matter what other players do. When
all lenders choose to lend and the sovereign chooses to repay, the lenders drive
the bond price down until they break even, earning zero. If a lender enters the
auction and the sovereign defaults, the lender loses an amount ∆ > 0 for the
opportunity cost. 10
All players move simultaneously. The equilibrium concept used here is a pure-
strategies Markov equilibrium. 11
When the combined funds of the set of lenders that entered the auction is less
than the breakeven price for the bond times the new issuance, the bonds are sold
at a lower price.
In equilibrium, symmetry implies all lenders choose the same action unless both
actions yield the lenders the same utility. But for the lenders to be indifferent, it
10The nature of this cost ∆ is immaterial for the equilibrium as long as it is positive. It can be equal to the
total bid the lender made, or just a small fraction representing as the opportunity cost of setting aside funds
for an auction.
11Recently Aguiar et al. (2016b) generalized this timing structure, allowing for a detailed within period
auction-settlement separation and microfounding some of the assumptions made here. In the end they
showed that under pure strategies the equilibrium is exactly the same as the one coming out from this setup.
In that sense this setup is a simplified version of theirs.
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must be the case that the sovereign is repaying (because ∆ > 0) and that the bond
price in the auction is the break-even price (a lot of lenders enter the auction).
This implies that either the auction is fully subscribed or no lender enters, and
the outcome is equivalent to the one under the assumption that all lenders do the
same. Hence, the payoff matrix is given by:
Repay Default
Lend 0,V+(s)-∆,X(s)
Don’t Lend0,V−(s) 0,X(s)
Conditional on a state vector s = (y,a,b,ω) the game reduces to a two player
simultaneous-move game described by the payoff matrix above. Its Nash Equilib-
ria depend on the government’s payoffs.
Case 1) If X(s) < V−(s) < V+(s), then repay is the strictly dominant strategy for
the sovereign and (lend, repay) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Case 2) When V−(s) < V(s)+ < X(s) default is the strictly dominant strategy and
thus (Don ′t,Default) is the only Nash equilibrium.
Case 3) If V−(s) < X(s) < V+(s) then there is no dominant strategy. In this case
both (lend, repay) and (Don ′t,Default) are Nash Equilibria. Here the
sunspot variable ω ∈ {0, 1} plays a role: when ω = 1 all agents coordi-
nate to the (lend, repay) equilibrium, otherwise the (Don ′t,Default) is
played.
Lenders’ optimality condition
Let δ∗(y,a,b,ω), a∗(y,a,b,ω) and b∗(y,a,b,ω) be the policy functions for de-
fault, reserves and debt for the next period. The world risk-free interest rate r is
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exogenous. The zero-profits condition of lenders is:
q(y,a ′,b ′,ω) = (1 + rf)−1 Ey,ω
[(
1 − δ∗(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′)
)
× . . .
[
λ+ (1 − λ)z+ (1 − λ)q
(
y ′,a∗(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′),b∗(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′)
)]]
.
(1.6)
1.2.3. Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium in this model consists of value functions W+ : S→
R, V+ : S → R, V− : S → R, X : Sb → R, and functions a∗ : S → R, b∗ : S → R
and δ∗ : S → R and a price function q : S → R defined over the state space
S = R3+ × {0, 1} such that:
1. Given the unconditional value function W, the default value function X
solves the subproblem (1.2).
2. Given the price schedule q(·), the unconditional value function W and the
default value function X, the value function V+ solves subproblem (1.1).
3. Given the price schedule q(·), the unconditional value function W and the
default value function X, the value function V− solves subproblem (1.3).
4. Given the policy functions a∗,b∗, δ∗ the price function q satisfies (1.6).
1.3. The Model’s Mechanism
1.3.1. Description of the mechanism
A key aspect of the model is the specification of the rollover crises, which splits
the state space into three regions. An upper region where default is never optimal
even if there is no new lending, a bottom region where default is always optimal
no matter the market conditions, and a middle region where repayment is optimal
if and only if there is new lending. In this middle region the sunspot variable acts
as a coordinating device that determines if there is a self-fulfilling debt crises
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(ω = 1) or not (ω = 0). As a result, the probability of facing a self-fulfilling debt
crisis is the product of two probabilities: the probability that the sunspot variable
takes the value ω = 1 and the probability that the economy’s fundamentals land
in the vulnerability region.
The effect of adding reserves to the standard Eaton-Gersovitz setup with one-
period debt is as follows: take as given the country’s net foreign asset position,
which is equal to reserves minus debt (i.e. NFA = a− b). Since reserves cannot
be confiscated, it is known that an increase in reserves increases the value of de-
fault X(y,a,ω) for sure. Assuming the coupon z is such that debt is issued at
par, an NFA neutral increase in reserves is matched with an increase in debt of
equal size, and causes a decrease in the value of repayment V+(y,b,a,ω) next
period. This happens because the sovereign loses the difference between the re-
turn on those assets. Hence, an NFA neutral increase in reserves shifts resources
from repayment to default states, and increases the default probability next pe-
riod. The resource shifting is undesirable ex-ante because resources are more
scarce on repayment states. In addition, the higher default probability implies a
lower revenue on issuance. Putting those two together it follows that an NFA neu-
tral increase in reserves is undesirable, which implies no reserves in equilibrium,
consistent with the findings of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009).
The key channel in this paper is that reserve holdings also increase the value of
repaying when there is no new lending V−(y,b,a,ω). This happens because extra
reserves can be used to service the additional debt and, with long debt maturity,
some will be left for consumption smoothing. This makes repayment the domi-
nant strategy for the government in more states of the world, precluding the bad
equilibrium of no-lending and default in those states. Hence, more international
reserves shrink the vulnerability region of the state space (the region in which
V− < X < V+). From an ex-ante perspective, more reserves reduce the probabil-
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ity of landing in that region, and thus the probability of a self-fulfilling crisis is
reduced.
It is possible to shed further light on the mechanism by which reserves reduce the
likelihood of self-fulfilling debt crises, and the conditions that allow the model to
support a portfolio with debt and reserves, by assuming that the value functions,
policy functions and bond pricing function are differentiable, which is done in
this section. This is not necessary for the quantitative solution method to work.
1.3.2. Default thresholds
For a given debt, reserves and sunspot realization (a,b,ω), define the default
thresholds df(a,b,ω) and ds(a,b,ω), depicted on Figure 3, as the income realiza-
tion that leaves the sovereign indifferent between repaying and defaulting. They
are defined implicitly by:
V+
(
df(a,b,ω),a,b,ω
)
= X
(
df(a,b,ω),a,ω
)
, (1.7)
V−
(
ds(a,b,ω),a,b,ω
)
= X
(
ds(a,b,ω),a,ω
)
. (1.8)
For the case when there are no self-fulfilling debt crises (ω = 1), figure 3a depicts
the value after default X(·) and after repayment V+(·) as a function of the income
realization y. As it is standard in the sovereign default literature, the default
output cost function is set to be increasing (and convex) in output to match the
fact that default tends to happen for low realizations of the income, which implies
the graph of X(·) is above the graph of V+(·) for low realizations of output. The
crossing point determines the fundamentals default threshold df. A fundamentals
default occurs if y < df(a,b,ω). The unconditional value function W(·) is just the
upper envelope of X and V , also depicted in Figure 3a.
On the other hand, when ω = 0 the value after repayment but without new
lending V−(·) plays a role. In Figure 3b the graph of V−(·) is depicted along those
of V+(·) and X(·). For high income realizations the no-lending constraint does not
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bind, since the sovereign finds optimal to buy back debt, hence V+(·) = V−(·). But
as income decreases, the constraint starts binding and V− decreases faster than
V+.
Figure 3: Default thresholds for a fixed debt-reserves pair.
(a) ω = 1
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y
X(y)
V+(y)
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W(y|ω=1)
(b) ω = 0
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y
X(y)
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W(y|ω=0)
Zones: Default Multiplicity Safe
The crossing point between V− and the default value X determines the Self-
fulfilling crises default threshold ds. A self-fulfilling default occurs if ω = 0 and
df(a,b,ω) < y < ds(a,b,ω). Each point s = (y,a,b,ω) of the state space is
classified to be in one of three regions, also depicted in Figure 3b:
i) Safe region: when y > ds(a,b,ω), repayment is the dominant strategy for
the sovereign no matter what the lenders do and thus the state is part of the
safe region.
ii) Default region: When y < df(a,b,ω), default is the best option for the gov-
ernment given the weak fundamentals and thus the state is part of the default
region. Defaults occurring in this region are denominated fundamentals de-
faults.
iii) Multiplicity: When df(a,b,ω) < y < ds(a,b,ω), the state is in the multiplic-
ity region. Here default happens if and only if ω = 0, and when it happens
it is denominated a self-fulfilling default.
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Note that the unconditional value function W(·) when ω = 0 is discontinuous at
the self-fulfilling default threshold y = df. This is because of the outcome of the
game of default and rollover described in Section 1.2.2. The value V− is never
realized on the equilibrium path, only V+ or X are realizations of Nash equilibria.
Given the thresholds, the probability of default next period can be written as:
Pr(def) = Pr
(
δ(y ′,a ′,b ′,ω ′) = 1
)
= Pr(y ′ < df) + Pr(ω ′ = 0)Pr(df < y ′ < ds).
(1.9)
And the equilibrium bond price function can be compactly specified as:
q(1 + r) = [1 − Pr(def)]
((
λ+ (1 − λ)z
)
+ (1 − λ)Ey,ω[q ′|repay]
)
. (1.10)
With the features of the model defined, the mechanism can be stated briefly:
issuing extra debt to finance reserves accumulation, increases the fundamentals
default threshold but reduces the self-fulfilling one. In aggregate, it reduces the
next period default probability and thus the sovereign spread. These statements
are developed in the next subsection.
1.3.3. Consolidating debt and reserves
Assume that in an equilibrium the economy is at a state s = (y,a,b,ω) in which
both chosen reserves and debt are positive a∗(s) > 0, b∗(s) > 0 and there is repay-
ment. After repayment is chosen, define a “consolidation of debt and reserves"
as the following portfolio adjustment made at the current equilibrium debt price
q̄ = q
(
y,a∗(s),b∗(s),ω
)
: the sovereign issues ε less of face-valued debt and de-
creases reserves by q̄(1 + r)ε tomorrow. To keep continuation values accounting
easy, this consolidation is fully undone in the next period, that is: for each realiza-
tion of the exogenous states (y ′ω ′) in the next period, the asset holdings chosen
for two periods ahead are the same before and after the consolidation.
Next, it will be argued that the consolidation operation is always beneficial to the
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sovereign in the standard Eaton-Gersowitz setup where no self-fulfilling crises
occur, but that it can leave the government worse off once self-fulfilling crises are
possible. To determine the overall effect of consolidation, the impact on current
consumption and on next period consumption has to be addressed.
Consolidating debt and reserves is not neutral on current consumption since bond
prices react. How do they react depends in part on how the thresholds in the next
period move. This in turn depends on the consolidation effect on next period
consumption since continuation values two periods ahead are kept constant.
In the next period, the consolidation effect on available resources is as follows. In
the states in the default region, reserves change by
− q̄(1 + r)ε (1.11)
and this is the total effect since debt is wiped away.
The effect on resources under repayment has two components: the first one comes
from the fall in reserves (equation 1.11), the second one comes from the reduction
in debt outstanding
ε
[
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′)
]
,
it includes the lower debt service λ+(1− λ)z and the extra room for new issuance
(1 − λ)q ′.
Using condition (1.10) for q̄, the total effect on resources after repayment is then:
εq̄(1 + r)
Pr(def)
1 − Pr(def)
+ ε(1 − λ)
(
q ′ − Ey,ω[q
′|repay]
)
. (1.12)
The consolidation effect on resources next period is an actuarially fair transfer.
The first term of equation (1.12) captures the average transfer into each of the
repayment states, which is just the negative of the average transfer out of each of
the default states (equation 1.11) times their relative masses.
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The consolidation operation keeps fixed the debt outstanding two periods ahead
(b ′′), but there is a change in the periods that debt is issued. After the consolida-
tion, some debt is issued in the next period instead of the current one. The second
term on equation (1.12) captures the fact that market conditions may change be-
tween these two periods and, depending on the price schedule, it may or may
not be cheaper to issue in the current period and save as reserves than to issue
in the next period. In the current period, lenders anticipate this potential for cap-
ital gains or losses and adjust the price accordingly such that on expectation it
vanishes away. Hence the second term is just a zero-sum reshuffling of resources
among repayment states.
The effect on resources is actuarially fair, but since the sovereign is risk averse,
there is room for utility changes. The expected marginal change in utility next
period from consolidation can be decomposed in four parts:
1. The expected utility loss in the default states because of less resources avail-
able: −Pr(def) · (εq̄(1 + r)E
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
2. The expected utility gain in repayment states coming from the net resource
transfer from the default states:
(
1 − Pr(def)
)
· εq̄(1 + r) Pr(def)
1 − Pr(def)
E
[
uc(c
′)|repay
]
3. The expected utility gain or loss coming from shifting the issuance period of
the surviving debt: +ε(1 − λ)Cov
(
uc(c
′),q ′
)
,
4. The expected utility gain or loss coming from the change in the self-fulfilling
default threshold.
−Πω(ω
′ = 0)
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)∆ds, (1.13)
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where cx is the consumption policy in case of default and ∆ds is the change in the
self-fulfilling default threshold due to the consolidation operation. This fourth
term appears because of the discontinuity of the function W(·) when ω = 0,
which happens because at the self-fulfilling default threshold the sovereign is not
indifferent between repay and default.
Let z = εq̄(1 + r)Pr(def). Abstracting from the effect coming from the change
in thresholds, the marginal effect of consolidation on utility next period can be
written as:
− zE
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
+ zE
[
uc(c
′)|repay
]
+ (1 − λ)Cov
(
uc(c
′),q ′
)
. (1.14)
The case of one-period debt
When (λ = 1) the resource transfer into repayment states (equation 1.12) reduces
to +εPr(def). Those resources come from the default states, −ε(1 − Pr(def))
(equation 1.11).
The fact that resources increase in repayment states and decrease in default di-
rectly implies lower default thresholds. Consequently, bond prices move in favor
of the sovereign and, since ∆ds < 0, there are gains from enlarging the safe zone
(equation 1.13). However, the benefit of this bond appreciation should be com-
pared against the expected utility cost (or benefit) of that transfer of resources.
Given that reserves are a risk-free asset and debt provides some insurance against
low realizations of income by the means of default, it is reasonable to think that
in equilibrium the expected marginal utility under default (δ = 1) is the same as
the expected marginal utility under repayment (δ = 0), that is E
[
uc(c
′
x)|δ = 1
]
=
E
[
uc(c
′)|δ = 0
]
. However this is not the case in the Eaton-Gersovitz framework
because the lack of commitment: the government cannot choose separately the
default and repayment states and the amount borrowed, because more borrow-
ing implies more default states. In appendix A.1.3 the sovereign’s problem with
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commitment is stated along the lines of Rios-Rull and Mateos-Planas (2016) and
the first order condition showing E
[
uc(c
′
x)|δ = 1
]
< E
[
uc(c
′)|δ = 0
]
is presented.
So far it has been established that in the case of one-period debt, the consolida-
tion of debt and reserves decreases default thresholds in the next period, which
implies a better price schedule in the current period and some utility gain in the
next period coming from those states getting out of the multiplicity zone. It also
moves resources from the default states to the repayment states, which is ex-ante
desirable because the lack of commitment forces the sovereign to default in more
states than what it would have committed to. All that adds up to debt and re-
serves not coexisting in equilibrium, because the consolidation increases not only
current but also expected utility. This is consistent with the results found by
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009).
The case of long-term debt without self-fulfilling crises
In this case, the only threshold that matters is the one for fundamentals default.
The change in that threshold depends on the change of the value functions at the
old threshold, more precisely the variation in X(df) minus the change in V+(df),
due to the consolidation operation:
∆X(df) ' −εuc(č ′x)q̄(1 + r), (1.15)
∆V+(df) ' εuc(č ′)
( q̄(1 + r) · Pr(def)
1 − Pr(def)
+ (1 − λ)
(
q̌ ′ − Ey,ω[q
′|pay]
))
, (1.16)
where a variable with a ˇ indicates it is evaluated at the threshold.
Figure 4 depicts the effect of consolidation on this threshold, on the same plane
of income and utility used in Figure 3a. The consolidation effect on the value
of default is the same as in the case with one-period debt: less reserves imply a
reduction for all future states. It can be seen in Figure 4 as a new graph for the
value function X ′ (in red) drawn below the original curve X (in gray).
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As stated before, there is a net transfer of resources into repayment states (first
term of equation 1.12). However, the valuation effect on resources (1 − λ)
(
q ′ −
Ey,ω[q
′|repay]
)
is negative for low income realizations like y = df, even though
on average it is zero. This implies that ∆V+ may be negative. Numerically, this
effect is small and the change in V+ at the threshold is still greater than ∆X.
Hence, the threshold df goes down which makes the bond price in the current
period to increase. Figure 4 depicts the new curve V ′+, which is close to the
original graph of V+.
Figure 4: Consolidation effect on df threshold
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y
df
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Regarding the change in utility in the next period, the inequality E
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
<
E
[
uc(c
′)|repay
]
still holds. The same argument from the one-period case holds
here: the lack of commitment implies a trade-off between the default threshold
next period and the resources brought into the current period. 12 However, in this
case the covariance term of the consolidation effect in expected utility (equation
1.14) is negative. This could potentially generate an incentive for reserves hold-
ing, although there is an extra cost of long-term debt, which is that lenders now
incorporate dilution risk in the price schedule. Numerically, the gains in utility
due to the covariance are of second order and less relevant than the losses due to
12Rios-Rull and Mateos-Planas (2016) show that under commitment long term debt is equivalent to short
term debt.
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the lack of commitment, which are of first order.
Hence the main conclusion still is that the consolidation operation reduces the
default threshold, which implies higher bond prices, and shifts resources into re-
payment states, which is desirable. It also reshuffles resources among repayment
states, which may hurt the sovereign. Numerically the first two effects dominate
and the consolidation operation increases the value for the government, which
implies no debt and reserves coexistence.
The case for reserves with self-fulfilling crises
In this case, the behavior of the fundamentals default threshold is the same de-
scribed for the case without self-fulfilling crises. The difference now is that the
behavior of the self-fulfilling default threshold matters. The consolidation effect
on ds depends on the change in the value of repayment with no rollover V−:
∆V− = −εq̄RV−a − εV
−
b = εuc(c
′)
[
− q̄R+
(
λ+ (1− λ)(z+ q ′)
)]
−µ(1− λ), (1.17)
where µ is the multiplier of the no-rollover constraint b ′ 6 (1− λ)b. As in the pre-
vious case, the term in square brackets is still generically positive. However the
multiplier term is of first order as long as λ < 1. Directly, less debt outstanding is
worse in case of a rollover crisis because it tightens the borrowing constraint. In-
directly, a lower amount reserves implies less room to smooth consumption when
additional borrowing is not possible, which increases the value of the multiplier.
Hence V− can fall significantly with the consolidation operation.
Figure 5 graphs new V ′− relative to the old one depicted in Figure 3b. The bigger
the gap between the old V+ and V− is before the consolidation operation, the more
binding the constraint is and the bigger the fall in V ′− after the consolidation.
Evaluated at the ds threshold, the fall in V− due to the lower reserves holdings
will generally be greater than the reduction in the default value X due to the same
cause. In both cases, more borrowing is not possible, but in default there is no
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Figure 5: Consolidation effect on ds threshold
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df
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need for debt servicing and the output loss is small since it happens at low income
realizations. Hence, available resources are more tight under repayment and no
rollover, which implies the self-fulfilling threshold ds increases. This increase in
the threshold is depicted in Figure 5.
1.3.4. The role of reserves in preventing self-fulfilling debt crises
Given that consolidation increases the self-fulfilling default threshold, it has the
potential to be very damaging, since that increase translates into discrete ex-
pected utility losses in some states in addition to bond price reductions due to
the increased probability of default. In this subsection an operation opposite to
consolidation is considered: a debt financed reserve holdings increase.
The discussion in the previous subsection still applies but the effects on the thresh-
olds are the opposite. In particular, debt financed reserves increase the fundamen-
tals default threshold df but they reduce the self-fulfilling threshold ds. Figure 6
shows the effect of this operation on both default thresholds, which is the inverse
of reserves-debt consolidation. It abstracts from the value function curves and
focuses only on the x-axis of Figures 4 and 5.
The debt financed accumulation of reserves shrinks the multiplicity zone and
enlarges both the default and safe zones. The effect on default and bond prices is
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Figure 6: Change in zone thresholds from a debt financed reserves increase
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harder to isolate, but some intuition can be given. In the long run, default rates
are low which implies the sovereign avoids falling into default. There is little
mass in the default region, most of it is in the safe one. The probability of default
next period is:
Pr(δ ′ = 1) = Pr(y ′ < df) + Pr(ω ′ = 0)Pr(df < y ′ < ds) (1.18)
Hence, when taking expectations ex-ante the effect of the enlarging safe region
dominates. The future probability of default falls and that causes current spreads
to go down as well.
Taking stock: the previous discussion outlined the mechanism through which in-
ternational reserve holdings can reduce sovereign spreads and the probability of
self-fulfilling debt crises. However, the model does not yield unambiguous pre-
dictions about the strength of the mechanism driving the link between reserves,
self-fulfilling crises and spreads, and the overall direction of the effects connect-
ing these variables. For that reason the numerical predictions of the model are
studied in the next section.
1.4. Quantitative analysis
1.4.1. Solution Method and Calibration
The model is solved on a discretized state space using the method proposed by
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). 13 Gordon and Guerrón-Quintana (2013) de-
13Which is the best algorithm for computing a numerical solution of sovereign default models with long
term debt is an open question. As mentioned in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), with long term debt
the budget sets for the sovereign are not convex, hence infinitesimal changes in the value function can
lead to large changes in policies, causing convergence problems in global methods. They introduced a
small purification i.i.d. endowment shock to smooth the value and policy functions. Under monotonicity
assumptions, they are able to guarantees the existence of an equilibrium on discretized state spaces.
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velop a variant of that algorithm to deal with multiple assets in an efficient man-
ner, reducing the dimensionality curse of endogenous states.14
Debt and reserves come from equally spaced grids, with 100 points each. Log-
output is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
ln(yt) = ρ ln(yt−1) + νt,
where νt ∼ N(0,σν). The endowment process is discretized using Rouwenhorst’s
method to a grid of 50 points. Kopecky and Suen (2010) found this method to
have better properties for highly correlated processes.
The utility function is the standard CRRA:
u(c) =
c1−γ
1 − γ
.
The function that characterizes the income cost of default is the same as in Chat-
terjee and Eyigungor (2012)::
φ(y) = max{0,d0y+ d1y2}
where d0 ∈ R and d1 > 0 . Note that d0 can take negative values, which implies
zero cost for low income realizations. 15
The sunspot variable ω ∈ {0, 1} is assumed to follow a two-state Markov chain,
with transition matrix:
Γ =
 Γ11 1 − Γ11
1 − Γ22 Γ22
 .
14For a given state, the method by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) finds the output default threshold
and also the thresholds for portfolio allocation by comparing all the feasible choices. Gordon and Guerrón-
Quintana (2013) variant proposes a way to efficiently discard big portions of the portfolio state space.
15Arellano (2008) introduced a kinked specification for the default cost, and showed it is necessary to prop
up the sustainable debt and to make default occur in bad times. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) show that
the quadratic form allows this models to better match the spread’s standard deviation.
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Two key parameters in this model are the Γ11 and Γ22. Very little is known about
them because they are not directly observable and very hard to estimate from
data. A stance is taken here to pin them down for a baseline calibration, but
not without acknowledging that the values found should not be taken as precise
estimates.
The model is calibrated to Mexican data, in line with the recent literature on
international reserves that focuses on Mexico (Bianchi et al., 2012; Tavares, 2015).
Although the sovereign default literature generally uses Argentina, the fact that
it had a fixed exchange rate until 2001 implied its reserve holdings had to back
the money in circulation, making the precautionary-savings motive for reserves
of second order.
Unless stated otherwise, the data covers the period between 1994:Q1 and 2015:Q4.
The model has 12 parameter values to select. Seven of these parameter values can
be set directly using the data. The corresponding parameter values are shown in
Table 3.
The bond duration parameter λ is set to 20−1 = 0.05 yielding an average maturity
of 20 quarters (5 years). Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013) find an average
maturity of 10 years at issuance which implies an average outstanding debt maturity
of 5 years. The interest rate spread on debt is taken from J.P. Morgan Emerging
Market Bond Index (EMBI+). The average annualized blended spread is 228 basis
points.
The quarterly real risk-free rate r is set to 0.38%, which is one quarter of the
average nominal yield on 2 year constant maturity treasury bills deflated by the
US PCE, using data from the St. Louis FRED database. Two reasons motivate this
choice: first, no less than 70% of international reserves were invested at maturities
longer than 1 year between 2007 and 2010 (McCauley and Rigaudy, 2011); second,
the EMBI spread is calculated as the yield difference against a portfolio of US
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bonds of similar duration, which justifies the use of longer maturities.
The quarterly coupon z is set to 0.95%, which is the risk-free rate plus one quarter
of the annualized average spread (228 bp). This parameter just scales up or down
the cash-flow associated with debt but it is useful to make the debt stock in the
model easier to compare with that in the data. Sovereign debt in the real world is
measured at face value, and interest payments only enter the debt stock statistics
when they are due, hence it is useful to have both -the market value and face value
of debt- coincide (the latter is 1). This happens when the coupon is exactly the
risk-free rate plus the spread. In addition, is common practice among sovereign
issuers to set the promised coupons in their bond auctions aiming to sell debt at
par.
The parameters ρ and σν that govern the endowment are set to match the cycli-
cal properties of Mexican real GDP times the real exchange rate. This captures
not only real output volatility but also changes in the debt burden arising from
real exchange rate fluctuations. 16 Hence, the Mexican GDP in US dollars is first
deflated with the US PCE index to leave it in global basket consumption terms.
Then, an AR(1) process is fitted to the Hodrick-Prescott detrended series. The pa-
rameters for the income autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the income
shock are ρ = 0.76 and σν = 6.0%.
The parameter ε governing the re-entry probability is set at 0.128 which implies an
average exclusion time of 8 quarters. This is consistent with the findings of Gelos,
Sahay, and Sandleris (2011) for the average exclusion time for default episodes
16The sovereign default literature has mainly focused on Argentina, which has a very volatile real income
process, with some success (Arellano, 2008; Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012). Recently, Aguiar et al. (2016b)
showed the struggles Eaton-Gersovitz models face when trying to match the quantitative success of those
models on Mexico, which has a much less volatile real income process. One overlooked difference among the
two economies is the exchange rate arrangement: Mexico has a floating exchange rate while Argentina had a
fixed one until to its most recent default episode. Floating exchange rates are known to be a buffer to absorb
external shocks, which can account for the lower volatility of Mexican real income relative to the Argentinian
one. However, floating exchange rates expose the sovereign to the currency mismatch problem, as the
exchange rate volatility translates into debt burden volatility relative to income. Eichengreen, Hausmann,
and Panizza (2007) discuss how international reserve holdings can lessen the currency mismatch problem.
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in the 90’s. Also, as standard in the sovereign debt literature, the relative risk
aversion coefficient is set to 2.
Table 3: Parameters related to moments in the data
ParameterValueData moment Source
r 0.038 Avg. 2yr US Treasury real yieldFRED
λ 0.05 Govt. external debt duration Broner et al. (2013)
z 0.096r plus EMBI spread Datastream
ρ 0.76 GDP autocorrelation WB-GEM
σν 0.06 GDP standard dev. WB-GEM
γ 2 Standard in literature. -
ε 0.125 Avg. default exclusion time Gelos et al. (2011)
Γ22 0.875 Avg. duration of SS events Jeanne and Rancière (2011)
The transition probability parameters governing the sunspot Markov process de-
termine the frequency and duration of self-fulfilling debt crises. The former is
hard to measure directly in the data since those crises are only observed when the
sovereign is in the multiplicity zone. On the other hand, the duration of systemic
sudden stops can be observed in the data. Bianchi et al. (2012) report a sudden-
stop duration of 1.12 years which implies 1 − Γ22 = 14·1.12 = 0.22 and Jeanne and
Rancière (2011) find a duration of 4 years which would imply 1− Γ22 = 14·4 = 0.032.
The baseline calibration is set to the middle point of those estimates 1− Γ22 = 0.125
which implies a duration of 2 years.
The remaining four parameter values: β, d0, d1 and Γ11 are set using a Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) algorithm.
Table 4: Parameters set by SMM
ParameterValueTargeted Moment
β 0.983 Debt to GDP ratio
d0 -0.460Default frequency
d1 0.595 Spread Std. dev.
Γ11 0.949 Spread-GDP corr.
In the sovereign debt literature, the goal is to match the mean debt to GDP ratio,
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the average spread and the standard deviation of the spread. As argued by Aguiar
et al. (2016b), the first three parameters have been found to be enough to match the
debt level and average spread, but they find that either the spread volatility is too
low or the correlation between the spread and income predicted by the model is
very high. In this framework, the possibility of self-fulfilling crises allows multiple
bond price schedules to be consistent with the same fundamentals, weakening the
correlation between those fundamentals and sovereign spreads. Building of this,
the calibration targets the correlation between spread and output cycle.
In addition, Aguiar et al. (2016b) document the role of risk premium as a driver
of sovereign debt returns. They point to a gap between the realized returns on the
EMBI+ index and the return on US govt indexes of similar maturity. Given that
in this framework the lenders are assumed to be risk neutral, spreads are going
to be closely related with the default probability. In the SMM calibration, instead
of the spread, the target is the default probability which Aguiar et al. (2016b) find
at 2% per year for Mexico.
Table 4 presents the values found during the procedure. The discount factor
β = 0.983 corresponds to a yearly discount factor of 0.934 which is in line with
the values found in the literature. The default cost parameters d0 = −0.46 and
d1 = 0.59 imply a 15.6% proportional default cost when output is at its long run
average, 8.1% when it is one standard deviation below average and 0.7% when it
is two standard deviations below average.
The parameter governing the frequency of the sunspot switching from the good
equilibrium to the bad one (a panic) obtained was 1 − Γ11 = 0.051. It implies
that those events happen roughly 10.051 ' 20 quarters (5 years). This parameter
together with the probability of going back to the good equilibrium 1− Γ22 = 0.125
implies that financial markets are in the high beliefs regime 0.0510.051+0.125 =' 28.5%
of the time.
40
Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole, and Stangebye (2016c) estimated a two-state regime-
switching model of Mexico’s EMBI+ and found a transition of 0.12 from the low
bond price into the high bond price regime, which is similar to the corresponding
value used in the baseline calibration 1− Γ22 = 0.125. They also report a transition
probability of 0.028 from the high bond price regime into the low bond price
one, which implies a bad regime frequency of once every 10.028 ' 36 quarters (9
years), as they identified two episodes in their 20 year sample when the spread
jumped more than what was granted by fundamentals. In the calibration here,
the probability of the sunspot switching to the self-fulfilling crises prone regime is
higher (0.051), but it is important to stress that in this framework not all periods
where the sunspot variable point to the bad regime imply a spike in spreads since
the economy’s fundamentals can be deep inside the safe zone.
1.4.2. Results
Table 5: Data and model targeted moments
Targeted Moments DataModel
Debt to GDP ratio 15.8 15.9
Default probability 2.0 1.9
Std. dev. of spread 1.1 1.2
Spread-GDP corr. -0.67 -0.68
Non-targeted Moments
Reserves to GDP ratio 8.0 4.0
Average Spread 2.3 1.8
All in percentage points except Spread-
GDP correlation which is scalar.
Table 5 presents the model’s performance with respect to data moments. The
model is able to match all the targeted moments, particularly the countercyclical
and volatile spread together with observed debt holdings.
The model can explain half of the average reserves holdings: 4% of GDP in the
model vs 8.0% in the data. This result leaves room for other motives for reserve
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accumulation. 17 On the spread side, the model is able to generate high mean
spreads (177 b.p), but still they are 50 b.p. below the data average. As mentioned
before, the lack of a risk premium on sovereign debt can explain this shortfall.
Figure 7: Effect of debt and reserves on spreads
(a) Next period Debt (b) Next period Reserves
The current debt and reserve holdings are at their mean values. Yavg: mean income. Ylow: mean minus 1.6
standard deviations of income. Panic: ω = 0.
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of debt and reserve choices on sovereign spreads.
The left panel depicts the spread schedule for different levels of future debt which
has the standard convex shape reflecting higher spreads for higher debt positions.
The right panel of figure 7 presents the spread schedule for reserve holdings
choices. Consistent with the empirical evidence, reserves holdings are correlated
with lower spreads.
Figure 8 presents the optimal debt and reserves policies as a function of current
output. The state of the economy is assumed to be at the mean debt and reserve
holdings and the sunspot variable pointing to no self-fulfilling crises (ω = 1).
The results show that reserves are accumulated in periods of high output while
the debt response is somewhat muted, which is consistent with the findings of
Aguiar, Amador, Hopenhayn, and Werning (2016a). Aguiar et al. (2016a) argue
17It its important to acknowledge that there seems to be a recent upward trend in reserves accumulation
in the data and a downward trend in the spread. A parameter shift can accommodate such trends, further
research could delve into the precise nature of that shift and its quantitative preformance.
42
Figure 8: Policy response to changes in current output
(a) Next period Debt (b) Next period Reserves
The current debt and reserve holdings are at their mean values. The sunspot variable value isω = 1.
debt buybacks are very costly because the bond prices move against the gov-
ernment and they find that adjustments are better performed in the short-term
margin, which in this framework corresponds to the reserves margin. Debt and
reserve accumulation are thus procyclical, which is consistent with the findings
by Broner et al. (2013) on gross capital flows.
Table 6 presents the results of a regression of the sovereign spread on debt, re-
serves, current account, growth and the sunspot variable using data simulated
from the model.
The results are very similar to those found in the data (Table 2). The reserves
coefficient is negative and slightly larger in magnitude than the coefficient on
debt, indicating that, in the model, higher levels of both debt and reserves are not
associated with higher spreads.
The coefficient on the sunspot variable is small, which seems odd but in fact
is consistent with the features of the model. First, in the safe and in the default
region the sunspot is not very relevant, besides some impact through the expected
value of landing in the multiplicity region in subsequents periods, which is small.
Second, in the multiplicity region the direct effect of ω = 0 is to cause a self-
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Table 6: Spread regression on model simulated data
Dep. var.: Spread Pooled OLS
β/s.e.
L.Reserves/GDP -9.598***
(0.066)
L.Debt/GDP 8.797***
(0.109)
L. Sunspot 1.560**
(0.749)
L.Current Account/GDP -10.033***
(0.188)
L.GDP growth -4.005***
(0.049)
Constant 83.872***
(2.063)
R2 0.325
N 96427
All variables are simulated from the model
using the baseline calibration. "L." indicates
one period lagged variable. Standard errors
in parentheses. * Significance at the 10 per-
cent level. ** Significance at the 5 percent
level. *** Significance at the 1 percent level.
fulfilling crises where the country defaults, but those periods are dropped in the
regression since the spread goes to infinity. Hence the coefficient in the regression
shown in Table 2 is capturing just the indirect effect of the sunspot on spreads.
To further assess the impact of the sunspot variable and the proposed mecha-
nism, Table 7 presents the results of alternative specifications in which either the
frequency or the duration of the bad equilibrium regime is reduced.
The Low Frequency specification in Table 7 shows the numerical performance of
an specification in which the parameter Γ11 is set such that the sunspot variable
switches to the self-fulfilling crises prone equilibrium once every 8 years (instead
of the 5 years in the baseline calibration). This specification can still match the
average debt level, the spread volatility and spread correlation with income, but
it is not able to match the default probability which decreases from 2.0% to 1.6%.
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Table 7: Alternative specifications of the sunspot process
Targeted Moments1 DataBaseline2Low frequency3Low duration4
Debt to GDP ratio 15.8 15.9 15.7 15.5
Default probability 2.0 1.9 1.6 2.0
Std. dev. of spread 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4
Spread-GDP corr. -0.61 -0.60 -0.60 -0.59
Non-targeted Moments
Reserves to GDP ratio 8.0 4.0 3.0 2.6
Average Spread 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.0
1 All in percentage points except Spread-GDP correlation which is scalar.
2 Baseline specification described in Tables 3 and 4. On average, the self-
fulfilling regime happens once every 5 years and lasts 2 years .
3 Low frequency specification: the self-fulfilling regime happens on average
once every 8 year. Expected duration still 2 years.
4 Low duration specification: the self-fulfilling regime is expected to last 1 year.
On average occurs once every 5 years.
On the non-targeted moments, the spread is still 1.8% but reserves holdings fall
to 3.0% (compared to the baseline at 4.0%). Making the coordination problems
less frequent reduces the perceived risk of the multiplicity zone which in turn
lowers the incentive to accumulate reserves, and also reduces the frequency of
self-fulfilling defaults.
The last column in Table 7 shows the quantitative results of the Low Duration
specification, in which the parameter Γ22 is set such that the sunspot stays in the
self-fulfilling crises prone regime for 1 year on average (compared to 2 years on
the baseline calibration). This specification matches the average debt level, the
default probability and the correlation between spread and income, but yields a
higher spread volatility (1.4%). The spread level attained is higher that the one
in the baseline (2.0% vs 1.8%) but the reserve holdings fall significantly to 2.6%
(baseline: 4.0%). Reducing the duration of the self-fulfilling regime means that in
the case of repayment without rollover the government expects to quickly regain
access to borrowing, which implies that a lower amount of reserves is required
to smooth consumption and service debt if that is the case. In addition, the
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lower duration of this regime reduces its expected impact, meaning that the value
functions V+ and V− are closer, and the multiplicity region is then smaller.
To sum up, reducing either the frequency or the duration of the self-fulfilling
crises prone regime significantly reduces the average reserve holdings the sove-
reign finds optimal. This shows the relevance of the mechanism in generating a
role for reserves.
1.5. Concluding Remarks
This paper developed a quantitative model of sovereign default and international
reserves to address the optimal portfolio choice of the government. The model
embedded Cole-Kehoe style self-fulfilling crises in a standard Eaton-Gersovitz
setup with long-term debt. In this framework lenders were risk-neutral, but the
government faced a rollover risk arising from coordination failures on the lenders’
side.
The mechanism described here explained the role of reserves in reducing spreads
and the probability of debt crises. It was shown that for a given Net Foreign Asset
position, additional reserves reduce the set of states that allow multiple equilibria
regarding the repayment and rollover decisions. Higher reserve holdings pre-
clude some of the risk of a self-fulfilling debt crises in the future and consequently
reduce current sovereign spreads.
The model was calibrated to replicate the average external public debt, the default
frequency and the volatility and countercyclicality of sovereign spreads. In the
simulations, the model generates mean reserve holdings that are half as big as the
observed one. In addition, the mean spread level in the model is 78% of the one
observed in an environment with risk-neutral lenders.
This paper caught up with the empirical literature on vulnerability measures to
sovereign debt crisis that has established the connection between higher reserve
holdings and lower crises probability.
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Further research can use the developed framework to evaluate policies aiming
at preventing crises in sovereign debt markets. Those include the standard pol-
icy prescription rules, like the reserves adequacy ratios to imports, debt, output,
short-term debt or debt service, or the more elaborated and widely used Guidotti-
Greenspan rule.
In addition, this model is in position to evaluate the different contingent lending
arrangements put in place by the IMF and other developed countries’s central
banks. Those are motivated as means to generate confidence in sovereign debt
markets and prevent self-fulfilling crises, and are not supposed to bail-out or
subsidize lending to the recipient countries.
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Chapter 2
Fighting For The Best, Losing With
The Rest: A case for regulation in the
entrepreneurship financing markets 1
2.1. Introduction
Innovation has being widely recognized as the key source of economic growth,
at least going back to the work of Schumpeter (1934). Arrow (1962) argued that
potential entrants have stronger incentives to undertake innovation than incum-
bent monopolists, and indeed, an important fraction of new projects and products
come from start-up firms. However, in many situations the firm or entrepreneur
having access to a potential project lacks the financial resources needed to under-
take it and has to rely on external lenders or investors.
Financial markets for case of small R&D intensive start-ups present are plagued
with frictions that generically lead to inefficient outcomes. First, the profitability
of a particular endeavor is not guaranteed, the research project or new product
may or may not succeed and this uncertainty can only be resolved after the in-
1 Coauthored with Daniel Wills
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vestment is made. In that sense, projects are risky. Moreover, since innovations
require specific and sophisticated knowledge, it is likely that the entrepreneur
will know more about the project’s prospects than investors do. This introduces
a second friction, asymmetric information. Third, by the nature of the project, its
most important assets are the knowledge, time and effort, devoted by its team of
workers. If the project fails, the salvage value is close to zero. As a consequence,
there is severe limited liability.
Recent legislation has intended to deregulate the market for funding for start-
ups. Specifically, The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) act of 2012 eased
securities regulation making it easier for companies to both go public, and raise
capital privately. This motivates us to ask if complete deregulation is desirable in
a market featuring risk, asymmetric information and limited liability as described
above.
To answer the question, we characterize the contracts offered in equilibrium by
a competitive financial sector to entrepreneurs facing risk and limited liability, in
an environment with adverse selection. We then proceed to describe the welfare
implications of the resulting equilibrium. Our main result is that the optimal
contract delivers an inefficient outcome. This is in contrast with the screening
literature in environments with linear types (such as ours): when utility is linear
in the type, optimal contracts achieve first best allocations. In our environment,
the presence of limited liability and an outside option for entrepreneurs do not
allow to achieve the first best outcome. Interestingly, if financial intermediaries
were able to collude, the first best outcome would be achieved. Alternatively,
under competition, the inefficiency can be corrected using simple policy tools
such as a tax per financial contract.
In our model, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs, each one having access to a
risky project. The entrepreneurs are heterogeneous on the probability with which
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their project will succeed. Also, they typically won’t have enough resources to
fund their projects and will need to rely on financial intermediaries. Financial in-
termediaries supply financial contracts in a competitive way, aiming to maximize
their profits, but do not observe the ex ante probabilities of success. Beyond the
information friction and limited liability, the set of contracts to be offered is com-
pletely unrestricted. Naturally, all intermediaries would like to attract the best
entrepreneurs, and competition will force them to offer good terms on borrowing
for the best types. They also will need to provide incentives in the right way
to distinguish good entrepreneurs from bad entrepreneurs which implies a (very
specific) gap between the contracts offered to good and bad types. However, lim-
ited liability imposes a lower bound on the terms of a contract. Hence, in order to
sustain those incentives, bad types must also receive good terms. In equilibrium,
intermediaries will break even, but they will fund both projects with positive ex-
pected profits (from good types) and projects with negative expected profits (with
bad types). The inefficiency arise because entrepreneurs have an outside option
(or equivalently a utility cost). We show that if an intermediary is only funding
socially efficient projects (i.e: projects with expected profit higher that the cost
of capital plus the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur), she is making positive
profits. As a consequence, her competitor is willing to improve borrowing terms
for good types, even though some low types with inefficient projects will take the
contract. The inefficiency can be corrected with simple tax instruments.
In the basic model, entrepreneurs cannot collateralize their assets. We extend the
model to the case in which entrepreneurs have some collateral. We show that
as long as loans cannot be fully collateralized, the inefficiency is reduced but
not removed. We then proceed to study how the inefficiency changes when the
parameters of the model change. The effect of the entrepreneur’s outside option
is non-monotonic: the inefficiency is zero if there is no outside option (all projects
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are socially efficient), but it is also zero if the outside option is so high that nobody
want to undertake risky projects (no project is efficient). Further, the inefficiency
(relative to the net economic surplus) increases with the cost of capital faced by
financial intermediaries and with the relative density of lower types. When we
allow for collateralizable assets, the inefficiency decreases with the mean of the
asset distribution.
Starting from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and extensive body of literature has stud-
ied asymmetric information in financial markets. The main message of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) is that the interest rate cannot clear the credit market because
of a standard “lemons” problem, and as a result, there is credit rationing. Sub-
sequent papers allow the financial intermediaries (banks) to use different tools,
other than the interest rate, to screen borrowers’ types. A first strand of papers
allow intermediaries to use collateral, on top of the interest rate, to screen types.
Bester (1985) turns down the credit rationing result, by allowing intermediaries
to offer interest rate/collateral contract pairs. By using collateral in addition to
the interest rate, banks can screen borrowers: risky borrowers will accept to pay
higher interest rates in order to benefit from a lower collateral requirement. How-
ever, in Bester (1985)’s economy, there is no limit to the amount of collateral that
borrowers can provide. The question of limits to collateral is studied by Besanko
and Thakor (1987). The environment is similar to Bester (1985)’s, and safer types
will prefer loans with low interest rate and high collateral. Nonetheless, it may
be that the borrower has not enough wealth to provide the required collateral. In
that case, the collateral/interest rate pair cannot achieve the sufficient spread in
payoffs necessary to separate types. Besanko and Thakor (1987) solve this issue
by allowing the contracts to additionally depend on the probability of approval.
To achieve the necessary spread of utilities, low interest - high collateral credits
will be denied with positive probability. An interesting point in Besanko and
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Thakor (1987) that relates to our result is that the paper compares welfare when
the financial intermediation sector is competitive or a monopoly, and finds that
monopoly may lead to a higher welfare, depending on parameter values.
Another strand of papers have departed from the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) result
by allowing intermediaries to screen borrowers using the size of the loan. A con-
tract is hence a pair interest rate - loan size. In Milde and Riley (1988), borrowers
are entrepreneurs with access to a project with risky returns. The return on the
project depends on both the borrower’s type and the size of the loan. The inter-
action between type and loan size in the project’s payoff allows to separate types
using interest rate - loan size menus. The outcome, however, depends strongly on
the specific function mapping the type and loan size to the return of the project.
In general good types take bigger loans accompanied by higher interest rates.
However, Milde and Riley (1988) provide examples of production functions for
which the opposite happens: good types take smaller loans and pay lower inter-
ests. A point to keep in mind from Milde and Riley (1988) is that projects wont
be be funded to its optimal, full-information size.
More recently, Martin (2009) uses a similar framework to study the relation be-
tween entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment. In his model, interme-
diaries can use both collateral and the size of the loan to screen types. He shows
that when entrepreneurial wealth is high, collateral can be used to separate types.
When entrepreneurial wealth is low, screening is mainly done by restricting the
level of investment, and becomes more costly. As a result, in the later case, a pool-
ing equilibrium is more likely. However, Martin (2009) restricts the interest rate
to be un-contingent. We show that, when transfers contingent of success of the
project are allowed (say by a contingent interest rate or an equity-like contract),
the intermediaries never distort the level of investment to screen types. Instead
they find optimal to use the contingent transfer.
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Although close in terms of topic, all the papers cited above impose ad-hoc re-
strictions to the space of contracts potentially offered by the financial sector. In
contrast, in our model, the set of contracts is only restricted by the features of the
environment.
Lester, Shourideh, Venkateswaran, and Zetlin-Jones (2015) develop a model where
screening contracts are unrestricted. Their environment features adverse selection
between informed sellers and uninformed variables. Beyond asymmetric informa-
tion, they introduce imperfect information coming from search theoretic frictions.
The later feature allows them to do comparative statics on the degree of imper-
fect competition and how it interacts with the severity of adverse selection. As in
our environment, they find that increasing competition may reduce welfare when
markets are competitive.
In our model, the financial intermediation is competitive. Intermediaries fund
projects in which they expect to loose, but are socially efficient because the pay-
off of the entrepreneur compensates the intermediary’s loses. They also fund
projects that are socially inefficient in the sense that they generate a dead-weight
loss. Our environment is close to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1992), in which adverse
selection is introduced to a competitive market. In their environment the equilib-
rium (when it exists), is separating. The limited liability constraint in our model
prevents the separating outcome. In our model, the inefficiency results from the
interaction of several forces: first, there is asymmetric information that introduces
a “lemons” problem; second, limited liability puts a bound on the screening that
can be done by financial intermediaries; third, competition among intermediaries
introduces profitable deviations from the efficient outcome (that would be reached
by a monopolist lender).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we describe
the model which is the core of the paper. Then, in section 2.3 we extend the
53
model to allow for a distribution of assets among entrepreneurs. In section 2.4 we
introduce numerical example, and show how the deadweight loss changes with
the parameters of the model. Concluding remarks are made in section 2.5.
2.2. Basic Model
2.2.1. Environment
In this section we describe the main mechanism of the paper in a partial equilib-
rium static economy. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with
mass 1 indexed by their heterogeneous ability θ ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent can work for
a wage w or undertake a project with a risky outcome, that depends both on the
ability of the agent and the capital invested. If an agent decides to start his own
project, he or she will have to borrow funds from a financial intermediary2.
The financial intermediaries have access to capital at the (gross) risk free rate R.
They cannot observe the entrepreneurs ability and will have to provide incentives
in order to get that information. Intermediaries can observe investment in the
project, i.e. agents cannot divert funds from their projects without being caught.
Both agents and intermediaries are risk neutral. However, if a project fails the in-
termediaries cannot exert any claims on the entrepreneurs. In that sense, projects
in this economy are subject to limited liability.
The ability of each agent will determine the probability that an entrepreneurial
venture succeeds. We denote G(θ) the cumulative distribution of abilities. More
specifically, if the agent decides to become an entrepreneur and invests an amount
k of capital in the project, the project will succeed with probability p(θ,k)
Assumption: p(θ,k) is multiplicatively separable: i.e. p(θ,K) = g(θ)f(k). Where
f is continuous and f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, f(0) = 0 and lim
k→∞f(k) = 1. Without loss of
generality, we can set g(θ) = θ since we are just renaming the unobservable types.
. Although we are interpreting θ as entrepreneurial ability, notice that it could be
2This w can also be interpreted as the opportunity cost, pecuniary or not, of running the project for the
entrepreneur.
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anything that is known by the entrepreneur, but not by the intermediary, and that
increases the probability that the project succeeds.
The assumption of multiplicative separability is important because it allows us
to abstract from Riley-style signaling distortions in investment and highlight our
main mechanism where competition in the intermediation sector generates over-
investment. It also helps to keep the model tractable and allows a better charac-
terization of the optimal contract.3
In line with the endogenous growth literature, we interpret a successful project as
the arrival of a new innovation, which allows the entrepreneur to create or “steal"
some market. We denote π the payoff of a successful project which, in turn, can
be interpreted as the value of the innovation. As a result, the expected surplus of
an entrepreneurial venture is given by,
θf(k)π− Rk−w
As we will show later, in equilibrium, the surplus will be shared between the
entrepreneur and the financial intermediary who lends the funds.
In principle, a contract is a triple, (k, x1, x0) where the k is the size of the loan,
x1 the repayment in case of success and x0 the repayment if the project fails.
However, for convenience we make a linear transformation of the contract that
will allow a more straightforward relation with the mechanism design literature.
Set x = −x0 and z = π− (x1 − x0) From the point of view of the agent the contract
(k, x, z) prescribes a fixed pay for the agent x, an additional payment contingent
on success z and an investment amount k that determines the probability of the
3Without multiplicative separability the optimal contract is harder to characterize, however the main
message of the paper remains: the optimal contract yields an inefficient outcome. When the cross-partial
derivatives of ln(p(θ,k)) are not zero, the entrepreneurs will use k to signal type, leading to the standard Riley
distortion. As a result, the project size k will be distorted which will lead to another source of inefficiency.
Relative to our results, this will lead to less extensive inefficiency (fewer ex-ante suboptimal projects are
started) but more intensive efficiency (all projects will be run at a suboptimal scale). This is in contrast with
the equilibrium of the linear environment we present, in which k is always the full information optimal level.
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contingent payment happening.
The intermediaries’ objective is to offer a profit maximizing contract schedule,
taking into account that agents would choose the better option available to them,
and also the competition from other entrepreneurs.
2.2.2. Contract menus and entrepreneur choices
The game
In this subsection we formally define the game. For simplicity we assume there
are only two financial intermediaries, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, that compete a-là
Bertrand for entrepreneurs.4
• Players: 2 intermediaries, 1 entrepreneur. The intermediaries are identical.
The entrepreneur has a private type θ drawn from a distribution G(θ).
• Timing: Intermediaries move simultaneously, posting arbitrary sets of con-
tracts. Then the entrepreneur chooses among the available contracts an her
outside option.
• Strategies: For intermediaries the strategy space contains any subset of con-
tracts of the form (k, x, z). The strategy space is hence the power set of
R+ ×R+ ×R denoted P(R+ ×R+ ×R). We denote the strategy of inter-
mediary i (or his contract menu) by Ci. For the entrepreneur a strategy
is a probability distribution s : Θ × P(R+ × R+ × R)2 → ∆R3 such that
Supp{s(θ,C1,C2)} ⊆ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ {(0,w, 0)}. Above, ∆R3 denotes the set of prob-
ability measures over R3, Supp{f} denotes the support of f and (0,w, 0) is the
outside option. Abusing notation, we let s(θ,C1,C2)[k, x, z] be the cumulative
density function of s evaluated at (k, x, z).
Note that we allowed for mixed strategies for entrepreneurs. They will be
4As long as the entrepreneurs observe all offered contracts, the outcome will be the same with more inter-
mediaries, although the optimal strategies of each one may differ. Hence this is just a notational simplification
for free entry in the intermediaries sector.
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able to randomize over any subset of the offered contracts, including the
outside option. We focus on the case in which intermediaries play pure
strategies.
• Payoffs: All players are risk neutral and care only about expected payoff. For
an entrepreneur of type θ the expected payoff of signing a contract (k, x, z)
is
u
(
θ, (k, x, z)
)
= θf(k)z+ x.
in particular, if the entrepreneur take his outside option, his payoff is
u
(
θ, (0,w, 0)
)
= w.
The entrepreneur’s expected payoff is,
U(θ, s,C1,C2) =
∫
(k,x,z)∈R3
(
θf(k)z+ x
)
ds(θ,C1,C2)[k, x, z]
Conditional on an entrepreneur of type θ signing a contract (k, x, z) with
intermediary i her expected payoff is: θf(k)(π− z) − x− Rk.
The total expected payoff of intermediary i can be written as:
vi(s,C1,C2) =
∫1
0
∫
(k,x,z)∈R3
[
θf
(
k
)
·
(
π− z
)
− x− R · k
]
ds(θ,C1,C2)[k, x, z]dG(θ),
Given s, C1 and C2 it is useful to define the set of types strictly willing to take a
contract from intermediary i,
Ai(s,C1,C2) =
{
θ : Supp (s(θ,C1,C2)) ⊆ Ci \ C−i
}
,
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the set of types indifferent between the two intermediaries,
B(s,C1,C2) =
{
θ : Supp (s(θ,C1,C2)) ⊆ Ci ∩ C−i
}
and the set of types willing to sign a contract, rather than taking the outside
option,
A = A1 ∪A2 ∪B
Notice that we are using the maintained assumption that when indifferent be-
tween being an entrepreneur or a worker, agents prefer entrepreneurship.
Equilibrium definition
The equilibrium concept applicable to this framework is the Bayes-Nash Equilib-
rium.
Definition 2.1 A strategy profile (C∗1,C
∗
2, s
∗) is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium if:
1. For all θ ∈ Θ
Supp
(
s∗(θ,C∗1,C
∗
2)
)
⊆ arg max
(k,x,z)
θf(k)z+ x
s.t: (k, x, z) ∈ C∗1 ∪ C∗2 ∪ {(0,w, 0)}
2. For each intermediary i ∈ {1, 2}, given the entrepreneur strategy s∗ and the competi-
tor’s contract menu C∗−i her own contract menu C
∗
i maximizes her expected utility
C∗i ∈ arg max
Ci
vi(s
∗,Ci,C∗−i)
s.t. ∀(k, x, z) ∈ Ci ⊂ R3
k > 0, x > 0, x+ z > 0.
The conditions x > 0 and x+ z > 0 make sure that limited liability is satisfied: if
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the project fails, the entrepreneur cannot make any payment to the intermediary,
but the intermediary could potentially make a transfer to the entrepreneur.
2.2.3. The Equilibrium Contract
In this section we state a sequence of claims leading to the characterization of the
equilibrium contract. As will be shown, intermediaries make zero profits in any
equilibrium and the entrepreneur’s payoff is linear in their type. Although the
equilibrium is by no means unique, all equilibria are payoff equivalent.
The Payoff of Entrepreneurs
Let U(θ;C1,C2) be the potencial payoff that a θ-type agent could get, conditional
on becoming an entrepreneur, when intermediaries play C1 and C2. That is,
U(θ;C1,C2) = max
(k,z,x)∈C1∪C2
θf(k)z+ x
Let
(
k(θ), z(θ), x(θ)
)
be a representative of the (equivalence class of) maximiz-
ers. Under the assumptions for θ and f(k), the Spence-Mirrless conditions (single
crossing) hold and local incentive compatibility conditions are equivalent to the
global incentive compatibility conditions. Hence, Myerson’s lemma can be ap-
plied:
Lemma 2.2 If C∗1 and C
∗
2 are part of an equilibrium:
U(θ;C∗1,C
∗
2) = Ui(0) +
∫θ
0
f
(
k(s)
)
z(s)ds, (2.1a)
f
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ) is non-decreasing. (2.1b)
x(θ) = U(0) +
∫θ
0
f
(
k(s)
)
z(s)ds− θf
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ), (2.1c)
We refer to
(
k(θ), z(θ), x(θ)
)
as an incentive compatible contract menu.
The equilibrium payoff of a θ-type agent is max{w,U(θ)}.
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Project/Loan Size
We now aim to characterize the amount of capital lent to each entrepreneur in
equilibrium. First, define k∗(θ) as the full information optimal investment in a
project of type θ.
k∗(θ) = arg max
k
{θf(k)π− Rk}
And let S(θ) be maximum gross surplus generated by an entrepreneur of type θ,
S(θ) = max
k
{θf(k)π− Rk}
= θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− R · k∗(θ).
S(θ) is a gross surplus because it doesn’t include the opportunity cost of forgoing
the outside option w. Note that under the assumptions for f(k), the optimal
project size k∗(θ) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of θ.
The payoff of the entrepreneur only depends on k through the product f(k)z.
Because of the multiplicative separability, given k0, z0, the intermediary can offer
k∗(θ) and adjust z to keep f(k)z constant.
Claim 2.3 formalizes the argument above. All proofs are in the appendix.
Claim 2.3 Contracts signed in equilibrium have k(θ) = k∗(θ) for (almost) every θ ∈ A.
The Payoff of Intermediaries
The market structure resembles Bertrand competition, and it is natural to con-
jecture that if an intermediary were to make profits, his competitor could offer
contracts slightly more generous and steal the market.
Claim 2.4 (Zero Profit Condition) In any equilibrium, the profits for intermediaries is
zero.
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Fighting for the Best
We just showed that intermediaries make zero profits. In this case, entrepreneurs
have all the bargaining power and one could suspect that intermediaries will
make zero profits type by type and each entrepreneur would receive all the eco-
nomic surplus she produces. That suspicion would be correct in a similar frame-
work without limited liability, or without asymmetric information. However, the
interaction between the two frictions does not allow for that to happen in our
economy. On the contrary, the expected surplus of the project tends to grow
much faster than incentives can be provided: whenever expected profits are pos-
itive, locally expected revenues increase faster than expected costs. In a nutshell,
intermediaries want to invest more in more able types, but cannot increase re-
wards too fast to keep incentives.
Claim 2.5 Suppose S(θ̂) > U(θ̂) for some θ̂ > 0. Then, S(θ ′) > U(θ ′) for almost every
θ ′ > θ̂.
Because both intermediaries are making zero profits, and U and S are continuos,
there is a θ such that U(θ) = S(θ). The claim above implies that such θ is neces-
sarily unique: although intermediaries make zero profits on average, they make
strict profits with the best types and strict loses with other types.
The result above is in sharp contrast with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1992). In such an
environment, if there were profits to be made with a particular type, the market
will “cream skim” it, until profits are zero type by type. We will show that the
limited liability constraint binds and prevents that from happening. Before, we
need to characterize the set A of types choosing to be entrepreneurs.
The next claim states that A takes the form of an interval, and the lowest type
willing to take one of the offered contracts rather than the outside option is well
defined. We will refer to such a type as θL.
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Claim 2.6 The set A of all types that are willing to accept at least one of the offered
contracts is an interval of the form A = [θL, 1] for some θL ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, if θL > 0,
U(θL) = w.
When entrepreneurs are risk neutral, it is natural to expect that if a project fails,
intermediaries won’t pay anything to entrepreneurs, and hence x(θ) = 0. If that
was not the case, intermediaries could “cream skim" the market. That is, interme-
diary i could deviate to a contract serving all the profitable types, and leave all
the unprofitable types to his competitor.
Claim 2.7 Competition in the intermediation market and the limited liability constraint
imply that any contract offered and signed in equilibrium has x(θ) = 0 for all θ > θL.
It is useful to note that the result above would not hold, absent limited liability.
In that case, the optimal mechanism specifies that entrepreneurs get all the profits
from the project and pay R · k∗(θ) no matter if the project succeeds or fail. Limited
liability puts a bound to the separation of types. As a result, high types are more
profitable for intermediaries.
Limited Incentive Provision
Given the above results, incentives can only be be provided using z. Claim 2.7
implies that U(θ) = θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
z(θ) for all theta. Hence U(0) < w and then θL >
0. Also, the set of maximizers of θf(k)z is independent of θ. It follows that
f(k(θ))z(θ) cannot depend on θ. Since, θLf(k(θL))z(θL) = w, we get from the
condition above:
f(k(θ))z(θ) =
w
θL
. (2.2)
This together with claims 2.3 and 2.7, fully characterize the equilibrium optimal
contract.
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Proposition 2.8 In equilibrium, the contract signed by almost every θ is:
k∗(θ) = arg max
k
{θf(k)π− Rk}, z∗(θ) =
w
θLf
(
k∗(θ)
) , x∗(θ) = 0.
where θL, the lowest type who accepts the contract, is such that the financial intermediaries
make zero profits.
Some Implications
The expected payoff for the entrepreneur of type θ is θθLw, the gross rate of re-
turn is θ
θLk
∗(θ)w. Thus the expected return may be increasing or decreasing in θ,
depending on f.
The expected payoff for the intermediary on a θ-type project is θf
(
k(θ)
)
π− wθθL −
Rk(θ) = S(θ) −U(θ). It follows from claim 2.5 that this payoff can be zero only
for one particular θ and will be positive for higher types. Moreover S(θ) −U(θ) is
a convex function of θ.5 The good types are very valuable for intermediaries: the
profits coming from them will compensate for the losses from bad types.
Interestingly, firms cannot fight for segments of the market (i.e: try to steal only a subset
of Θ = [0, 1]). The expected return for entrepreneurs is independent of k and z. If
a firm offers a more attractive contract for some θ, it must be because θL is lower,
and hence the contract is better for every θ. In other words, in a world where
the limited liability constraint is binding, intermediaries are not able to “skim the
cream” up to the point of making zero profits type by type. This is in contrast
with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1992).
The following picture illustrates the equilibrium described by proposition 2.8.
The figure shows several monetary payments as functions of θ. We plot the en-
trepreneurs’ expected payoff U(θ) = θθLw and their outside option w (which is
assumed to be independent of θ); the expected surplus of the project, net of fi-
5By the envelope theorem, the derivative is πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− wθL
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nancial costs, S(θ) = θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π−Rk∗(θ).6 The area shaded in gray represents the
profits of an intermediary. From the figure it is clear that changes in θL change
the slope of the entrepreneurs expected payoff. Thess changes, in turn modify the
intermediaries’ payoffs and hence θL can be adjusted so that intermediaries make
zero profits.
Figure 9 illustrates the key force in this economy: to provide the correct incentives,
the payoff to entrepreneurs cannot grow as fast as the total surplus does. That
means that intermediaries always make higher profits with the highest types.
Since high types are so profitable, intermediaries are willing to lose money with
low types to offer more attractive contracts to (profitable) high types and maintain
incentives.
Figure 9: Equilibrium Contract and Zero Profits
0 θ
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
θ
θL
w
w
θL 1
Efficient projects
6Note that the expected surplus is similar to the profit function of a competitive firm facing an output
price of θ. It is well known that profit functions are convex in prices and hence the surplus is convex in θ, as
displayed.
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2.2.4. Welfare and optimal policy
The expected social surplus of a project is θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π−Rk∗(θ)−w. Hence a social
planner sets θf ′
(
k∗(θ)
)
π = R as before, but only for those θ such that the expected
social benefit is not negative. As the surplus is increasing in θ by the envelope
theorem, there is a lower bound θP, for those socially valuable projects. Then
it is worth for the society to devote resources to all projects with θ > θP where
θf
(
k∗(θP)
)
π− Rk∗(θP) = w.
By contrast, in the decentralized equilibrium, θL yields zero profit for intermedi-
aries: ∫1
θL
{
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
}
dG(θ) −
∫1
θL
θ
w
θL
dG(θ) = 0
Proposition 2.9 In the decentralized solution, socially inefficient projects are enacted.
That is θL < θP. Moreover, efficiency will be restored if any of the following becomes true:
• No adverse selection: Types become public information
• No limited liability: Intermediaries become able to recover any contracted amount.
• No competition: There is only one intermediary or intermediaries collude.
The intuition behind it is as follows: if only efficient projects were financed, the
intermediaries would make profits in all the projects. But then, positive profits
attract new intermediaries who can “steal” the market by offering more generous
contracts. More generous contracts involve some cross-subsidization, and as a
result socially inefficient projects will be active.
If types are public information but all other conditions remain the same, interme-
diaries will break even on each type. This implies that all signed offer is such that
U(θ) = S(θ), and only types θ > θP sign contracts. Contracts will not be com-
pletely determined since many combinations of x(θ) and z(θ) yield U(θ) = S(θ),
but k(θ) = k∗(θ). The equilibrium payoff of type θ is U(θ) = max{w,S(θ)}.
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If there is no limited liability but all other conditions hold, the only IC contract
schedule in equilibrium is k(θ) = k∗(θ), x(θ) = −R · k∗(θ) and z(θ) = π, which
implies U(θ) = S(θ). This is just the risk free debt contract. As it is well under-
stood, when the entrepreneur is risk neutral, transferring all the risk to her solves
the incentive problem.
If there is only one intermediary, but adverse selection and limited liability still
hold, the only equilibrium is as follows: the contract that maximizes profits for
the intermediary is k(θ) = k∗(θ), x = w, z = 0 and entrepreneurs with types
θ > θL take it, all others reject. The intermediary will take all the surplus and her
profits would be
∫1
θP
(
S(θ) −w
)
dG(θ).
Optimal policy
In this section we consider two possibilities for taxation. A fixed sum tax per
contract to financial intermediaries φ and a tax rate τ on entrepreneurs profits7 .
In both cases the full information optimal allocation can be achieved.
Claim 2.10 Let φ∗ be a fixed tax per contract defined by:
φ∗ ≡
[∫1
θP
{θf(k∗(θ))π− Rk∗(θ)}dG(θ) −
∫1
θP
θ
w
θP
dG(θ)
](∫1
θP
θw
θP
dG(θ)
)−1
Then only efficient projects (and all of them) are funded.
This tax can also be seen as fixed subsidy on w, or any instrument that increases
the outside option of every entrepreneur. However the revenue implications for
the tax authority would be different. Since we do not model the nature of the
wage or the outside option, we stick to the contract fee tax interpretation.
7A tax to entrepreneurs could be considered but it would require them to have some external funds that
the government can seize even in case of failure. In that case:
φ∗ ≡ θP
[∫1
θP
θdG(θ)
]−1 [∫1
θP
{θf(k∗(θ))π− Rk∗(θ)}dG(θ) −
∫1
θP
θ
w
θP
dG(θ)
]
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Now suppose there is a profit or dividend tax. Intermediaries make zero profit,
so they wont be affected by such tax. However entrepreneurs do make profits if
the project is successful. Hence a tax rate τ on profits would make any contract(
k, x, z
)
look to the entrepreneurs like
(
k, x, (1 − τ)z
)
Claim 2.11 Let τ∗ = φ
∗
w+φ∗ be the tax rate on profits, where φ
∗ is the fixed tax rate found
in claim 2.10. Then only efficient projects (and all of them) are funded.
Taxing R would be troublesome since it will distort k∗(θ,R) reducing the total
surplus, which is the standard result on capital income taxation. In principle this
would be at odds with claim 2.11, but this is because we assume taxation on capi-
tal income is made at the individual level. Hence as long as the intermediaries can
aggregate profits on investments before taxes, or claim back taxes on dividends
from entrepreneurs firms in which they have a stake, they wont be affected by
the taxation, only the entrepreneurs. So far we have avoided to make any inter-
pretation of the legal stance the contracts will have. We can think of the contracts
as debt contracts with limited liability clauses or as equity stakes in a firm, those
details are irrelevant for our discussion above but become important once we face
a complex tax law. Of course the discussion of that topic is far away from the
scope of this paper.
2.3. Capital Holdings
As the previous section shows, for θ high enough, the return of the project for the
entrepreneur would be higher if he had access to the risk free rate. Hence skilled
entrepreneurs who own capital are willing to use it on their project. The same
will happen if the asset owned is not liquid but is pledgeable: the entrepreneurs
are willing to pledge their assets if doing so gets them better loan terms. We allow
for that possibility in the current section.
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2.3.1. Observable Capital Holdings
Assume entrepreneurs have assets a ∈ A, distributed according to G(θ,a). Two
interpretations are possible, both will yield the same results : for a project of size
k the entrepreneur provides a as capital and the intermediary finances k− a or
the intermediary finances k collateralized by Ra from the entrepreneur. In what
follows the latter will be used.
The asset holdings from entrepreneurs serve two purposes, they relax the limited
liability constraint for the intermediaries and increase the outside option for the
entrepreneurs.
Claim 2.12 The outside option O(θ,a) of an entrepreneur of type θ that holds assets a
is characterized as follows:
O(θ,a) = max
{
w+ Ra, θF
(
min{a,k∗(θ)}
)
π+ R ·max{0,a− k∗(θ)}
}
The expression for the outside option results from the fact that an entrepreneur
of type θ holding a units of capital can always produce using his skills and own
capital, or work and lend his capital.
With observable assets, contract schedules are contingent on a. A strategy for an
intermediary specifies a subset of R3 for each a ∈ A.
To facilitate interpretation, let the equilibrium payoff of a type θ entrepreneur
with assets a be U(θ,a) + Ra.
Myerson’s lemma and claims B.1 to 2.4 will still hold for each a, since nothing in
their proofs depends on the limited liability condition being exactly zero. With
minor changes to the proof we can state:
Proposition 2.13 In equilibrium with observable assets, the contract offered by all finan-
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cial intermediaries to almost every (θ,a) is:
k∗(θ,a) = k∗(θ) = arg max
k
{θf(k)π− Rk}, z∗(θ,a) =
O
(
θL(a),a
)
θL(a)f
(
k∗(θ)
) , x(θ) = −Ra.
where θL(a), the lowest θ among those entrepreneurs with a assets who accepts the con-
tract. For each a, it must be the case that:
∫1
θL(a)
{
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− θ
O(θL(a),a)
θL
− R
(
k∗(θ) − a
)}
dG(θ|a) = 0
The following figure illustrates the equilibrium,
θ
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
θ
θL(a)
O(θL,a)
w
θL(a) 1
0
−Ra
Figure 10: Equilibrium Contract with Observable Asset Level a
As long as entrepreneur’s capital holdings are observable several loan markets
will be active, one for each asset level a. Those markets will be described by
proposition 2.13. In the next subsection we deal with the case of unobservable
asset holdings.
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2.3.2. Unobservable Capital Holdings
In principle, an entrepreneur with wealth a could hide part of his own wealth and
take a contract designed for a lower a if it is more profitable. This is akin to an
entrepreneur setting up a corporation but only investing a fraction of his wealth.
We ruled out this possibility by assuming that a was known (observable) by the
intermediary. In this subsection we drop that assumption.
Just as in the previous section, the strategy of intermediary i, Ci specifies a subsets
of R3 for each a ∈ A. But now, an entrepreneur with type (θ,a) solves,
U(θ,a;C1,C2) = max
(k,z,x)∈C(a)
θf(k)z+ x
where C(a) ≡
⋃
a ′6a
C1(a
′)∪
⋃
a ′6a
C2(a
′)
Let
(
k(θ,a), z(θ,a), x(θ,a)
)
denote a representative solution of the above problem.
Incentive compatibility across assets only requires U(θ,a) to be nondecreasing in
a. This because an entrepreneur cannot pledge more collateral or invest more
capital than the amount he owns, which implies he can only lie by hiding some
assets. For the incentive compatibility over θ, Myerson lemma holding fixed each
asset level is enough. Limited liability in this environment still requires x(θ,a) >
−Ra.
It can be shown that, as before, x(θ,a) is non increasing in θ, k(θ,a) = k∗(θ) for
(almost) all (θ,a), U(θ,a) will be nondecreasing in θ. If we define the set Ai(a) as
those θ such that types (θ,a) are willing to take the contract from intermediary
i it is still the case that
⋃
iAi(a) = A(a) = [θL(a), 1]. Also there would be a zero
profit condition but in an aggregate sense across assets. Hence proofs depending
on a zero profit condition per asset level need to be updated.
The unobservability of the assets may (will) imply limited liability is not binding
for some cases. However we still can state an updated version of claim 2.7.
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Claim 2.14 Competition in the intermediation market and the limited liability constraint
imply that any equilibrium contract schedule satisfies x(θ,a) = −Ra for all (θ,a) such
that S(θ) > U(θ,a) > w.
This implies that limited liability will bind for those types for which the interme-
diaries expect to make some profits. Now, for each a define θe(a) as the solu-
tion to U(θ,a) = S(θ) which means the intermediary expects to break even with
this type. Above those θe(a) claim 2.14 implies x = −Ra and therefore for all
θ > θe(a):
U(θ,a) = θ
S
(
θe(a)
)
+ Ra
θe(a)
− Ra (2.3)
Now, fix the non decreasing function θe(a). That completely determines the ex-
pected earnings for intermediaries among the profitable contracts. For types be-
low θe(a) losses are incurred in expectation so the intermediary wants to offer
as little as possible. However, the IC constraint across assets may bind. Equation
(2.3) is then a lower bound for the surplus given to those types. If the IC across
assets binds for a type (θ,a) is because there exists some 0 6 a ′ < a such that:
θ
S
(
θe(a
′)
)
+ Ra ′
θe(a ′)
− Ra ′ > θ
S
(
θe(a)
)
+ Ra
θe(a)
− Ra.
After fixing θe(a), a profit maximizing intermediary has no way to improve. The
contracts she is profiting with are fully determined, and for those types she is
expected to lose she has a lower bound on the utility she has to deliver. Hence for
θ < θe(a) a profit maximizing intermediary sets:
Ui(θ,a) = sup
06a ′6a
θ
S
(
θe(a
′)
)
+ Ra ′
θe(a ′)
− Ra ′ (2.4)
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) fully characterize the contracts given θe(a). Figure 11
illustrates this feature. The zero profit condition is not enough to pin down that
function, since zero profits must hold on aggregate across types. To pin down
71
Figure 11: Characterization of the profit maximizing contract given θe(a)
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θe(0)
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1
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S(θ)
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U(θ, 0)
U(θ,a)
θ
U(θ,a ′)
θ
w
that function consider the following:
Claim 2.15 In any equilibrium, contract schedules must offer the same utility to (almost)
all types willing to sign at least one of the offered contracts.
The intuition rests on the fact that the average of two IC contracts is IC because the
expected utility for entrepreneurs is linear in the varying elements of the contract
(x, z).
An intermediary can decide not to offer any contract with x(θ,a) = Rb̄ for some
asset level b̄ > 0. By doing so she gives up the expected profit of types with
θ > θe(b̄) and assets b̄, she avoids the losses with those types θ < θe(b̄) with
assets b̄. But also there could have been some types (θ,a) with θ 6 θe(a) and
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a > b̄ but such that:
U(θ,a) = θ
S
(
θe(b̄)
)
+ Rb̄
θe(b̄)
− Rb̄.
If that was the case, half of those types were taking the contract with intermediary
i before she dropped those contracts. To quantify the effect of that action define
A(a|b) =
{
θ : x(θ,b) = −Ra
}
Incentive compatibility implies that if two types are offered the same x(θ,a) they
should be offered the same f
(
k∗(θ)
)
z(θ,a). Hence for all θ ∈ A(a|b) it must be
the case that:
U(θ,b) = θ
S
(
θe(a)
)
+ Ra
θe(a)
− Ra
Definition 2.16 Let P(a) =
S
(
θe(a)
)
+Ra
θe(a)
be the slope of all contracts such that x(θ,b) =
−Ra.
Claim 2.17 The sets A(a|b) are intervals. For all b 6 c A(a|c) ⊂ A(a|b).
Given that, we can now write a closed form for intermediary’s profits given some
non decreasing function θe(a).
Π = 0.5
∫a=∞
a=0
∫b=∞
b=a
∫
θ∈A(a|b)
[
S(θ) − θP(a) + Ra
]
d2G(θ,b)da (2.5)
Now define Π(c) as the profits brought by contracts with x(θ,a) 6 −Rc:
Π(c) = 0.5
∫a=∞
a=c
∫b=∞
b=a
∫
θ∈A(a|b)
[
S(θ) − θP(a) + Ra
]
d2G(θ,b)da
Claim 2.18 For all c profits brought by contracts with x(θ,a) 6 −Rc are zero.
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Proof. If Π(c) is negative, the intermediary can always drop all those contracts
and increase profits. If Π(c) is positive, analogously to the zero profit condition,
the intermediary can give some ε > 0 more to all types with assets equal or
higher than c, stealing the half of the market serviced by the other intermediary
and getting 2Π(c) − ε. Taking derivative of Π(c) we obtain that for all a
0 =
∫b=∞
b=a
∫
θ∈A(a|b)
[
S(θ) − θP(a) + Ra
]
d2G(θ,b) (2.6)
which implies that for each a the intermediaries should break even on those
contracts such that x(θ,b) = −Ra. This result is analogous to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1992), where zero profits should be made contract by contract. In our
setting all contracts with x(θ,b) = −Ra are equivalent for the entrepreneurs be-
cause f
(
k∗(θ)
)
z(θ,a) has to be constant across all those contracts, but different to
the intermediary because of the different expected surplus. Next the following
proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.19 In equilibrium, the contract offered by all financial intermediaries to
almost every θ and every a is:
k∗(θ,a) = arg max
k
θf(k)π− Rk,
U(θ,a) = max
06a ′6a
θP(a ′) − Ra ′
x(θ,a) = −R
[
arg max
06a ′6a
θP(a ′) − Ra ′
]
.
where θe(·) is such that for all a the financial intermediaries make zero profits over all
entrepreneurs taking a contract with x = −Ra. That is,
∫b=∞
b=a
∫
θ∈A(a|b)
[
S(θ) − θP(a) + Ra
]
d2G(θ,b) = 0.
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2.4. A Numerical Example
We have established that in the environment described above, competition among
financial intermediaries yields to an inefficient outcome. The result raises a nat-
ural question: in which markets, industries or countries will be the inefficiency
more pronounced? In the current section we use a numerical example to illus-
trate the changes in the deadweight loss when various parameters of the model
change.
2.4.1. Parameterization
For the numerical example we set the entrepreneurs’ outside option w = 15; the
output of the project in case of success, π = 100; and the gross interest rate is
R = 1.02.
Recall that a project succeeds with probability p(θ,k) = θf(k). We let f(k) = 1 −
exp(−βkα) for β > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). This functional form has several properties.
First, it is continuous and strictly increasing and strictly concave on R+. Second,
f(0) = 0 and lim
k→∞f(k) = 1. Third, limk→0f ′(k) = ∞. The last condition ensures that
for every θ > 0 there is a scale such that the θ-type project is profitable (Inada
condition). A way to interpret the above functional form is that the p(θ,k) is the
product of θ and the probability that an exponential random variable is lower
than kα 8. As exponential variables are usually employed for waiting times for
a poisson process, it can be interpreted as the waiting time until the arrival of a
new innovation (success), an amount k of capital allows the entrepreneur to run
the project for kα periods and hence the probability of a good idea arriving would
be f(k).
We set β = 0.1, implying that the latent exponential random variable would have a
mean of 10. Under the above interpretation increasing k increases the probability
8Equivalently, p(θ,k) is the product of θ and the probability that a Weibul random variable is lower to k.
In that case, the waiting time interpretation would be that thelonger it takes for a project to succeed the less
likely it wil succeed in the future, Jovanovic and Szentes (2013) use a similar approach hence our functional
forms may be regarded as a reduced form of their results
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that the random falls below kα at a decreasing rate. We set α = 0.1.
Last but not least, the joint distribution of assets and types will be key to compute
intermediaries profits. We focus on the conditional distribution of θ given a,
and let g(θ|a) = a+1η θ
a+1
η −1 be its density. The exponent a+1η − 1 controls the
participation of high types on the conditional distribution. The higher is the
exponent, the higher will be the density of types higher than a fixed value θ
(Saffie and Ates (2013)). We let the exponent to be increasing on the asset level
a, meaning that assets are positively correlated with the types. In addition, we
assume the unconditional distribution of assets has density λ exp(−λa). Hence
an average entrepreneur has an asset level of 2. All the parameters and functional
forms used in the numerical example are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8: Benchmark Parameters
w 15
π 100
R 1.02
f(k) 1 − exp(−βkα)
α 0.7
β 0.1
g(θ|a) a+1η θ
a+1
η −1
η 1
g(a) λ exp(−λa)
λ 0.5
2.4.2. Benchmark Results
We begin by describing the case where entrepreneurs do not have assets. In order
to facilitate comparability with the upcoming section where assets are introduced,
we use use the marginal distribution of types that is consistent with the joint
distribution of assets and types that will be used next (i.e: intermediaries will
face the same population in both cases).
As defined before, an equilibrium is fully described by the triple
(
k(θ), x(θ), z(θ)
)
.
We established that x(θ) = 0, ∀θ. The functions k(.) and z(.) are plotted in the
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Figure 12 below. An important equilibrium object is the lowest type taking the
Figure 12: Optimal Contract
contract, θL. For this example, the value of θL is 0.49, which implies that 74% of
the entrepreneurs take the contract. Compare θL with the lowest type that would
be funded by a social planner θP = 0.62.
In the Figure 13 we plot S(θ) = πθf
(
k∗(θ)
)
−Rk∗(θ) as well as the expected payoff
of entrepreneurs U(θ) = wθ/θL. In addition we plot the the wage (horizontal line)
to allow the reader to picture the equilibrium deadweight loss. In what follows
we will use the relative inefficiency, defined as the ratio of the deadweight loss to
the net economic surplus,
I =
∫θP
θL
(
w− S(θ))dG(θ)∫θL
θP
(
S(θ) −w)dG(θ)
For our benchmark parameterization, the relative inefficiency is I = 5.03%. In the
next section we study how this inefficiency responds to changes in the parameters
of the model.
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Figure 13: Surplus, Payoff, Inefficiency
2.4.3. The Relative Inefficiency: Comparative Statics
In the current section we change, one by one, all the parameters of the model,
holding the other parameters at their respective benchmark values.
The outside option of entrepreneurs, w, is very important because, absent this
cost, the economy would not be inefficient. In fact, when w = 0, all projects
are socially profitable - by assumption -, and they are all funded at the optimal
scale. An increase in w directly increases the deadweight loss and decreases
the net economic surplus (everything else equal). It also induces an endogenous
adjustment of θL. A higher w tends to increase θL, but this increment is dampen
because the pool of types is increased and competition induces intermediaries to
increase the terms of the contract. However, increases in θL reduce the deadweight
loss. As illustrated in Figure 14, when the wage is very high, the force is strong
enough to actually decrease the inefficiency. Note that is the wage is high enough,
all the entrepreneurs take the outside option and the deadweight loss disappears.
The relative inefficiency is maximized when w = 31, attaining 6.8% of the net
78
surplus.
Figure 14: Relative Inefficiency and Wage
The gross interest rate, R, is similar to the wage, in the sense it represents the out-
side option, or opportunity cost of the capital in hands of financial intermediaries.
A higher gross interest rate not only decreases the payoff of intermediaries, but it
also decreases the optimal scale of the projects, and hence their expected return.
The condition θπf ′(k∗) = R implies that the function S(θ;R) = πθf(k∗) − RK∗ is
linearly homogenous in (θ,R). Since θ ∈ [0, 1], an increase in R can be interpreted
graphically as a downward shift of the curve S(θ) as shown in the right panel of
Figure 15. This force increases both the net surplus and the deadweight loss ev-
erything else equal. However, θL will increase to satisfy the zero profit condition.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 15, when we let R vary between 1 and 1.8,
the relative inefficiency increases up to 11%, at R = 1.8.
We move to describing how the inefficiency responds to changes in the shape of
function f(k). Figure 13 above suggests that the size of the inefficiency is very
related to the concavity of the function S(θ). This concavity only depends on the
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Figure 15: Relative Inefficiency and Interest Rate
shape of f. In fact,
S ′′(θ) = f
(
k∗(θ)
)
−
(
f ′(k∗)
)2
f ′′(k∗)
Not surprisingly, the relative inefficiency is quite sensitive to the parameters α and
β, that govern the shape of f in the current example. The results are displayed
in Figure 16. The relative inefficiency is decreasing in both α and β. It decreases
particularly fast as β increases, getting to 0.05% when β = 1.
Last, the distribution of types importantly affects the size of the inefficiency. The
parameter η governs the shape of the distribution of θ. More precisely, as η in-
creases, the density is shifted toward lower types. Holding the outside option
fixed, an increase in η decreases the net surplus, because some density will be
shifted from socially profitable projects to unprofitable projects. However, when
good types are scarcer, intermediaries will offer less generous contracts, increas-
ing θL. The last force tends to decrease the inefficiency. Figure 17 shows that the
relative externality actually increases, reaching 7.7% when η = 3. On the other
hand, for values of η close to zero, the relative inefficiency gets close to zero.
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2.4.4. Assets
For simplicity, we discretize the space of assets, using the quantiles of the of the
marginal distribution described in section 2.4.1, g(a) = λ exp(−λa). We use five
asset levels, 0, 0.45, 1.02, 1.83 and 3.22; there will be of 20% of the population hold-
ing each of the levels of assets. To put this numbers in perspective, a entrepreneur
of type θ = 1 will optimally invests k∗(1) = 25, while the for the lowest type tak-
ing the contract in the absence of assets, k∗(θL) = 10.3 (see Figure 12). Recall that
assets and types are correlated, and g(θ|a) = a+1η θ
a+1
η −1.
The equilibrium is summarized in Table 9 and Figure 18. It will prove useful to
introduce some further notation and let θF = infA(a|a) be the lowest type with
asset level a, taking the contract with slope P(a). By contrast, θL(a), the lowest
type with assets a taking any contract. Hence, θL(a) = minâ6a θF(a). Then, the
relative inefficiency becomes,
I =
∑5
a=1
∫θP
θL(a)
(
w− S(θ))dG(θ)Pr(a)∫θL(a)
θP
(
S(θ) −w)dG(θ)
Figure 16: Relative Inefficiency and the Shape of f(k)
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Figure 17: Relative Inefficiency and the Distribution of Types
The lowest type taking the 0 asset contract is type θ = 0.5123. Next, the lowest
type taking the contract that requires to advance a = 0.45 is θF(0.45) = 0.5108.
This implies that the contract that requires a = 0.45 is more generous than the
one that doesn’t require assets. By contrast, the lowest type taking the contract re-
quiring a = 3.22 is 0.5478. When θ is between 0.5136 and 0.5478, an entrepreneur
with a = 3.22 prefers to take the contract that only requires a collateral of 1.8.
In this setting, the relative inefficiency is 3.94%. Hence, allowing intermediaries
to condition their contracts on collateral decreases the inefficiency by more than a
percentage point (from 5.03 %) in this example. There are two reasons why the in-
efficiency is reduced when the contracts depend on assets. First, the introduction
of assets relaxes he limited liability constraint. Second, because the collateral is
more likely to be held by higher types, conditioning contracts on collateral allows
the intermediaries to do some sort of screening.
In order to disentangle the two effects, we compute the equilibrium for an econ-
omy with the same marginal distributions of assets and types, but where assets
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Figure 18: Optimal Contract Under Asset Holdings
and types are independent. When assets and types are independent, the relative
inefficiency is 4.62%. We also consider the case in which intermediaries observe a
signal, that is correlated with types in the exact same way that assets were, but (of
course) does not affect the limited liability constraint. In that case, the economy
has a relative inefficiency of 4.65%.
The results are presented in Table 9. The upper panel displays the optimal con-
tract for entrepreneurs holding assets that are independent of types, and the sec-
ond panel shows the results when there is an observable signal correlated with
the types. In the first case, entrepreneurs with higher asset holdings receive more
generous contracts than their peers with lower assets. To understand this, recall
that limited liability prevents “cream-skimming” in this environment once x = 0.
For entrepreneurs with higher assets, the limited liability is not binding until it
hits x = −Ra. Hence, intermediaries have incentive to skim the cream until they
hit the constraint. Under this situation, although the contracts are more generous,
they are taken by a lower number of types. In the second case, entrepreneurs
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with higher signals also get more generous contracts, but simply because they are
better on average, and hence intermediaries break even offering higher terms to
entrepreneurs. In this case, the lowest type taking the contract will be decreasing
on the signal.
Table 9: Separate Asset Effects
Independent Types
Asset Level 0 0.45 1.02 1.83 3.22
θF 0.5004 0.5248 0.5498 0.5766 0.6378
Expected Payoff 30.8θ 31.6θ− 0.532.5θ− 1.033.7θ− 1.935.4θ− 3.3
Informative Signals
Asset Level 0 0.45 1.02 1.83 3.22
θF 0.5119 0.5065 0.4998 0.4906 0.4769
Expected Payoff 29.3θ 29.6θ 30.0θ 30.6θ 31.5θ
We end this section presenting some comparative statics of the inefficiency to the
distribution of assets. In particular, we consider changes in the parameter λ of
the exponential distribution of assets. We let λ vary between 0.5 and 50, which
implies that the mean of the asset distribution varies approximately between 2
and 1/50 9. If the mean of the asset distribution is high enough, the inefficiency
can be arbitrarily reduced, because most of the entrepreneurs can fund their own
projects. On the other extreme, as λ→∞, the economy converges to one in which
all entrepreneurs have zero assets, and the inefficiency converges to 7.5% of the
surplus. It is important to note that the limit economy where all entrepreneurs
have zero assets is not the same as the benchmark economy described in section
2.4.2. In the benchmark economy, the distribution of types, is the marginal dis-
tribution implied by joint distribution of types and assets used throughout the
section. I.e, in the benchmark economy g(θ) =
∫∞
0 g(θ,a)da. When λ → ∞,
the distribution of types faced intermediaries is g(θ|0). Because of the positive
correlation between assets and types, “lemons” are more abundant in the later
9The mean of the exponential distribution is 1/λ. In our case, this is, however, only an approximation
because we discretize the distribution.
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Figure 19: Inefficiency and Asset Distribution
economy.
2.5. Conclusion
We characterized financial contracts in a competitive environment with risk, ad-
verse selection and limited liability. We find that, under the optimal contract the
highest types are rewarded below the expected value of their project, and hence
financial intermediaries make profits with high types. They also make losses with
lower types. Our main result is that the optimal contract generates an inefficient
outcome: projects that wouldn’t be funded by a social planner are funded in equi-
librium. We show that asymmetric information, limited liability and competition
are all necessary to generate the result. We also show both analytically and nu-
merically that the ability to use some assets as collateral mitigates but does not
eliminate the inefficient outcome.
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An implication of our results is that competition among financial intermediaries
is not desirable. Note, however, that a monopolist financial intermediary would
get all the economic surplus. In fact, the monopolist attains the first best because
he has the ability to set loan sizes and interests rates, that is, has the ability to
price discriminate. Needless to say, being the monopolist of financial interme-
diation in the economy would be extremely profitable. Who, if anyone, should
get this rents? Even if the government gets the rents, a lot of political economy
consideration would arise, that may challenge the efficiency of the result.
The results of this paper suggest at least two directions for future research. On
the theoretical front, allowing for dynamics would generate an incentive for firms
(or entrepreneurs) to retain earnings in order to escape from the inefficiency, and
can be related to the literature on firm dynamics. On the empirical front, the
degree to which working capital can be collateralized varies exogenously across
industries. This opens the door to test the implications of the model.
86
Chapter 3
Optimal v. Simple Financial Policy
Rules in a Production Economy with
“Liability Dollarization” 1
3.1. Introduction
Recent quantitative studies show that optimal financial policy, defined as policy
that implements the allocations that solve a constrained-efficient planner’s prob-
lem facing a credit constraint, can be very effective at reducing the magnitude and
frequency of financial crises.2 On the other hand, these studies also show that
the optimal policy has a complex state-contingent structure, which raises doubts
about its feasibility and suggests that simpler policy rules should be favored. A
conjecture implicit in this reasoning is that simple rules are at worse harmless
and at best a good approximation to the optimal policy. The findings of recent
1 Coauthored with Enrique Mendoza. This paper was prepared for the 2016 conference on Policy Lessons
and Challenges for Emerging Economies in a Context of Global Uncertainty organized by the Central Bank of
Colombia, the Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building for Central Banks Program of the Graduate Institute
Geneva, and the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs. We are grateful to conference participants for their
comments and to Eugenio Rojas for excellent research assistance.
2See, for example, Bianchi (2011), Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci, and Young (2013, 2014), Bianchi and
Mendoza (2010, 2017).
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studies suggest, however, that this conjecture is incorrect. Bianchi and Mendoza
(2017) showed that simple policies can be welfare-reducing, because they may
not match well the prudential characteristics of the optimal policy, which tightens
credit-market access in periods of expansion, with a magnitude that varies with
the likelihood and severity of future credit crises, and eases credit conditions in
the opposite situations. Hence, there is a delicate tradeoff in financial policy de-
sign: The optimal policy is too complex to be feasible operationally, but arbitrarily
chosen policy rules can be harmful.
This issue is of major policy relevance, because it highlights the importance of the
specific rules setting the conditions that trigger the use of financial stability policy
instruments and their evolution over time, and yet there is little guidance about
the quantitative features that these rules should have. For instance, the Basel
III Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) has the same macroprudential aim of
the optimal financial policy described above (i.e. tightening credit in periods of
expansion), but it did not define specific rules for when the CCyB is triggered
and for how it moves over time. Instead, it left these key features of the CCyB to
be determined by BIS member countries using their own judgment. In particular,
Basel III indicates that: “each jurisdiction will be required to monitor credit growth
and make assessments of whether such growth is excessive and is leading to the build
up of system-wide risk. Based on this assessment they will need to use their judgment,
following the guidance set out in this document, to determine whether a countercyclical
buffer requirement should be imposed. They will also need to apply judgment to determine
whether the buffer should increase or decrease over time (within the range of zero to 2.5%
of risk weighted assets) depending on whether they see system-wide risks increasing or
decreasing. Finally they should be prepared to remove the requirement on a timely basis if
the system-wide risk crystallizes.” 3
3Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical
capital buffer, Bank for International Settlements, Dec. 2010.
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In this paper, we compare optimal and simple financial policy rules using a quan-
titative Fisherian model of financial crises similar to a model widely used in the
literature, in which a small open economy faces an endogenously-binding collat-
eral constraint and displays “liability dollarization.”4 In particular, debt is denom-
inated in units of tradable goods and cannot exceed a fraction of the income from
tradables and nontradables. Models in this Fisherian class feature an endogenous
financial amplification mechanism that produce infrequent financial crises with
realistic features.
As the literature has shown, the market failure that justifies policy intervention in
these models is a pecuniary externality that exists because goods used as collateral
are valued at market prices. The social marginal cost of borrowing exceeds the
private marginal cost because private agents do not internalize the negative effects
of their individual borrowing decisions made in normal times on collateral prices
in crisis times. When a crisis hits, the collateral constraint binds inducing agents to
fire-sale goods, which in turn causes a collapse in the relative price of nontradable
goods, which tightens the constraint further and induces larger declines in relative
prices triggering Fisher’s classic debt-deflation mechanism.
The model we propose is based on the one developed by Bianchi, Liu and Men-
doza (2016), who introduced noisy news about future economic fundamentals
and regime shifts in global liquidity to the workhorse model of macroprudential
policy with liability dollarization. We modify this setup by introducing produc-
tion of tradable and nontradable goods using intermediate goods. This has two
important implications. First, it introduces a mechanism by which the collateral
constraint causes a drop in output in crisis episodes, because the collapse of the
relative price of nontradables causes a collapse in demand for inputs in produc-
4The literature usually refers to this constraint as occasionally binding, but the key feature of the constraint
is that whether it binds or not is an equilibrium outcome that depends on endogenous individual choices
and aggregate variables. An exogenous credit constraint can be designed to be occasionally binding but it
would have very different implications than those obtained with Fisherian models.
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tion of nontradables. Second, as a result of the supply-side effects of the collateral
constraint, it provides additional vehicles for policy intervention by introducing
inefficiencies in sectoral production and factor allocations during crises.
We also characterize optimal policy in the model, showing how the constrained-
efficient social planner has incentives to implement both macroprudential and
ex-post financial policies. The former reflects the standard pecuniary external-
ity from the existing literature: the optimal policy seeks to increase the cost of
borrowing when the collateral constraint is not binding in the current period but
can bind with positive probability next period, so as to induce private agents to
face the social marginal cost of borrowing in periods of expansion. The ex-post
financial policies result from the fact that the effects of the crisis can be mitigated
by reallocating resources from production of nontradables to production of trad-
ables in order to prop up the value of collateral and enhance borrowing capacity.
Both macroprudential and ex-post financial policies are decentralized as optimal
taxes. The macroprudential policy takes the form of a debt tax, and the crisis-
management policies take the form of sectoral production taxes and subsidies.5
Following Bianchi, Liu, and Mendoza (2016a), we also characterize the effects of
news about fundamentals and global liquidity shifts on the optimal policies.
The model is calibrated to data from Colombia and solved to illustrate the model’s
crisis dynamics in the absence of policy intervention, the effectiveness of the op-
timal policy, and the comparison with simple policy rules. The optimal policy
reduces the magnitude and severity of financial crises significantly. In contrast,
simple policies are much less effective and can be welfare reducing. In particular,
time-invariant taxes set to the average values under the optimal policy yield an
outcome with lower social welfare than the competitive equilibrium without pol-
icy intervention. The time-invariant taxes that yield the largest welfare gain can
5Modeling macroprudential policy with a debt tax is done only for simplicity. Identical outcomes can be
obtained with ceilings on debt-to-income ratios, which are used in practice as a regulatory instrument (for
example by the central banks of England, Hungary and Korea).
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only produce a gain about half as large as under the optimal policy, have crises
in which consumption and the real exchange rate drop nearly four times more,
and have crises with a frequency of 1.1 percent (v. nearly zero with the optimal
policy).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the decentralized
equilibrium of the model without policy intervention. Section 3 examines the
problem solved by the financial regulator, characterizes the optimal policy, and
shows how the allocations of the social planner can be decentralized using taxes
on debt and producers’ input purchases. Section 4 examines the quantitative
predictions of the model. Section 5 provides conclusions.
3.2. Model
Our analysis is based on a two-sector model with liability dollarization that has
been widely studied in the literature on emerging markets sudden stops and
on optimal macroprudential policy (e.g. Mendoza (2002), Bianchi (2011)). In
particular, we extend the variant of this model proposed by Bianchi et al. (2016a)
that features noisy news about future fundamentals and global liquidity regime-
switches by introducing production of tradable and nontradable goods. Durdu,
Mendoza and Terrones (2009) proposed a similar setup but with production only
in the nontradables sector, keeping tradable goods as an endowment, and they
abstracted from studying the normative implications of the model.
3.2.1. Households and Firms
The model represents a small open economy in which a representative household
consumes tradable and nontradable goods, denoted cT and cN respectively, and
representative firms produce tradable and nontradable goods using intermediate
goods, denoted mT and mN in each industry respectively. The household collects
the profits of the firms (πT and πN) and has access to a world credit market of non-
state-contingent bonds (b) denominated in units of tradable goods. Goods and
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factor markets are competitive and the prices of traded goods (including both
consumption and intermediate goods) and bonds are taken as given from world
markets. The credit market is imperfect, because borrowing is limited to fraction
of the agent’s income in units of tradable goods.
The preferences of the representative agent are given by a standard intertemporal
utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) defined over a com-
posite good ct:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct), u(ct) =
c1−γ
1 − γ
. (3.1)
E(·) is the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, and γ is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. The composite good is modeled as a CES agregator:
ct =
[
ω
(
cTt
)−η
+ (1 −ω)
(
cNt
)−η]− 1η
,η > 1,ω ∈ (0, 1). (3.2)
The elasticity of substitution between cTt and c
N
t is given by which 1/(η + 1).
This is an important parameter because, as we show later, is one of the main
determinants of the collapse of the real exchange rate in periods of financial crises,
which in turn is the main driver of crisis dynamics in the model.
Choosing the world-determined price of tradable goods as the numeraire, the
agent’s budget constraint is:
qtbt+1 + c
T
t + p
N
t c
N
t +A
T + pNt A
N = bt + π
T
t + π
N
t (3.3)
The left-hand-side of this expression shows the uses of the agent’s income: pur-
chases or sales of bonds bt+1 at the world-price qt (the inverse of which is the
world real interest rate Rt), plus total expenditures in consumption of tradable
and nontradable goods in units of tradables, denoting the relative price of non-
tradables as pNt . A
T and AN are constant levels of autonomous expenditures that
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represent investment and government expenditures, which are introduced so that
the model can be calibrated to actual consumption-GDP ratios. The right-hand-
side of the budget constraint shows the sources of the agent’s income: Income
from maturing bond holdings bt (or repayment of debt if bt < 0), and profits
from production of tradables and nontradables.
Borrowing requires collateral and only a fraction of the agent’s income is pledge-
able as collateral. As a result, the representative agent cannot borrow more than
a fraction κ of total income in units of tradables (i.e. a fraction of total profits):
qtbt+1 > −κ(π
T
t + π
N
t ) (3.4)
This constraint can be interpreted as the result of enforcement or institutional
frictions by which lenders are only able to harness a fraction κ of a defaulting
borrower’s income, or borrowers can only pledge a fraction κ of their income as
collateral. It can also be viewed as resulting from conventional practices in credit
markets, such as the loan-to-income ratios used to limit household credit or in the
construction of credit scores.
As noted earlier, the model’s approach to model two sectors, tradables and non-
tradables, with debt denominated in units of tradables, aims to capture the so-
called liability dollarization phenomenon typical of emerging economies: For-
eign liabilities denominated in hard currencies, which represent tradable goods,
backed up by the income generated in both tradables and nontradables sectors.
The representative agent chooses optimally the sequences {cTt , c
N
t ,bt+1}t>0 to max-
imize (3.1) subject to (3.3) and (3.4), taking b0 and
{
pNt ,π
T
t ,π
N
t
}
t>0 as given. This
maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
λt = uT (t) (3.5)
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pNt =
(
1 −ω
ω
)(
cTt
cNt
)η+1
(3.6)
λt =
β
qt
Et [λt+1] + µt (3.7)
qtbt+1 + κ
(
πTt + π
N
t
)
> 0, with equality if µt > 0, (3.8)
where λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and credit
constraint respectively, and uT is the marginal utility of consumption of tradables.
The representative firms in both industries use inputs, purchased at a world-
price pm, to produce. They operate Neoclassical production functions zitm
i
t
αi, for
i = T ,N, facing sectoral TFP shocks (zit for i = T ,N) that follow a Markov process
to be specified later. We abstract from modeling capital and labor for simplicity.
They can be assumed to enter the production technologies in fixed unit supply.
Profits are given by:
πTt = z
T
tm
T
t
αT
− pmmTt (3.9)
πNt = p
N
t z
N
t m
N
t
αN
− pmmNt (3.10)
The demand for inputs is chosen so as to maximize profits in each sector. This
yields standard optimality conditions equating the value of the marginal product
of inputs with the relative price in each industry:
αTzTtm
T
t
αT−1
= pm (3.11)
αNpNt z
N
t m
N
t
αN−1
= pm (3.12)
It is critical that the relative price of nontradables determines the value of the
marginal product of inputs in the production of nontradables, because financial
crises in the model produce an endogenous drop in output of nontradables, which
is induced by a drop in demand for inputs due to a collapse in the relative price
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of nontradables. Note also that fluctuations in production of tradable goods and
in the demand for inputs from that sector, are solely driven by the industry’s TFP
shock, and hence are unaffected by a financial crisis.
3.2.2. Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by sequences of allocations
{cTt , c
N
t ,m
T
t ,m
N
t ,bt+1}t>0,
profits
{
πTt ,π
N
t
}
t>0 and prices
{
pNt
}
t>0 such that:
(a) the representative agent maximizes utility subject to the budget and collateral
constraints taking prices and profits as given,
(b) the representative firms maximize profits taking prices as given, and
(c) the market-clearing condition for nontradable goods (cNt + A
N = zNt m
N
t
αN)
and the resource constraint of tradables (cTt +A
T = zTtm
T
t
αT
− pm(mTt +m
N
t ) −
qtbt+1 + bt) hold.
Notice that the cost of inputs used in both industries enters in the resource con-
straint of tradables. Algebraically, this follows from noticing that equilibrium
profits are πTt = (1 − αT)z
T
tm
T
t
αT and πNt = (1 − αN)p
N
t z
N
t m
N
t
αN in the trad-
ables and nontradables sector respectively, and then using these results to re-
place profits in the household’s budget constraint, and applying the nontrad-
ables market-clearing condition. Intuitively, this makes sense because inputs
are assumed to be tradable goods, regardless of whether they are used to pro-
duce tradables or nontradables. Hence, the economy’s balance of trade is given
by yTt − p
m(mTt +m
N
t ) − c
T
t −A
T . Note also that gross production and GDP in
units of tradable consumer goods are given by yGt = y
T
t + p
N
t y
N
t and GDPt =
yGt − p
m(mTt +m
N
t ) respectively.
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3.2.3. News and Global Liquidity Regimes
We use the same formulation of news about fundamentals and global liquidity
regime switches as in Bianchi et al. (2016a). They followed the work of Durdu,
Nunes and Sapriza (2013) to model news as noisy signals received at date t about
the value that zTt+1 may take. Notice that in this setup news about future TFP of
the tradables sector or about future world-determined relative prices of exportable
goods in terms of a world basket of tradables (i.e. the small open economy’s terms
of trade) are equivalent. This is useful because it implies that we can think of the
noisy news as related to future real commodity prices, which are a key source of
volatility for many emerging economies.
The probability of a news signal conditional on a date-t+1 tradables TFP realiza-
tion is given by the following condition:
p(st = i|z
T
t+1 = l) =
 θ if i = l1−θ
Z−1 if i 6= l
(3.13)
where st is the signal at date t, Z is the number of possible realizations of zTt+1,
and θ is the signal precision parameter. When θ = 1Z , the signals are completely
uninformative, because p(st = i|zTt+1 = l) simply assigns a uniform probability of
1/Z to all values the signal can take at t, regardless of the value of zTt+1. In this case,
news do not add any information useful to alter the expectations about zTt+1 that
are formed using the probabilistic process of zT alone. Conversely, θ = 1 implies
that the signals have perfect precision. The agent can perfectly anticipate the
value of zTt+1 (e.g. z
T
t+1 = l is expected to occur for sure when the signal st = l is
observed). Perfect precision does not, however, remove tradables TFP uncertainty
completely, because future signals themselves are stochastic, so uncertainty about
TFP for dates t+2 and beyond remains, although now expectations of future TFP
are based only on expectations of future signals.
96
Following Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013), we can use Bayes’s Theorem to
derive the conditional forecast probability of tradables TFP at date t+1 conditional
on a particular date-t pair (zTt , st), and then form Markov transition probabilities
for the joint evolution of zT and s:
Π(zTt+1, st+1, z
T
t , st) ≡p(st+1 = k, zTt+1 = l|st = i, zTt = j)
=p(zTt+1 = l|st = i, z
T
t = j) . . .
×
∑
m
[
p(zTt+2 = m|z
T
t+1 = l)p(st+1 = k|z
T
t+2 = m)
] (3.14)
These probabilities are used by the representative agent to form expectations
when solving the expected utility maximization problem. Notice that Π(·) com-
bines the information provided by the date-t signal and TFP realization about the
likelihood of a particular date-t+1 TFP realization being associated with a par-
ticular new signal. The representative agents knows that signals themselves are
stochastic, and hence forms rational expectations about their future evolution.
Fluctuations in global liquidity are modeled as a standard two-point, regime-
switching Markov process that can drive either fluctuations in the world real
interest rate or in the fraction of income that can be pledged in credit markets.
The regime realizations are xh (low liquidity) and xl (high liquidity) with xh > xl
for x = R, κ. Continuation transition probabilities are denoted Fhh ≡ p(xt+1 =
xh | xt = x
h) and Fll ≡ p(xt+1 = xl | xt = xl), and switching probabilities are
Fhl = 1 − Fhh and Flh = 1 − Fll. The long-run probabilities of each regime are
Πh = Flh/(Flh+ Fhl) and Πl = Fhl/(Flh+ Fhl) respectively, and the mean durations
are 1/Fhl and 1/Flh.
3.3. Optimal Financial Policies
Following Bianchi (2011), we study optimal financial policy by first characterizing
the solution to a constrained planner’s (or financial regulator’s) problem, in which
97
the regulator chooses directly the economy’s bond holdings (i.e. debt) facing
the same credit constraint as private agents, but lets all other markets operate
competitively.
The regulator’s optimal policy problem can be formulated as a recursive dynamic
programming problem, following the standard convention of denoting with a
prime variables dated t+ 1:
V(b, e) = max
pN,cT ,cN,mT ,mN,b′
[
u
([
ω
(
cT
)−η
+ (1 −ω)
(
cN
)−η]− 1η)
+βEV(b′, e′)
]
(3.15)
subject to
cT +AT + pm(mT +mN) + qb′ = b+ zTmT
αT
(3.16)
cN +AN = zNmN
αN
(3.17)
qb′ > −κ[(1 −αT)zTmTt
αT
+ (1 −αN)pNzNmNt
αN
] (3.18)
pN =
(
1 −ω
ω
)(
cT
cN
)η+1
(3.19)
This Bellman equation has a single endogenous state variable, current bond hold-
ings, b, and four exogenous shocks that are included in the vector of exogenous
states: e = (zT , zN, s,q).
The constraints in the regulator’s optimal policy problem include: the resource
constraint for tradables ((3.16)), the market-clearing condition for nontradables
((3.17)), the credit constraint with profits as determined in competitive markets
((3.18)), plus an implementability constraint that requires that the equilibrium
price of nontradables matches the representative agent’s marginal rate of substi-
tution in consumption of tradables and nontradables ((3.19))
Deriving the first-order conditions of the regulator’s problem, simplifying them,
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and expressing them in sequential form yields:
λt = uT (t) + µtκψt (3.20)
λt =
β
qt
Et [λt+1] + µt (3.21)
pNt αNz
N
t m
N
t
αN−1
= pm
 λt
λt + µtκ(1 −αN)
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N
t c
N
t +c
T
t
cTt
)(1 + AT
cNt
)
]
(3.22)
αTzTtm
T
t
αT−1
= pm
[
λt
λt + µtκ(1 −αT)
]
(3.23)
In these expressions, λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers on the resource con-
straint and credit constraint respectively, and ψt ≡
[
(1 + η)p
N
t [(1−αN)z
N
t m
N
t
αN
)
cTt
]
.
The term ψt in the first optimality condition measures how the regulator’s choice
of bt+1 affects borrowing capacity via its effect on tradables consumption and
the equilibrium price of nontradables (i.e. by affecting the value of collateral). It
follows then that the term µtκψt shows that, when the credit constraint binds,
the social marginal benefit from consumption of tradable includes not only the
marginal utility of tradables consumption, but also the gains resulting from how
changes in tradables consumption help relax the credit constraint. Note also that
the magnitude of ψt falls with the elasticity of substitution in consumption of
tradables and nontradables, because the price of nontradables falls less during a
crisis the higher this elasticity, and rises with the ratio of profits from the non-
tradables sector to consumption of tradables.
Optimal financial policy in this setup includes macroprudential or ex-ante policy,
defined as policy used when the credit constraint is not binding at date t but can
bind with some probability at t+1, and ex-post financial policy, defined as policy
that is active when the constraint binds at date t. In particular, the aim of the
macroprudential policy is to affect credit allocations in normal times because of
what those allocations can cause during crisis times. Hence, this type of policy
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is active when µt = 0 but Et[µt+1] > 0. In this scenario, the regulator’s Euler
equation (eq. (21)) takes this form:
uT (t) =
β
qt
Et [uT (t+ 1) + µt+1κψt+1] (3.24)
Comparing this condition with the household’s Euler equation for bonds shows
that this model features the usual wedge between the private and social marginal
cost of borrowing from the literature on macroprudential policy, which is given by
the term µt+1κψt+1. In particular, when the credit constraint is expected to bind,
the regulator faces a strictly higher marginal cost of borrowing than the represen-
tative agent. This is a pecuniary externality, because it results from the fact that
the regulator evaluates borrowing choices at t taking into account that the credit
constraint could bind at t+ 1, and if it does the Fisherian debt-deflation mech-
anism will cause a collapse of the relative price of nontradables (i.e. a collapse
of the real exchange rate) that will shrink borrowing capacity. The representative
agent takes prices as given, and thus does not internalize these effects.
The terms in square brackets in the right-hand-side of the third and fourth op-
timality conditions (equations (22) and (23)) capture the regulator’s incentives to
use financial policy ex-post, when the credit constraint binds. In particular, when
µt > 0, the regulator finds it optimal to introduce wedges between the value of the
marginal product of inputs and their marginal cost in each sector, which indicates
that the sectoral social marginal costs of inputs differ from the private marginal
cost pm.
Consider first the wedge in the regulator’s optimality condition for production
of nontradables. This wedge captures the effects of changes in inputs allocated
to production of nontradables on borrowing capacity induced via changes in the
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output and price of nontradables.6 Borrowing capacity is affected by three ef-
fects: First, an increase in demand for inputs, which are tradable goods, reduces
resources available for tradables consumption, contributing to lower the nontrad-
ables price. Second, the increased production of nontrables obtained with the
increase in inputs also lowers the price of nontradables because of the higher
supply of these goods. Third, the additional profits generated by the increase in
production increase pledgeable resources. The first two effects reduce borrow-
ing capacity while the third increases it. The first two effects are also pecuniary
externalities, because they capture price effects of production decisions that are
not internalized by private nontradables producers, and the third effect is a non-
pecuniary externality that captures the effects of these producers’ decisions on the
representative agent’s access to world debt markets, which are not internalized by
firms.
The wedge in the regulator’s optimality condition for production of tradables has
a similar intuition: It captures the effects of changes in inputs allocated to produc-
tion of tradables on borrowing capacity induced via changes in the output and
price of nontradables. Effects analogous to the first and third effects referred to
above are again present (i.e. again higher demand for inputs reduces tradables
consumption and makes the price of nontradables and borrowing capacity drop,
and again higher profits enhance borrowing capacity). The second effect, how-
ever, does not operate because production of tradables does not alter directly the
supply of nontradables.
6The wedge in the regulator’s first-order-condition for mt has the form

1+µtκψt
uT (t)
1+
µtκψt
∂pNt
∂cNt
uN(t)
∂pNt
∂cTt
+
µtκ(1−α)
uT (t)
,
where uT and uN are the marginal utilities of consumption of tradables and nontradables respectively,
and ∂pNt /∂c
T
t and ∂p
N
t /∂c
N
t are the derivatives of the equilibrium price of nontradables with respect to
tradables and nontradables consumption respectively. The wedge as shown in equation (22) follows from
simplifying this expression algebraically using the equilibrium price of nontradables, the definition of ψ and
the nontradables market-clearing condition.
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It is critical to note that the social marginal cost of inputs in the production of
nontradables is higher than the private marginal cost (i.e. the wedge in equation
(22) is less than 1), while the opposite is true in the tradables sector (i.e. the wedge
in eq. (23) is higher than 1). This is because the second term in the denominator
of (22) is unambiguously negative while the second term in the denominator of
(23) is unambiguously positive. Hence, although effects of the regulator’s opti-
mal plans affecting borrowing capacity in opposite directions are at work in both
sectors, as explained above, the isoelastic production and utility functions we are
using imply that the effects reducing borrowing capacity dominate in the non-
tradables sector, and the effects increasing borrowing capacity dominate in the
tradables sector.
News about future TFP in the tradables sector (e.g. about future terms of trade or
commodity prices) and regime-switches in global liquidity have important effects
on the externalities driving both macroprudential and ex-post policies. As Bianchi
et al. (2016a) explained, “good news” at t about productivity in the tradables
sector at t+ 1 lead to higher consumption, and since the resulting gain in income
has not been realized yet, this leads to an increase in borrowing which makes
the economy more vulnerable to hitting the credit constraint. On the other hand,
by increasing expected future income, good news also increase on expectation
the future borrowing capacity and at the same time reduce future borrowing
needs. Similarly, a shift into a regime with high global liquidity leads the economy
to take on more debt (e.g. a switch to a lower interest rate makes borrowing
cheaper). A sudden shift into a low global liquidity regime can lead to a decline
in consumption, which in turn makes the credit constraint tighter and leads to
a sharp reduction in both production and capital flows, and a drop in the real
exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of nontradables).
The constrained-efficient allocations and prices that solve the planner’s problem
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can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium using various policy instru-
ments, including taxes on debt, debt-to-income ratios, capital requirements or re-
serve requirements (see Bianchi (2011), Stein (2012)). Since the market failures are
in the form of externalities, the natural instruments to consider are standard taxes
on the cost of the good associated with each externality. In particular, the regula-
tor can implement the optimal allocations by taxing debt, taxing input purchases
in the nontradables sector, and subsidizing input purchases in the tradables sec-
tor.
With a debt tax, the cost of purchasing bonds in the budget constraint becomes
[qt/(1 + τt)]bt+1. We assume also that the revenue of the tax is rebated to the
household as a lump-sum transfer to neutralize income effects from this tax. The
optimal macroprudential tax is then the value of τt that equates the Euler equa-
tions of bonds of the regulator and the decentralized equilibrium with the tax.
Hence, the tax induces private agents to face the social marginal cost of borrow-
ing in the states in which this cost differs from the private cost in the absence of
macroprudential policy. When µt = 0, the optimal macro-prudential tax is:
τt =
Et [µt+1κψt+1]
Et [uT (t+ 1)]
(3.25)
Notice that the numerator of this tax is equal to the expected value of the pecu-
niary externality.
With a tax τNt on input costs in the nontradables industry, the total cost of inputs
in that sector becomes pm(1 + τNt )m
N
t . Similarly, with a subsidy s
T on input costs
in the tradables industry, the total cost of inputs in that sector becomes pm(1 −
sTt )m
T
t . The optimal gross tax and subsidy are those such that (1+τ
N
t ) and (1− s
T
t )
match the wedges in the square-bracket terms in the right-hand-sides of equations
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(22) and (23) respectively. Hence the optimal tax and subsidy are:
τNt =
 λt
λt + µtκ(1 −αN)
[
1 − (p
N
t c
N
t +c
T
t
cTt
)(1 + AT
cNt
)
]
− 1 (3.26)
sTt = 1 −
[
λt
λt + µtκ(1 −αT)
]
(3.27)
Since the social marginal costs of inputs differ from the private marginal cost
only when the constraint binds at date t, both the tax and the subsidy are zero
if the constraint is not binding. When the constraint binds, the government taxes
production of nontradables and stimulates the production of tradables (both the
tax and subsidy rates are strictly positive when µt > 0). Notice also that profits are
still given by the same expressions as before, because the optimality conditions
for the demand for inputs with the tax and subsidy still imply that profits are
πNt = (1 − αN)z
N
t m
N
t
αN (πTt = (1 − αT)z
T
tm
T
t
αT ). Hence, in order to neutralize
the budgetary effects of these production taxes and subsidies at equilibrium, we
can assume that households are levied lump-sum taxes to pay for subsidies and
lump-sum transfers to rebate tax revenues.
It is worth noting that, according to the above two conditions setting the optimal
production taxes and subsidies, we should expect taxes on nontradables to be
much larger in absolute value than subsidies on tradables. The expressions for
the two are similar, and in addition in our calibration αT > αN, which tends to
make the subsidy on tradables larger than the tax on nontradables. But the key
difference in the two expressions is the term in square brackets in the denomi-
nator of the nontradables tax, which in turn captures the effect missing from the
wedge in the optimal allocation of inputs for tradables production relative to that
pertaining to nontradables production mentioned earlier: Production of tradables
does not alter directly the supply of nontradables, while production of nontrad-
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ables does, and this in turn affects the value of collateral (pN) and thus borrowing
capacity. This effect is larger the larger is nontradables consumption relative to
tradables consumption.
With the three policy instruments and lump-sum taxes and transfers in place, the
budget constraint of the household becomes:
qt
1 + τt
bt+1 + c
T
t + p
N
t c
N
t +A
T + pNt A
N = bt + π
T
t + π
N
t + Trt. (3.28)
The government sets Trt = −qtbt+1 τ1+τ + τ
N
t m
N
t − s
T
tm
T
t , which is a lump-sum
transfer if positive or tax if negative. Substituting profits from the producers’
optimal plans, using the nontradables market-clearing condition, and the govern-
ment’s total transfers, we recover again the resource constraint for tradables of
both the decentralized equilibrium and the planner’s problem.
It is worth noting that this setup also preserves the property that the debt tax is
inessential when the collateral constraint binds, as in the setup of Bianchi et al.
(2016a). Any value of τt consistent with the collateral constraint being bind-
ing in the competitive equilibrium with taxes (i.e. any τt such that UT (t) >
β
qt
(1 + τt)Et[UT (t + 1)]) can support the planner’s allocations and prices. With
the tax and subsidy on input purchases by producers of nontradables and trad-
ables set to their corresponding optimal values when the constraint binds, the
consumption, input and debt allocations are determined without the consump-
tion Euler equation, and therefore without the debt tax. For simplicity, we set
the debt tax to zero in these situations, after verifying that it is in the range of
inessential debt taxes.
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3.4. Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1. Calibration
The parameterization follows the one constructed by Bianchi et al. (2016a), but
here we use data for Colombia and use a quarterly frequency. The main differ-
ence is in that, since we have added production with intermediate goods into the
model, we need to calibrate the sectoral shares of intermediate goods in the pro-
duction functions of tradables and nontradables and the sectoral TFP shocks. The
parameter values used to calibrate the model are shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Baseline Calibration
ParameterValues
αT 0.487
αN 0.210
zN 1.000
Z 3
θ 23
E[zT ] 1
ρzT 0.860
σzT 0.015
β 0.989
γ 2.000
η 0.205
κ 0.870
ω 0.460
Rh 1.013
Rl 0.992
Fhh 0.983
Fll 0.900
As in Bianchi et al. (2016a), we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to γ = 2,
which is a standard value. We also follow their calibration in setting η = 0.205.
The value of this parameter is important because, as we explained earlier, the elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption of tradables and nontradables (1/(1 + η)) is
a key determinant of the response of the price of nontradables to changes in sec-
toral consumption allocations, and hence of the size of the pecuniary externality
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and the collapse in the nontradables price when a crisis hits.
The factor shares of intermediate goods in production of tradables and nontrad-
ables are set according to information from the Colombian input-output matrix.
Since we are abstracting from nontradable inputs, we re-define gross production
in each sector as the sum of value added plus tradable inputs, with the breakdown
between tradable and nontradable sectors constructed by defining the former as
including those sectors for which total trade (exports plus imports) exceeds 10
percent of gross production. The value of αT is then set equal to the ratio of
tradable inputs used in all tradable sectors to the combined gross output of all
tradable sectors, and similarly, the value of αN is set equal to the ratio of tradable
inputs used in the nontradables sector to the combined value added of all non-
tradable sectors. This results in factor shares of 49 and 21 percent in the tradables
and nontradables sector respectively. Notice from expressions (26) and (27) that
both the tax on nontradables and the subsidy on tradables are higher when their
corresponding factor share is lower, with a factor of proportionality that depends
on µtκ.
The joint Markov process of the tradables productivity and news signals is set as
follows. First, we set ρzT = 0.860 and σzT = 0.015 so as to match the first-order
autocorrelation and standard deviation of the HP-filtered cyclical component of
GDP from Colombian data. Second, we use the Tauchen-Hussey quadrature al-
gorithm to construct a Markov process with three realizations of tradables TFP
shocks (Z = 3). Third, to set the value of θ, recall that we are assuming that the
signals also have three realizations. Hence, θ = 13 makes news completely unin-
formative and θ = 1 makes news a perfect predictor of yTt+1 as of date t. Thus,
following again Bianchi et al. (2016a), we set θ to the mid point between these two
extremes so that θ = 23 . For simplicity, we also assume that the signal realizations
and the vector of realizations of zT are identical, and we abstract from TFP shocks
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in the nontradables sector.
Global liquidity phases 
(ex post real return on 90-day U.S. Tbills) 
Figure 20: Global Liquidity Regimes
The regime-switching process of the world interest rate also matches the one
used by Bianchi et al. They constructed it so as to capture the global liquidity
phases identified in the studies by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) and
Shin (2013), using data on the ex-post net real interest rate on 90-day U.S. trea-
sury bills from the first quarter of 1955 to the third quarter of 2014. Calvo et al.
identified in data for the 1988-1994 period a surge in capital inflows to emerging
markets that coincided with a trough of −1 percent in the net U.S. real interest rate
in the second half of 1993. Shin found two global liquidity phases, one in the first
half of the 2000s with a real interest rate through of around −5.5 percent in early
2004, and another one in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, with
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the net real interest rate hovering around -3 percent since 2009. Taking the aver-
age over the troughs in the Calvo et al. sample and in the first of Shin’s global
liquidity phases, we set a −0.82 percent real interest rate for the high liquidity
regime, which in gross terms implies Rl = 0.9918. Given this, and the transition
probabilities across regimes calibrated below, we set Rh = 1.013 so that the mean
interest rate of the regime-switching process matches the full-sample average in
our data, which was 1 percent.
Constructing estimates of the duration of the global liquidity phases is difficult,
because the era of financial globalization, and hence global liquidity shifts, started
in the 1980s, and of the three global liquidity phases observed since then, the third
is heavily influenced by the unconventional policies used after the 2008 crisis.
Using data from the first two phases, it follows that the duration of Rl was 10
quarters, which thus leaves a duration of 60 quarters for Rh, starting the sample
in 1980. This yields Fhh = 0.983 and Fll = 0.9 at quarterly frequency.
The discount factor β is set to match an average net foreign asset position-GDP
ratio of −0.79, which is the quarterly equivalent of the annual average for Colom-
bia in the data of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). We set ω = 0.460 to obtain a
share of tradables output over total output of 0.30 for Colombia in a determin-
istic version of the model with constant b. Given the calibrated value of b, ω is
obtained from y
T
1−ω
ω
(
yT+(R−1)b
yN
)η+1
yN+yT
= 0.30 7.
Finally, we calibrate the value of κ so that, conditional on all the other calibrated
parameter values, the model yields a frequency of crises of 3 percent, in line
with estimates of the annual frequency of financial crises and sudden stops (see
Mendoza (2010)). This yields a value of κ = 0.87. We target the annual frequency
of crises because in the quarterly model simulation we count successive quarters
7The mean values of tradables and nontradables output are set to one. This is an innocuous assumption.
Since we calibrate the model to match the observed share of tradables output in total output, 0.3, a different
value for yN would lead to a different calibrated value of ω, which in turn would keep the total income
unchanged. Thus a different value of yN would not change the borrowing decisions
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of a financial crises as a single event.
3.4.2. Long-run and Financial Crisis Moments
Table 11 shows a set of the moments that characterize the decentralized equilib-
rium without policy intervention (DE) and the social planner’s equilibrium (SP)
with the optimal financial policy. The top panel shows the mean net foreign asset
position-output ratio, the standard deviation of the current account-output ra-
tio, the welfare gain of adopting the optimal policy, the probability of a financial
crisis, the probability of observing a binding collateral constraint, and the proba-
bility of being in the macroprudential tax region (i.e. the probability that µt = 0
and Et[µt+1] > 0).8
The mean debt ratios are similar in the two scenarios. In the DE baseline calibra-
tion, we set β = 0.989 to match the average quarterly NFA-GDP ratio in the data
for Colombia. The mean debt ratio of the planner is slightly smaller (76.7 percent),
because of the reduced incentive to borrow once the pecuniary externality is re-
moved. In contrast, the variability of the current account in DE is roughly twice as
large as in SP. Thus, the two economies support similar long-run debt positions,
but the optimal financial policy halves the volatility of capital flows. This finding
is in line with Bianchi (2011), who showed that optimal macroprudential policy
achieves a reduction in volatility despite small changes in average debt ratios.
The optimal policy also reduces the probability of crises from 2.95 percent in DE
to 0 in SP, and the probability that the constraint binds falls from 16.8 percent to
3.2 percent. Note that in the DE the frequency with which the constraint binds
(16.8 percent) is 5.7 times the frequency with which financial crises occur, hence
there are several periods in which the constraint binds but there is no crisis (i.e.
the correction in the debt position is not enough to trigger a sufficiently large
current account reversal). The frequency with which the macroprudential tax is
active in the SP scenario is about 10 percent, while the frequency with which the
8See the notes to Table 2 for the definitions of crisis and welfare used in these exercises.
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production taxes and subsidies are used is only 3.2 percent since these taxes are
used only when the collateral constraint binds for the planner. These frequency
results, however, are not informative about the size of the taxes and subsidies,
they only measure the likelihood of observing them.
The optimal policy increases social welfare by a sizable amount, equivalent to a
permanent increase of roughly 1.3 percent in consumption. This is interesting be-
cause typically welfare gains of smoothing fluctuations are negligible in standard
business cycle models with CRRA preferences. In this model, the gains are larger
because of both the significant reduction in long-run volatility and the removal
of infrequent but dramatic crisis events, in which quarterly consumption drops
significantly, as we show next.
Table 11: Baseline Model Moments
(1) (2)
Long-run Moments DE SP
E[B/Y] % -78.91 -76.65
σ(CA/Y) % 2.11 0.99
Welfare Gain 1 % n/a 1.27
Prob. of Crisis 2 % 2.95 0.00
Pr(µt > 0) % 16.79 3.20
Prob. of MP tax region % n.a. 10.01
Financial Crisis Moments
∆C% -5.38 -1.33
∆RER% -5.58 -0.59
∆CA/Y% 7.04 -0.35
E[τ] pre-crisis 3 % n.a. 0.05
E[sT ] at-crisis 4 % n.a. 0.07
E[τN] at-crisis 5 % n.a. 0.61
1 Welfare gains are computed as compensating variations in consumption constant across dates and
states that equate welfare in the DE and SP. The welfare gain W at state (b,z) is given by (1 +
W(b, z))1−σVDE(b, z) = VSP(b, z). The long-run average is computed using the ergodic distribution of
the DE.
2 A financial crisis is defined as a period in which the constraint binds and the current account (CA/Y)
raises by more than two standard deviations in the ergodic distribution of the decentralized economy, which
implies a reversal in (CA/Y) larger than 4.2 percent.
3 Average τ in the period before financial crises.
4 Average sT in starting period of financial crises.
5 Average τN in the starting period of financial crises.
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The bottom panel of Table 11 shows moments that summarize the main features
of financial crises in both the DE and SP solutions. First we report three statistics
about the average magnitude of crises: the drops in aggregate consumption (∆C)
and the real exchange rate (∆RER), and the reversal in the current account-output
ratio (∆CA/Y). For the DE, these statistics are averages of the impact effects that
occur when a financial crisis hits, computed with the corresponding economy’s
long-run distribution of the state variables (b, z) conditional on the economy being
in a financial crisis state. For the SP, we report averages of the responses of the
variables under identical sequences of exogenous shocks as in the DE using the
SP’s long run distribution. The Table also shows the average macroprudential tax
before a crisis occurs (E [τ] pre-crisis), the subsidy on input costs of the tradables
sector (E
[
sT
]
), and the tax on input costs of the nontradables sector (E
[
τN
]
).
The results in the DE column show that financial crises in this model result in
large declines in consumption and the real exchange rate, and large current-
account reversals. The much smaller fluctuations in the SP column show that
the optimal financial policy reduces significantly the severity of crises.
In terms of the policy instruments, the size of the taxes and subsidies is small:
On average over the three years before a crisis, the macroprudential debt tax is
0.05 percent, while the averages across crises periods for the subsidy on tradables
producers and the tax on nontradables producers are 0.07 and 0.61 percent re-
spectively (with the latter nearly 9 times bigger than the former). Hence, in this
model the optimal financial policy is quite effective at reducing the frequency and
severity of financial crises with relatively small taxes and subsidies.
The effects of the pecuniary externality on borrowing choices, particularly the
incentive to over-borrow in the DE, and the effectiveness of the macroprudential
policy at containing these effects are both illustrated in the long-run distribu-
tions of bond holdings shown in Figure 21.Note also that the twin-peaked nature
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Figure 21: Ergodic Distributions of Bond Holdings
of these distributions results from the twin-peaked distribution of interest-rate
shocks characteristic of their two-point, regime-switching specification.
3.4.3. Crisis Dynamics
We study next macroeconomic dynamics around crisis events. Figure 22 plots
event-analysis windows for the price of nontradables, the debt choice, aggregate
consumption and the current account-GDP ratio that highlight these dynamics.
The windows show deviations from long-run averages spanning seven quarters,
centered on the quarter a crisis occurs, with the DE shown in continuous, red
curves and the SP in dashed, blue curves.9 The movements observed when fi-
nancial crises hit in the DE emerge as sharp, non-linear drops in the nontradables
prices, debt and consumption, and a sharp current account reversal (i.e. a Sudden
Stop), relative to the much smoother pre-crisis patterns.10 Recoveries after crisis
are relatively slow in the DE, with prices, debt and consumption still sharply
below their long-run means three quarters after the crisis hits. The effectiveness
of the optimal financial policy at reducing the severity of crises is evident in the
much smoother dynamics of the SP economy.
Figure 23 shows the composition of the shocks at work in the model in the seven
9Details of the event-analysis construction are documented in an Appendix available on request.
10In the top-left graph with the plots for b ′, a decline indicates a reduction in debt, because both the values
of bt+1 and the long-run averages are negative.
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Figure 22: Baseline DE v. SP around Crises
periods covered in the event windows, by plotting the fraction of realizations of
each shock that were observed each quarter. The top panel is for news signals,
the mid panel for interest rate regimes, and the bottom panel for tradables TFP
shocks. As one would expect, financial crises are periods that largely coincide
with high real interest rates and low productivity/income realizations. On the
other hand, less than 55 percent of financial crises coincide with bad news (i.e.
bad news at t = 0 in the top panel of the Figure). The pre-crisis phase is char-
acterized also by mainly high interest rates, and by average or bad TFP shocks.
In contrast, and in line with the intuition for the mechanism relating news to
financial crises described earlier, in the pre-crisis phase there is a non-trivial frac-
tion of observations of good and average news. Hence, several crisis episodes are
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preceded by good and average TFP news in the periods leading up to the crisis,
followed by actual low TFP realizations when the crisis hits.
Figure 23: Exogenous Shocks around Crises Events
3.4.4. Complexity of the Optimal Policy
The results discussed up to this point show that the optimal financial policy is
very effective, in terms of reducing the frequency and severity of financial crises
and increasing social welfare. We show next that, despite these positive results,
the optimal policy is also very complex. Implementing the optimal debt and pro-
duction taxes is challenging because they require precise knowledge of the state
of the economy at each point in time. In particular, the optimal macroprudential
debt tax requires knowing the probability that a crisis may hit one period ahead
conditional on financial and macroeconomic conditions in the current period. But
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even if precise information is available, the results we report below show that the
optimal policy has significant variation over time and across states of nature.
Figure 24 shows the evolution of the optimal policy instruments in the regulated
decentralized economy around financial crises events. The top-left plot shows the
probability of the leverage constraint being binding. The other three plots show
the evolution of the optimal macroprudential debt tax, the nontradables input tax
and the tradables input subsidy. For these three, the plots show unconditional
averages for each period of the event windows, and in addition for the input
tax and subsides we show averages conditional on the leverage constraint being
binding (since when the constraint does not bind both are zero), and for the debt
tax we show the average conditional on the constraint not being binding (since
when the constraint binds the debt tax is zero).
The plot of the macroprudential debt tax shows the pro-cyclical nature of this
policy. Conditional on credit not being constrained, the macroprudential debt
tax rises from about 0.03 to a just above 0.08 percent in the quarters before the
crisis, and falls to near 0.04 percent in the post-crisis phase. Thus, while debt
taxes are low on average, they still display significant variability over time. In
addition, debt taxes are very active around crisis times. Recall from Table 2 that
the debt tax is active 10 percent of the time in the long run, but the fact that
the unconditional and conditional-on-unconstrained-credit averages in the event
window are very similar suggests that this policy is active most of the time in the
periods covered by the window. The probability with which the debt tax is being
used each period cannot be inferred unambiguously from the gap between the
two averages, because the constraint not being binding at t is necessary but not
sufficient for the debt tax to be used. This requires in addition that the constraint
is expected to bind at t+ 1 at least in some states of nature.
The evolution of input taxes and subsidies around crises is countercyclical, and
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Figure 24: Policy Instruments around Crisis Events
the averages conditional on the constraint being binding are much higher than the
unconditional averages. This occurs because these two instruments are zero when
the constraint does not bind, and the probability of the constraint being binding
for the planner is generally low. Focusing on averages when the constraint binds
(i.e. when these instruments are used), the tax on inputs for the nontradables sec-
tor falls from about 2.8 percent to 2 percent in the pre-crisis phase, and then rises
gradually to about 2.5 percent in the post-crisis phase. The subsidy on inputs for
the tradables sector falls from 0.33 percent to 0.24 percent, and then rises back to
about 0.3 percent. Thus, while less volatile in terms of variance than the debt tax,
these two instruments also fluctuate markedly around crisis times. Moreover, in
terms of rates at which the three instruments are set, the tax on nontradables has
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a much higher average hovering around 2.5 percent (conditional on the constraint
being binding). This is because of the direct effect of the nontradables tax on the
supply of nontradables, and hence on its relative price, discussed earlier.
The production taxes and subsidies are used much less frequently than the debt
tax in the long run, since the probability of the constraint being binding is 3.2
percent v. 10 percent probability of using the debt tax (see Table 2). Around crisis
events, the top-right plot of Figure 24 shows that the probability of the constraint
being biding for the SP (which is the probability which which the production taxes
and subsidies are used) rises monotonically in the pre-crisis phase, from near zero
to 20 percent, and post-crisis it falls slowly to about 10 percent. From the period
just before the crisis hits to the last post-crisis period of the event windows, the
production taxes and subsidies are used with frequencies of 10 to 20 percent.
The complexity of the optimal financial policy is also reflected in significant, non-
linear variation of the state-contingent schedules of the three policy instruments.
We study this issue by examining how these schedules vary across states of na-
ture, particularly across news signals and liquidity regimes.
We examine first how the macroprudential debt tax varies with the three values
that the news signal can take. Figure 25 shows the schedule of debt taxes for bad,
average and good news as a function of the value of b organized in four plots: (a)
for low zT and Rh, (b) for medium zT and Rh, (c) for low zT and Rl, and (d) for
medium zT and Rl.11 In all four plots, there is always a threshold value of b above
which the debt tax is zero, because the debt is too low for the constraint to bind
both contemporaneously and in any state of nature in which the economy can
land the following period. Below this threshold, the constraint can bind in some
states in the following period, so the debt tax is positive, until b is low enough
to reach a second threshold in which the constraint binds contemporaneously,
at which point the debt tax becomes zero by construction as explained in the
11In the baseline simulations, for high zT the macro-prudential tax is always zero.
118
previous Section.
Consider first states with low global liquidity (high real interest rate) at some
date-t. If TFP is low (top, left panel of Figure 25), the debt tax is only used in
a narrow range of b around -0.84, and the tax is higher for good news. With
average TFP, however, the top, right panel of the Figure shows that the tax is used
in a wider range for b < −0.85, at much higher tax rates, and with higher taxes
for bad news. Moreover, the tax rises monotonically as debt rises (b falls). On the
other hand, the two plots in the bottom segment of the Figure show that, if global
liquidity is high (low R), the debt tax is higher with bad news for both bad and
average TFP, and has a non-monotonic bell-shape in debt.
Figure 25: Optimal Debt Tax Schedules: Effect of News
These non-linearities of the optimal debt tax are in line with previous findings
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reported by Bianchi et al. (2016a), and reflect the opposing forces affecting bor-
rowing decisions in the presence of noisy news, and their interaction with the
actual productivity realization. Since the productivity process is persistent, when
the news about next period coincide with the current state, the news add little to
the information agents have, but when the news point towards a different produc-
tivity level than the current one, agents update their expectations with the news.
The planner sees some extra risk in overborrowing, and hence acts as if it were
more pessimistic about the news.
Figure 26: Optimal Input Taxes for low TFP shock: Effect of News
Figure 26 shows similar plots for the nontradables sector input tax and the trad-
ables sector input subsidy as those for the debt tax in Figure 25, but for the low
TFP shock only, because the production policy instruments are only active when
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the collateral constraint binds, and this only happens when TFP is low (and b is
sufficiently low) in our baseline calibration. The plots in the left side of the Fig-
ure are for the subsidy on tradables sector inputs, and those in the right side are
for the nontradables input tax. Nontradable sector input taxes are much larger in
magnitude than the tradable sector input subsidies, which as we explained earlier
is due to the direct effect of the former on the supply of nontradables, and hence
on the value of collateral and borrowing capacity.
These plots show that the production policy instruments are set at higher rates
as debt becomes more constrained, which occurs as b falls further below the
threshold at which the collateral constraint begins to bind. The production tax
and subsidies do vary widely, however, as global liquidity and news change.
When global liquidity is low (high R), the rates of the optimal production tax
and subsidies are higher than when liquidity is high (low R). With low liquidity
the tax and subsidy rates are invariant to the news received, whereas with high
liquidity the tax and subsidy rates are higher with bad news than with average
or good news.
The optimal policy is also likely to display wide variations depending on the
stochastic structure of the underlying shocks driving the economy. For instance,
solving the model assuming a constant interest rate (i.e. without global liquidity
shocks), the frequency with which the optimal macroprudential debt tax is used
increases from 10 percent in the baseline to 23.2 percent, and the frequency with
which the optimal production taxes and subsidies are used rises from 3.2 to 11.2
percent. The average debt tax in pre-crisis periods rises from 0.05 to 0.12 percent.
3.4.5. Simple Financial Policies
Given that the optimal financial policy is very effective but also very complex, it is
important to consider the possibility that the policymaker may only have access
to policy rules that are much simpler than the optimal policy. This raises the
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question of whether these simpler policies can still be effective. To shed light on
this question, we compare the effects of the optimal policy with those produced
by simple policies that restrict the policy instruments to be be time- and state-
invariant (i.e. constant taxes).
We consider two alternative simple policy rules. First, a rule that sets the con-
stant policy rates equal to the long-run average rates under the optimal policy
(denoted CT@SPavg). Hence, under this simple rule the policy rates are set
to (τN, sT , τ) = (0.20, 0.02, 0.02) in percentages. The second simple rule corre-
sponds to the triple (τN, sT , τ) of constant policy rates that attains highest social
welfare, in terms of expected lifetime utility (denoted CT@optim). To find this
triple, we use a derivative-free routine starting from the unregulated DE, in which
(τN, sT , τ) = (0, 0, 0). The resulting welfare-maximizing triple of constant policy
rates is (τN, sT , τ) = (1.87, 0.05, 0.047). The ergodic distributions produced by
these simple rules are shown in Figure 27, and the performance of these policies
is compared with the optimal policy in Table 12.
Figure 27 shows that the ergodic distributions of bonds widen under the simple
policy rules. As can be seen in Table 12, both of the simple rules reduce the
average debt of the economy (i.e. increase NFA). However, agents are now less
afraid of hitting the constraint, as shown by the position of the peaks in Figure
27.
Figure 27: Ergodic Distributions of Bonds with Simpler Policy Rules
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Table 12 shows that the simple rules we considered are significantly less effective
than the optimal policy, and can even be welfare reducing. Relative to the DE,
CT@optim still yields a sizable drop in the probability of crises (from 3 to 1
percent), and it also reduces the severity of crises markedly (with smaller drops in
consumption and the real exchange rate and a smaller current account reversal).
Still, the optimal policy is significantly more effective in terms of reducing the
frequency and magnitude of crises, and it yields a welfare gain that is about 60
basis points larger.
Constant policy rates set at the average of the optimal policy with CT@SPavg
rule are significantly inferior to both the optimal policy and the CT@optim rule.
Under CT@SPavg, the probability of crisis is only slightly less than in the un-
regulated DE, the magnitude of crises is nearly unchanged, and in fact there is a
small welfare loss of -0.02 percent. Hence, agents are worse off with this “poorly
designed” financial policy than in the economy without any financial policy.
These results are in line with results obtained by Bianchi and Mendoza (2017).
They found that simple rules for macroprudential debt taxes, in a model in which
assets serve as collateral, are less effective than the optimal policy even when
optimized to maximize welfare gains, and even allowing for time-varying, log-
linear policy rules.
It is worth noting that the CT@optim rule sets a constant debt tax and a constant
subsidy for inputs used in the tradables sector that are similar to the values set
under the optimal policy for the debt tax before crises and for the tradables sub-
sidy during cries. In contrast, it sets a constant tax on inputs for the nontradables
sector that is three times bigger than the crises average under the optimal policy.
By doing this, the regulator with the CT@Optim rule aims to prop up the relative
price of nontradables more than under the optimal policy, and to do so perma-
nently and not just when a crisis hits. This reduces the severity of crises when
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they happen, but also makes it less likely that the credit constraint can bind, and
thus that crises can happen. On the other hand, the policy is inferior to the op-
timal policy because it induces misallocation of inputs across sectors at all times,
instead of just during crisis events.
Table 12: Comparison of Optimal v. Simple Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-run Moments DE SP CT optimCT @ SPavg
E[B/Y]% -78.91-76.65 -70.70 -77.46
σ(CA/Y)% 2.11 0.99 1.13 2.07
Welfare Gain1% n/a 1.27 0.69 -0.02
Prob of Crisis1% 2.95 0.00 1.07 2.78
Financial Crisis Moments
∆C % -5.38 -1.33 -3.98 -5.11
∆RER% -5.58 -1.33 -4.74 -5.59
∆CA/Y% 7.04 -0.04 2.15 6.76
E[τ] pre-crisis2% n.a. 0.05 0.047 0.02
E[sT ] at-crisis2% n.a. 0.07 0.05 0.02
E[τN] at-crisis2% n.a. 0.61 1.87 0.20
1 See notes on Table 11.
2 For the two simple rules with constant policy rates, the aver-
ages pre-crisis and at-crisis are the same as the unconditional
averages by construction.
Figure 28 shows event analysis windows that compare the macroeconomic dy-
namics of financial crises under the two simple policy rules and the unregulated
DE. These plots illustrate again the result that the CT@SPavg rule has negligible
effects in terms of reducing the severity of crises. They also illustrate the mecha-
nism by which the CT@optim rule manages to do much better than CT@SPavg
mentioned earlier: When a crisis hits, it implies less severe declines in the rela-
tive price of nontradables and debt (recall that higher numbers in the graph for
b ′ indicate higher debt levels relative to the long-run average), and smaller cur-
rent account reversals and consumption drops. Moreover, it also sustains higher
debt levels at all times, since it reduces the likelihood of crises by propping up
collateral values permanently.
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Figure 28: Financial Crisis Events with Simple Policies
3.5. Conclusions
This paper studied optimal financial policy in a liability dollarization model of
financial crises driven by an occasionally binding collateral constraint. Agents in
a small open economy have access to debt denominated in units of tradable goods,
but face a constraint limiting their debt not to exceed a fraction of the market value
of their total income also valued in units of tradables, which includes income
from the tradables sector and income from the nontradables sector valued at the
equilibrium relative price of nontradables (i.e. the real exchange rate). Similar
models have been widely used to study macroprudential policy, because they
embody a pecuniary externality that justifies policy intervention. In particular, in
normal times agents do not internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on
the size of the collapse in the price of nontradables, and hence on the collapse in
collateral values and borrowing capacity, in crisis times.
The model we studied is based on the model proposed by Bianchi et al. (2016a).
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They examined a liability dollarization model driven by conventional and uncon-
ventional shocks, with the latter including fluctuations across regimes of global
liquidity (e.g. a regime-switching specification of world interest rate shocks) and
noisy news about fundamentals (e.g. news about future tradables income). We
modified the Bianchi et al. model by introducing production of tradable and
nontradable goods using intermediate goods.
Introducing production has important implications for the optimal design of fi-
nancial policy. In particular, the optimal policy has both a macroprudential (ex
ante) component, which has the standard property of being active only when the
collateral constraint does not bind contemporaneously but may bind in the fol-
lowing period with some probability, and ex-post components that are active only
when the collateral constraint binds. The macroprudential component is modeled
in the familiar form used in the literature, as a debt tax that increases the private
marginal cost of borrowing to match the social cost in normal times. The ex-post
components take the form of a tax on input purchases levied on producers of
nontradables, and a subsidy on input purchases provided to producers of trad-
ables. These two instruments reallocate production across sectors so as to prop
up collateral values and hence borrowing capacity in crisis times.
The model was calibrated using Colombian data, and a set of quantitative ex-
periments showed that, while optimal financial policy is a very effective tool for
reducing the frequency and severity of financial crises, it is also a very complex
policy that entails significant, non-linear variation in policy instruments over time
and across states of nature. In addition, the paper shows that if only simple policy
rules in the form of time- and state-invariant policy instruments are feasible, these
simple rules are at best much less effective than the optimal policy and at worst
they can result in lower welfare than in an economy in which financial crises occur
without policy intervention.
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The findings of this paper indicate that the implementation and design of policies
aimed at tackling financial instability should proceed with caution. In particular,
specific policy rules need to be the subject of intensive quantitative assessment
with macroeconomic models that capture the relevant transmission mechanisms
that drive financial crisis and the transitions from normal to crisis times, because
otherwise seemingly harmless simple rules can actually be welfare-reducing.
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Appendix A
Appendix to How International
Reserves Reduce the Probability of
Debt Crises
A.1. Continuous State Space Heuristics
In this section it is assumed that the state space is continuous and that the value
functions X, V+ and V− and their corresponding policy functions are continu-
ously differentiable. The default decision follows from the thresholds defined in
equation (1.7) and (1.8) and those are also assumed to be differentiable.
Given the default thresholds, the problem for the government after repayment
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can be written as:
V+(y,a,b,ω) = max
a ′,b ′,c
u(c) +βΠω(ω
′ = 1)
[ ∫df(a ′,b ′,1)
−∞ X(y ′,a ′, 1)dF(y ′|y)
+
∫∞
df(a ′,b ′,1)
V+(y ′,a ′,b ′, 1)dF(y ′|y)
]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[ ∫ds(a ′,b ′,0)
−∞ X(y ′,a ′, 1)dF(y ′|y)
+
∫∞
ds(a ′,b ′,0)
V+(y ′,a ′,b ′, 0)dF(y ′|y)
]
s.t. c = y+ a−
a ′
1 + r
+ q(y,a ′,b ′,ω)
(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)
−
(
λ+ (1 − λ)z
)
b.
(A.1)
The equilibrium bond pricing equation (1.6) is then:
q(y,a ′,b ′,w) =
Πω(ω
′ = 1)
1 + r
[(
1 − F(df)
)(
λ+ (1 − λ)z
)
+ (1 − λ)
∫∞
df
q
(
y ′,a∗(s ′),b∗(s ′), 1
)
dF(y ′)
]
+
Πω(ω
′ = 0)
1 + r
[(
1 − F(ds)
)(
λ+ (1 − λ)z
)
+ (1 − λ)
∫∞
ds
q
(
y ′,a∗(s ′),b∗(s ′), 0
)
dF(y ′)
]
(A.2)
A.1.1. The change in thresholds with respect to debt and reserves
Using the implicit function theorem the impact of changes in reserves and debt
on those thresholds can be written as:
∂df(a,b,ω)
∂i
= dfi(a,b,ω) = −
V+i −Xi
V+y −Xy
∣∣∣∣∣
y=d(a,b,ω)
, (A.3)
∂ds(a,b,ω)
∂i
= dsi(a,b,ω) = −
V−i −Xi
V−y −Xy
, (A.4)
where i ∈ {a,b} and V+i is the partial derivative of the value function with respect
to i and the functions are evaluated at y = d(a,b,ω). Notice that the existence of
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the default threshold implies that at y = d(a,b,ω), V+y > Xy
The envelope conditions yield:
Xa(y,a,ω) =
∂X(y,a,ω)
∂a
= uc(cd) (A.5)
V+a (y,a,b,ω) =
∂V+(y,a,b,ω)
∂a
= uc(c) (A.6)
V+b (y,a,b,ω) =
∂V+(y,a,b,ω)
∂b
= −uc(c)
(
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q)
)
(A.7)
Next, the effect over the current default threshold of an infinitesimal change in
both current debt and reserves is computed. If the ratio of the change in reserves
to debt is α1 : α2 then the change in the fundamentals default threshold ∆(df) =
α1d
f
a +α2d
f
b is:
∆(df) = (V+y −Xy)
−1
(
α1uc(čx) + uc(č)
(
−α1 +α2λ+α2(1 − λ)(z+ q̌)
))
, (A.8)
where ž denotes the value or policy function z evaluated at the state when output
is equal to the threshold:s = (df(a,b,ω),a,b,ω), and cx is the consumption policy
in case of default.
The Self-Fulfilling default threshold change is
∆ds = dsa + d
s
b =
−V−b − V
−
a +Xa
V−y −Xy
(A.9)
The main difference is that the envelope condition for V−b now includes a multi-
plier term.
V−b = −u(c)[λ+ (1 − λ)z+ (1 − λ)Q̌
′] + µ(1 − λ)
Cole and Kehoe (2000) main insight: long term debt prevents self-fulfilling crises.
Higher λ relaxes the constraint.
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NFA-neutral change in holdings
Increase both current debt and reserves by 1$. The fundamentals default thresh-
old change is
∆df = dfa + d
f
b =
−V+b − V
+
a +Xa
V+y −Xy
.
Using the envelope conditions it reduces to:
∆df
[
uc(č) − uc(čδ)
]
= −uc(č)(1 − λ)
[
1 − z−Q(d,a ′,b ′,ω)
]
+ uc(čδ)
With one period debt (λ = 1), threshold moves up for sure. In the long term
debt case (λ < 1), the term
[
1− z−Q(d,a ′,b ′,ω)
]
is small since debt is issued on
average at par.
A.1.2. The Generalized Euler Equation (GEE)
This subsection follows Rios-Rull and Mateos-Planas (2016) and derives the first
order conditions for debt and reserves under repayment.
Using the envelope conditions. The first order conditions with respect to next
period reserves (a ′) is
∂V
∂a ′
=− uc(c)
[
(1 + r)−1 − qa ′
(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 1)
[ ∫df(a ′,b ′,1)
−∞ uc(c ′x)dF(y ′|y) +
∫∞
df(a ′,b ′,1)
uc(c
′)dF(y ′|y)
]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[ ∫ds(a ′,b ′,0)
−∞ uc(c ′x)dF(y ′|y) +
∫∞
ds(a ′,b ′,0)
uc(c
′)dF(y ′|y)
+
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)dsa ′
]
(A.10)
132
The FOC with respect to next period debt b ′ is:
∂V
∂b ′
=+ uc(c)
[
q(y,a ′,b ′,ω) + qb ′
(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)]
−βΠω(ω
′ = 1)
∫∞
df(a ′,b ′,1)
uc(c
′)
[
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′)
]
dF(y ′|y)
−βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[ ∫∞
ds(a ′,b ′,0)
uc(c
′)
[
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′)
]
dF(y ′|y)
+
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)dsb ′
]
(A.11)
The debt-reserves consolidation operation
The marginal effect of the consolidation operation at the price q̄ = q(y,a ′,b ′,ω)
is −q̄R ∂V∂a ′ −
∂V
∂b ′ , where R = (1 + r) and this is:
uc(c)
[
−
(
q̄Rqa ′ + qb ′
)(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 1)
[
− q̄R
∫df(a ′,b ′,1)
−∞ uc(c ′x)dF(y ′|y)
+
∫∞
df(a ′,b ′,1)
uc(c
′)
[
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′) − q̄R
]
dF(y ′|y)
]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[
− q̄R
∫ds(a ′,b ′,0)
−∞ uc(c ′x)dF(y ′|y)
+
∫∞
ds(a ′,b ′,0)
uc(c
′)
[
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′) − q̄R
]
dF(y ′|y)
+
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)(−q̄Rdsa ′ − d
s
b ′)
]
(A.12)
The first term captures the effect on current consumption due to the change in the
bond price. The last term captures the discrete gains from states coming out of
the multiplicity region. The other terms capture the effect on future consumption
depending on the repayment or default decision. From the equilibrium price
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equation (1.6):
λ+ (1 − λ)(z+ q ′) − q̄R =
Pr(def)
1 − Pr(def)
q̄R+ (1 − λ)(q ′ − E[q ′|repay]),
where Pr(def) is the probability of default next period. The consolidation effect
on utility can be compactly written as:
uc(c)
[
−
(
q̄Rqa ′ + qb ′
)(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)]
−βPr(def)qRE
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
+β
(
1 − Pr(def)
)
E
[
Pr(def)
1 − Pr(def)
q̄Ruc(c
′)
∣∣∣repay]
+
(
1 − Pr(def)
)
(1 − λ)E
[
uc(c
′)
(
q ′ − E[q ′]
)]
+βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)(−q̄Rdsa ′ − d
s
b ′)
(A.13)
Define the change in price ∆q = −q̄Rqa ′ −qb ′ and the change in the self fulfilling
threshold ∆ds = −q̄Rdsa ′ − d
s
b ′ , then the consolidation marginal effect is:
uc(c)∆q
(
b ′ − (1 − λ)b
)
−βΠω(ω
′ = 0)
[
V+(ds,a ′,b ′, 0) −X(ds,a ′,b ′, 0)
]
f(ds|y)∆ds
+βPr(def)qR
(
− E
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
+ E
[
uc(c
′)|repay
])
+β
(
1 − Pr(def)
)
(1 − λ)Cov
[
uc(c
′)q ′|repay
]
(A.14)
This operation is not revenue neutral in the first period because the bond price re-
acts to it, and the first term in equation (A.14) captures this effect on current utility.
The second term captures the direct effect of the change in the self-fulfilling de-
fault threshold ds in expected utility, the fundamentals default threshold change
has no first order effect since the unconditional value function W is continuous
at that point, but when ω = 0 there is a jump in W(·, 0) at y = ds(a,b, 0) which
captures the fact that crossing the self-fulfilling default threshold causes a discrete
loss for the sovereign.
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The third and fourth term in equation (A.14) reflect the resource transfer from
default to repayment states. If the sovereign had the opportunity to credible com-
mit to default and repay in selected states while keeping the expected repayment
constant, the term
(
− E
[
uc(c
′
x)|def
]
+ E
[
uc(c
′)|repay
])
would be zero. How-
ever, in the Eaton-Gersovitz environment, the expected payment choice and the
default threshold choice are made together, at the commitment optimal default
threshold, the expected payment is low, which means current revenues are low.
The sovereign faces a trade-off between issuing more debt and bringing more re-
sources to the current period and issuing less debt but keep the default threshold
low and close to the commitment optimal level.
The last term captures the utility gains from shifting the issuance date of debt
outstanding two periods ahead. Before the consolidation operation some of that
debt was issued on the current period, after the consolidation it is issued in the
next period. As lenders are risk neutral, the current price is consistent with the
average prices of that debt in the next period, but for the sovereign this matters
because of risk aversion. Since default is more likely at low realizations of output,
consumption and bond prices will be positively correlated, hence this covariance
term is generally negative.
A.1.3. The sovereign’s problem with commitment
Here, the sovereign problem with commitment is briefly discussed. This section
follows closely Rios-Rull and Mateos-Planas (2016).
The setup is the following: at the beginning of the period, before the income
shock is realized, the government enters with reserves a a promise to repay k in
expected value and chooses a default threshold dc, contingent consumption c(y)
and contingent portfolio positions k ′(y), a ′(y).
The previous realization of output y−1 matters only for the expectations. Given
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that, the problem for the government can be written in recursive form as:
Vc(y−1,a,k) = max
a ′(y),k ′(y),c(y),dc
∫∞
−∞ u
(
c(y)
)
dF(y|y−1)
+β
∫dc
−∞ Xc
(
y,a ′(y))dF(y|y−1) +β
∫∞
dc
Vc
(
y,a ′(y),k ′(y)
)
dF(y|y−1)
s.t. c(y) = y+ a−
a ′
1 + r
+ 1(y > dc)
[
k ′(y)
1 + r
−
k
1 − F(dc)
]
.
(A.15)
where Vc is the value function contingent on current reserve assets a and a
promised expected repayment k. Xc is the value after default and 1 is the in-
dicator function.
The first order condition with respect to the default threshold dc is:
0 =
∂Vc(y−1,a,k)
∂dc
= βX
(
dc,a ′(dc)
)
−βV
(
dc,a ′(dc),k ′(dc)
)
−
kf(dc)(
1 − F(dc)
)2 ∫∞
(d ′)c
uc
(
c(y ′)
)
dF(y ′|y),
(A.16)
from this first order condition it follows that the commitment default threshold
dc is determined by:
βXc
(
dc,a ′(dc)
)
= βVc
(
dc,a ′(dc),k ′(dc)
)
+
kf(dc)(
1 − F(dc)
)2 ∫∞
(d ′)c
uc
(
c(y ′)
)
dF(y ′|y).
(A.17)
The difference between this equation and the fundamental’s default equation (1.7)
is the third term, which is positive, indicating the sovereign commits to repay in
states where ex-post it would prefer to default.
Next, the first order conditions with respect to reserves and promised payments
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are derived. First, the envelope conditions yield:
Xca(y−1,a) =
∂Xc(y−1,a,k)
∂a
=
∫∞
−∞ uc
(
cx(y)
)
dF(y|y−1) (A.18)
Vca(y−1,a,k) =
∂Vc(y−1,a,k)
∂a
=
∫∞
−∞ uc
(
c(y)
)
dF(y|y−1) (A.19)
Vck(y−1,a,k) =
∂Vc(y−1,a,k)
∂k
=
−1
1 − F(dc)
∫∞
dc
uc
(
c(y)
)
dF(y|y−1) (A.20)
The first order condition with respect to the promised payment k ′(y) is then:
0 =
∂Vc(y−1,a,k)
∂k ′(y)
=
uc
(
c(y)
)
1 + r
−
β
1 − F((d ′)c)
∫∞
(d ′)c
uc
(
c(y ′)
)
dF(y ′|y). (A.21)
This equation can be compared with the first order condition w.r.t. b ′ in the
Eaton-Gersovitz setup (equation A.11. First, it is important to note that there are
no self-fulfilling crises with commitment. Second, since the borrowing decision
is independent of the default decision, there is no price feedback on the amount
borrowed (i.e. the term with qb in equation A.11). With commitment the expected
value of debt service is higher.
The first order condition with respect to reserves a ′(y) is:
0 =
∂Vc(y−1,a,k)
∂a ′(y)
= −
uc
(
c(y)
)
1 + r
+β
∫ (d ′)c
−∞ uc
(
cx(y
′)
)
dF(y ′|y) . . .
+β
∫∞
(d ′)c
uc
(
c(y ′)
)
dF(y ′|y)
(A.22)
Adding both first order conditions, it follows that:
0 = β
∫ (d ′)c
−∞ uc
(
cx(y
′)
)
dF(y ′|y) −
βF
(
(d ′)c
)
1 − F
(
(d ′)c
) ∫∞
(d ′)c
uc
(
c(y ′)
)
dF(y ′|y), (A.23)
and this can be rewritten as:
0 =
β
F
(
(d ′)c
)(E [uc(cx)|def]− E [uc(c)|repay]) (A.24)
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Hence, with commitment, expected marginal utilities under default and repay-
ment are equalized. In the standard Eaton-Gersovitz framework, the expected
marginal utility under default is lower that the expected marginal utility under
repayment because the sovereign is defaulting on states with higher income. This
implies that on the margin, shifting resources from default states to repayment
states is efficient and thus the term in the third line of equation (A.14), which is
part of the consolidation effect on utility, is positive.
A.2. Computation method
As mentioned in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), with long term debt the bud-
get sets for the sovereign are not convex. This is consequence of the debt dilution
problem: with one-period debt, if the government deviates from equilibrium into
slightly lower debt levels, bond prices react immediately to indicate a lower de-
fault probability. On the other hand, with long-term debt, bond prices almost do
not react to the low debt levels since it is expected that the normal level will be
chosen in the next period and current bondholders will be diluted.
This same argument explains the convergence problems of global methods solv-
ing this problem, the bond price function may not react for infinitesimal changes
of debt holdings until a discrete change at a default state happens. In addition,
as seen in figure 3, the possibility of self-fulfilling crises make the unconditional
value function W discontinuous which exacerbates the convergence problem of
global iterative methods.
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) introduced a purification i.i.d. endowment shock
to overcome this difficulties. They showed that introducing this shock smooths the
value functions and, under monotonicity assumptions, it guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium on discretized state spaces.
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A.3. Data
This section describes the data sources and the procedures used to aggregate and
combine data from different sources. The sample includes data for 18 emerging
markets: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Lithua-
nia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa,
Turkey, and Ukraine 1. It spans the period 1994-Q1 through 2016-Q1 with some
significant missing periods for some countries.
GDP: Quarterly data on current and constant GDP at market prices, seasonally
adjusted, from the Global Economic Monitor by the World Bank. The nominal
data was used to calculate all the ratios (Current Account, Debt and Reserves
ratio) while the real data was used to calculate the growth rate.
Spreads: Data for the monthly Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) of each
country (blended spread), as well as the composite blended spread or EMBI+,
was downloaded from Datastream. The values of March, June, September and
December were used for the quarterly data.
International Reserves: Monthly Total International Reserves data from the GEM
(Global Economic Monitor) was used. The values of March, June, September and
December were used for the quarterly data.
Current Account: The current account data corresponds to the total net US dollars
current account from the World Economic Outlook dataset available from the
International Monetary Fund.
Debt: Quarterly Public Sector External Debt data comes from different sources.
The data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Phi-
lippines, and South Africa was downloaded from Haver EMERGE database. All
other countries except Ukraine were downloaded from the Quarterly Public Sec-
tor Debt database of the World Bank. Neither of these two previous sources pro-
1The same countries were used in Aguiar et al. (2016b). They also include Latvia and Hungary, but due
to data availability those could not be included in the regressions on table 2
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vided enough data for Ukraine. To complement this country panel, annual data
from the International Debt Statistics database from the World Bank was used.
Linear interpolation was used to calculate the quarterly values.
Exchange rate regime: The exchange rate regime classification is taken from the
monthly fine classification by Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011). This scale
is then grouped into a dummy variable identifying those countries with a man-
aged rate regime which includes: No separate legal tender, Pre-announced peg
or currency board arrangement, Pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower
than or equal to ±2%, De facto peg, Pre-announced crawling peg, Pre-announced
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%, De facto crawling peg,
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%. Pre-announced
crawling band that is wider than or equal to ±2%, De-facto crawling band that is
narrower than or equal to ±5%, and Moving band that is narrower than or equal
to ±2%.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Fighting for the Best,
Losing with the Rest
B.1. Proofs
B.1.1. Zero assets proofs
The following is a useful consequence of lemma 2.2.
Lemma B.1 In any IC contract schedule, x(θ) is non-increasing.
Proof. Let θ ′ > θ from equation (2.1c) it follows that:
x(θ) = U(0) +
∫θ
0
[
f
(
k(s)
)
z(s) − f
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ)
]
ds then,
xi(θ
′) − x(θ) = (θ ′ − θ)
[
f
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ) − f
(
k(θ ′)
)
z(θ ′)
]
. . .
+
∫θ ′
θ
[
f
(
k(s)
)
z(s) − f
(
k(θ ′)
)
z(θ ′)
]
ds
And both terms in the last equation are negative or zero because of equation (2.1b)
hence the claim holds.
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Proof of claim 2.3
Proof. Start with and equilibrium in which an entrepreneur of type θ receives
payoff U0(θ). Lets denote by
(
k0(θ), x0(θ), z0(θ)
)
the equilibrium incentive com-
patible contract schedule. Finally let A0 denote the set of types taking one of
the contracts rather than the outside option. Suppose there is a set C ⊆ A0 such
that k∗(θ) 6= k0(θ) for all θ ∈ C. We will show that contract schedule is profit
maximizer for intermediary 1 only if C has measure zero.
Construct C ′ as the set
{
(k ′(θ), x ′(θ), z ′(θ))|θ ∈ A0
}
, where,
k ′(θ) = k∗(θ) z ′(θ) =
f
(
k0(θ)
)
z0(θ) + δθ
f
(
k∗(θ)
) x ′(θ) = x0(θ) + δ
2
(1 − θ2) (B.1)
If an entrepreneur of type θ takes the contract
(
k ′(θ̂), z ′(θ̂), x ′(θ̂)
)
∈ C ′, her payoff
will be,
θf(k0(θ̂))z0(θ̂) + x0(θ̂) + δθ̂θ+
δ
2
−
δθ̂2
2
The above payoff is maximized at θ̂ = θ and the term δθ̂θ− δθ̂2/2 ensures the
maximizer is unique. The resulting payoff is U ′(θ) ≡ U0(θ) + δ2
(
1 + θ2) > U0(θ).
Thus every entrepreneur θ ∈ A0 signs a contract with k∗(θ).
Next, we will show that offering C ′ constitutes a profitable deviation for interme-
diary 1. Let v0i , i = 1, 2 be the intermediaries payoff in the original equilibrium.
Note that, because intermediaries have always the option of offering empty sets
of contracts, v0i > 0.
The following equation follows from the definition of payoffs,
∫
A0
{
πf
(
k0(θ)
)
− Rk0(θ)
}
dG(θ) = v01 + v
0
2 +
∫
A0
U0(θ)dG(θ) (B.2)
Let,
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M ≡
∫
A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ)
}
dG(θ) −
∫
A0
{
πf
(
k0(θ)
)
− Rk0(θ)
}
dG(θ)
Since C has positive measure, the definition of k∗(θ) implies, M > 0.
Now, let v ′1 be the payoff of intermediary 1 when she deviates to C
′ and A ′ the set
of types signing a contract after the deviation.
v ′1 =
∫
A ′
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ)
v ′1 =
∫
A ′\A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) . . .
−U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ) +
∫
A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ)
v ′1 =
∫
A ′\A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
. . .
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ) +M+ v01 + v
0
2 −
∫
A0
{
U(θ) −U0(θ)
}
dG(θ)
The last equality follows from equation B.2.
The measure of A0 is obviously bounded by one and U ′(θ) −U0(θ) 6 δ2
(
1+ θ2) 6
δ. Hence, ∫
A0
{
U(θ) −U0(θ)
}
dG(θ) 6 δ
Moreover, πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ) is bounded and it follows that, as the mea-
sure of A \A0 goes to zero,
∫
A\A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ)→ 0
Now,
A \A0 = {θ : U0(θ) < w 6 U ′(θ)} ⊂ {θ : w− δ < U0(θ) < w}
And it is clear that the measure of A \A0 goes to zero as δ goes to zero.
As a result of the previous observations, there exists a value for δ, low enough,
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such that,
M > −
∫
A\A0
{
πf
(
k∗(θ)
)
− Rk∗(θ) −U ′(θ)
}
dG(θ) +
∫
A0
{
U(θ) −U0(θ)
}
dG(θ)
For such a δ,
v ′1 − v
0
1 > 0
Since the intermediary payoff is strictly higher, if the measure of C is strictly posi-
tive the alternative schedule C ′ will achieve strictly higher profits for intermediary
1.
Proof of claim 2.6
Proof. We begin by showing that U(θ) is non-decreasing in θ. Once that is
established, it will be straightforward to see that A must be an interval.
By lemma 2.2 it suffices to show f
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ) > 0 for all θ > 0. Suppose there is an
equilibrium with IC contract schedule
(
k(θ), x(θ), z(θ)
)
, and there exists θo > 0
such that f
(
k(θo)
)
z(θo) < 0. By claim 2.3, there exists a sequence {θn} ∈ [0, θo]
converging to zero such that k(θn) = k∗(θn) and this implies
{
f
(
k(θn)
)}
also
converges to zero.
Equation 2.1b guarantees that f
(
k(θn)
)
z(θn) 6 f
(
k(θo)
)
z(θo) < 0 for all n. Taking
limit on both sides implies limn→∞ z(θn) = −∞. But limited liability implies
x(θ) > 0 and x(θ) + z(θ) > 0. As x(θ) is non-increasing by claim B.1, x(0) is an
upper bound for all x(θ) and thus z(θ) has to be bounded below, contradicting
limn→∞ z(θn) = −∞.
Hence, any contract offered in equilibrium satisfies U(θ) is nondecreasing.
Now, because U(θ) is nondecreasing θ ∈ A implies θ ′ ∈ A for all θ ′ > θ (when
indifferent between being a worker and an entrepreneur, agents choose the later
by assumption). The continuity of U implies that if A is nonempty then A = [θL, 1]
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for some θL ∈ [0, 1]. Also, if θL > 0 then U(θL) = w.
Proof of zero profit condition (Claim 2.4)
Proof. By contradiction suppose intermediary 1 is making profit. We will show
intermediary 2 is not choosing an optimal contract schedule.
Let the contract schedules be
(
k(θ), x(θ), z(θ)
)
for i ∈ {1, 2} and U(θ) the corre-
sponding expected utilities for entrepreneurs. Suppose the profit for intermedi-
ary 1 is M > 0. Consider the alternative schedule for intermediary 2 in which
increases all entrepreneurs’ utility by a small amount ε. More precisely, this alter-
native schedule is defined by C ′2 =
{
(k ′(θ), x ′(θ), z ′(θ))|θ ∈ A
}
, where,
k ′(θ) = k(θ) z ′(θ) =
f
(
k(θ)
)
z(θ) + δθ
f
(
k(θ)
) x ′(θ) = x(θ) + δ
2
(1 − θ2) (B.3)
As shown in the proof of claim 2.3, the payoff U ′(θ) resulting from optimally
choosing a contract in C1 ∪ C ′2 is strictly greater than the original payoff: U ′(θ) >
U(θ). Hence by deviating to C2, intermediary 2 will steal half the market inter-
mediary 1 was servicing alone (A1). The revenue of intermediary 2 increases by
at least M. Naturally the costs also increase because entrepreneurs get more gen-
erous contracts, but also because the more generous contracts induce an entry of
new entrepreneurs. However, as shown in the proof of claim 2.3 δ can be chosen
so that the extra cost are smaller than M. For such a δ, C ′2 is a profitable deviation
for intermediary 2.
Proof of claim 2.5
Proof. Suppose U(θ ′) > S(θ ′) for some θ ′ > θ̂ such that k(θ ′) = k∗(θ ′) are not
positive. By the envelope theorem S ′(θ) = f
(
k∗(θ)
)
π, which is increasing in θ
because f is increasing and concave. Hence S(θ) is convex. Remembering that
145
S(0) = 0 6 x(θ ′), by incentive compatibility:
U(θ̂) > θ̂f
(
k∗(θ ′)
)
z(θ ′) + x(θ ′) =
θ̂
θ ′
U(θ ′) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′
x(θ ′)
>
θ̂
θ ′
S(θ ′) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′
S(0) > S(θ̂)
contradicting S(θ̂) > U(θ̂). As k(θ ′) = k∗(θ ′) for almost all θ ′, the lemma follows.
Proof of claim 2.7
Proof. Let C01,C
0
2, s
0 be an equilibrium with corresponding payoffs v01, v
0
2,U
0(θ).
Denote the incentive compatible schedule by k0(θ), z0(θ), x0(θ) and the set of types
taking the contract by A0.
Suppose there there is θ̃ ∈ A0 such that x(θ̃) > 0. Without loss of generality, the
associated contract is offered by intermediary 1.
Among the contracts in C1, there could be some that are dominated by another
contract in C1, for every entrepreneurial type. We focus on the contracts such that
this is not the case: {
k1(θ), x1(θ), z1(θ) : θ ∈ [0, 1]
}
such that
(
k1(θ), x1(θ), z1(θ)
)
is a maximizer of,
U1(θ) ≡ max
(k,x,z∈C1)
θf(k)z+ x (B.4)
We will construct a strategy for intermediary 2 allowing him to “cream skim" the
market. That is, intermediary 2 will serve all the profitable types, leaving the
unprofitable types to intermediary 1.
Because no intermediary would make loses in equilibrium, if a positive measure
among the contracts in C1 are actually signed by entrepreneurs, there must be an
positive measure subset over which C1 yields non-negative profits. Hence there
146
is a θ̂ > 0 (in that set) such that k1(θ̂) = k∗(θ̂) and with whom the intermediary
makes non-negative profits. By claim 2.5, S(θ) > U(θ) for all θ > θ̂.
If x01(θ̂) > 0, construct
C ′2 =
{
(k ′2(θ), x
′
2(θ), z
′
2(θ))|θ ∈ A0
}
, where,
k ′2(θ) = k
0
1(θ) z
′
2(θ) =
f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)/θ̂+ δ(θ− θ̂)
f
(
k01(θ)
) x ′(θ) = δ
2
(1 − θ2)
The payoff of entrepreneur θ among contracts (k ′2(θ
′), x ′2(θ
′), z ′2(θ
′)) in C ′2 is
U ′2(θ) = max
θ ′∈[0,1]
θ
(
f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)/θ̂+ δ(θ
′ − θ̂)
)
+
δ
2
(1 − θ ′2)
which is uniquely maximized at θ ′ = θ. That is,
U ′2(θ) = θ
(
f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)/θ̂
)
+
δ
2
(1 − θ2)
Next, we compare the payoffs of signing the contract with intermediary 1 or 2.
We show that for θ > θ̂, the later is better, while θ < θ̂ prefers the former.
First consider θ < θ̂.
By the envelope theorem applied to B.4
U01(θ) = U
0
1(θ̂) +
∫θ
θ̂
f
(
k01(s)
)
z01(s)ds
= f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂) +
∫θ
θ̂
f
(
k01(s)
)
z01(s)ds
and f
(
k1(s)
)
z1(s) is non-decreasing in s.
Notice that,
U ′2(θ) = U
′
2(θ̂) + (θ− θ̂)
(
f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)/θ̂
)
+
δ
2
(
θ̂2 − θ2
)
= U ′2(θ̂) +
∫θ
θ̂
(
f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)/θ̂
)
ds+
δ
2
(
θ̂2 − θ2
)
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Hence
U ′2(θ) −U
0
1(θ) =
∫θ
θ̂
{
f
(
k01(θ̂)z
0
1(θ̂)
)
− f
(
k01(s)
)
z01(s)
}
ds+
θ− θ̂
θ̂
x01(θ̂) +
δ
2
(
θ̂2 − θ2
)
Since f
(
k(.)
)
z(.) is non-decreasing, for θ < θ̂, the first term is non-positive. The
second term is strictly positive as x01(θ̂) > 0. We chose δ such that
θ−θ̂
θ̂
x01(θ̂) +
δ
2
(
θ̂2 − θ2
)
is still positive. We conclude that for θ < θ̂
U ′2(θ) −U
0
1(θ) > 0
Next, consider entrepreneurs with θ > θ̂
U01(θ̂) = θ̂f
(
k01(θ̂)
)
z01(θ̂) + x
0
1(θ̂)
> θ̂
(
f
(
k01(θ)z
0
1(θ) +
x01(θ)
θ
)
=
θ̂
θ
U01(θ)
where the week inequality in the second line comes from the envelope theorem
and the monotonicity of f
(
k(.)
)
z(.): an argument similar to the one describe in
more detail for θ < θ̂.
Since θ̂ > 0,
θ
θ̂
U01(θ̂) > U
0
1(θ)
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By construction, U ′2(θ̂) = U
0
1(θ̂). Moreover,
θ̂
θ
U ′2(θ) = U
′
2(θ̂) +
δ
2
(
θ
θ̂
(1 − θ̂2) − (1 − θ2)
)
> U ′2(θ̂) +
δ
2
(
θ2 − θ̂2)
)
> U ′2(θ̂)
We conclude that,
U ′2(θ) >
θ
θ̂
U ′2(θ̂) =
θ
θ̂
U01(θ̂) > U
0
1(θ)
It follows that entrepreneurs with type θ > θ̂ are better of contract C ′2 than with
contract C01. Hence intermediary 2 makes at least half of the profits over the
interval [θ̂, 1], which are strictly positive by claim 2.5.
So far we have assumed that x01(θ̂) > 0. If x1(θ̂) = 0, then it must be the case that
θ̃ < θ̂ (by lemma B.1).
In this case, intermediary 2 can deviate to the strategy,
C ′′2 =
{
(k ′′2 (θ), x
′′
2 (θ), z
′′
2 (θ))|θ ∈ A0
}
, where,
k ′′2 (θ) = k
0
1(θ) z
′′
2 (θ) =
f
(
k01(θ̃)
)
z01(θ̃) + x
0
1(θ̃)/θ̃+ δ(θ− θ̃)
f
(
k01(θ)
) x ′(θ) = δ
2
(1 − θ2)
By the same argument as before, when intermediary 2 deviates to C ′′2 , Every en-
trepreneur with type θ < θ̃ takes a contract from C01, and every type θ > θ̃ takes a
contract from C ′′2 .
It is left to show that intermediary 1 was making loses over [θL, θ̃] - and because
she wouldn’t make loses, intermediary 2 steals a strictly profitable fraction of the
market-. If this this was not the case, he must be making profits over a positive
measure set and we can redefine θ̂ as a point in that interval.
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Proof of proposition 2.9
Proof. Suppose θL > θP, then S(θL) > S(θP) = w = U(θL) by the definition of
θL and θP. But then the intermediary expects not to loose with the type θL and,
by claim 2.5, expects strictly positive profits with all θ ′ ∈ (θL, 1]. That implies the
intermediary is making profits strictly positive aggregate profits contradicting the
zero profit condition.
If types are public, intermediaries must break even with each type, which implies
U(θ) = S(θ). For those θ < θP, we have S(θ) < w hence none of them will take
any contract. All the rest will accept the contract offered for their type, hence
θL = θP and the inefficiency vanishes.
If limited liability is removed, but all other features remain the same, we will
show the equilibrium incentive compatible contract schedule has to be k(θ) =
k∗(θ), x(θ) = −R · k∗(θ) and z(θ) = π for (almost) all θ > θP.
We start showing that the following strategy profile is indeed an equilibrium:
Each intermediary offers, Ci =
{
(ki(θ), xi(θ), zi(θ))|θ ∈ [0, 1]
}
, where,
ki(θ) = k
∗(θ) zi(θ) = π xi(θ) = −R · k∗(θ) (B.5)
and entrepreneur θ flips a coin before selecting between (k1(θ), x1(θ), z1(θ)) and
(k2(θ), x2(θ), z2(θ)), - but strictly prefers any of these two instead when compared
to any other (ki(θ ′), xi(θ ′), zi(θ ′)) for θ ′ 6= θ -. As zi(θ) is constant, f
(
k∗(θ)
)
zi(θ)
is (strictly) increasing, hence the contract satisfies the conditions of lemma 2.2
and (ki(θ), xi(θ), zi(θ)) maximizes entrepreneur θ’s utility among the available
options. Also Ui(θ) = S(θ), and by definition on θP, type θ takes the contract if
and only if θ > θP. If intermediary i is offering the above contract, intermediary
j’s best response cannot yield her any profit, since she would get only those types
such that Uj(θ) > Ui(θ) = S(θ), and hence offering the same contract is a best
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response.
To see all equilibrium are payoff equivalent, notice that claims 2.3 and 2.4 still
must hold. Define B2 = A2 ∪B, and suppose that in an equilibrium, intermediary
2 offers a contract schedule such that on a positive measure subset of B2 ⊂ [θP, 1],
S(θ) 6= U2(θ) for all θ ∈ B2. Denote the equilibrium strategies by C1,C2 and s. De-
fine the associated contract schedules
(
k1(θ), x1(θ), z1(θ)
)
and
(
k2(θ), x2(θ), z2(θ)
)
as in equation (B.4) above.
We will show that intermediary 1 can post a contract schedule that strictly in-
creases her profits.
Define the deviation by, C ′1 =
{
(k ′1(θ), x
′
1(θ), z
′
1(θ))|θ ∈
}
, where,
k ′1(θ) = 0.5k
∗(θ) + 0.5k2(θ) z ′1(θ) = 0.5π+ 0.5z2(θ)
x ′1(θ) = −0.5R · k∗(θ) + 0.5x2(θ)
(B.6)
The new contract schedule to be offered by intermediary 1 is just the average
of intermediary 2’s and the prescribed equilibrium contracts. Note that the new
contract skims the cream: there is a threshold level θ, such that every θ > θ takes
the contract offers by intermediary 2 (if any), and lower θs take the contract by
intermediary 1.
Define B+2 = {θ ∈ B2 : U2(θ) > S(θ)} and analogously B
−
2 = B2 \ B
+
2 . If B
−
2 has
positive measure, this average contract makes profits with all θ ∈ B−2 because
S(θ) > U ′1(θ) > U2(θ); it cannot make loses in B
+
2 since there U2(θ) > U
′
1(θ); and,
it is irrelevant outside B2. Hence if B−2 has positive measure, this contract yields
positive profits to intermediary 2 contradicting the zero profit condition. If B−2
has measure zero and B+2 has positive measure, this implies that intermediary 2
is not making profit with any type, since B−2 has measure zero, but then for her
to avoid losses it must be the case that no positive measure of her contracts in
B+2 is taken in equilibrium, which implies that for all θ in a positive measure set
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B+1 ⊂ B
+
2 we must have U1(θ) > U2(θ) > S(θ) which implies intermediary 1 is
making loses there. Since she cannot make profits with any positive measure of
types, because 2 offers at least S(θ) to everybody but those in B−2 , she must be
making negative profits over all types.
Hence for all θ ∈ [θP, 1] it must be the case that U1(θ) = U2(θ) = S(θ). The
envelope theorem for S(θ) yields S ′(θ) = f
(
k∗(θ)
)
π which implies z1(θ) = z1(θ) =
π for (almost) all those θ. That in turn implies xi(θ) = −R · k∗(θ).
Last, if there is a unique intermediary facing limited liability and adverse selec-
tion, the unique equilibrium is k(θ) = k∗(θ), z(θ) = 0 and x(θ) = w and (almost)
all entrepreneurs with θ > θP take the contract. In this case an equilibrium should
be a contract schedule and a decision rule for entrepreneurs such that the sched-
ule maximizes profit for the intermediary and the decision rule maximizes return
to the entrepreneur. In the proposed equilibrium the intermediary extracts all
the surplus, hence it is profit maximizing, and entrepreneurs are always indiffer-
ent between accepting or rejecting the contract, hence they are also maximizing.
Note that in any equilibrium a type θ entrepreneur must take any contract such
that her payoff is higher than w and reject anyone otherwise. So potentially the
acceptance rule for some θ ′ could be to accept the contract offering k∗(θ) with
θ 6= θ ′.
To see that can only happen in measure zero sets, suppose there exists an equi-
librium where the acceptance rule differs from the one prescribed above in a set
Θ ∈ [0, 1] with positive measure. For all ε > 0 the contract with k(θ) = k∗(θ),
z(θ) = εθP and x(θ) = w − ε is such that θL = θP and the profits for the in-
termediary are the total surplus less ε
∫1
θP
(
1 −G(θ)
)
dθ, this implies that in any
equilibrium profits should be equal to the total surplus, otherwise the intermedi-
ary could do better with the contract above for some ε. But to have profits equal
to the total aggregate surplus, almost all θ ∈ [θP.1] must accept the contract and
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almost all θ < θP must reject it. Hence the result follows.
Proof of claim 2.10
Proof. A lump sum tax does not change the intermediaries optimal decisions.
Then the contract offered in equilibrium is still characterized by proposition 2.8.
Now the decision rule for entrepreneurs is as follows: they must accept the best
contract offered to their type if U(θ) − φ > w and reject if the inequality is re-
versed. In this sense the tax can also be seen as a subsidy on w. Hence, at θL we
must have U(θL) = w+φ. Then, the zero profit condition for θL is:∫1
θL
{
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
}
dG(θ) −
∫1
θL
θ
(w+φ)
θL
dG(θ) = 0
Which has a unique solution θL since its derivative with respect to θL is strictly
positive. By definition of φ, θL = θP solves the equation and is thus the only
solution.
Proof of claim 2.11
Proof.
Suppose intermediaries compete with contracts of the form
(
k, x, (1 − τ)z
)
. Then
the contract offered in equilibrium is still characterized by proposition 2.8 but the
θL now has to solve:
∫1
θL
{
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
}
dG(θ) −
∫1
θL
θ
w
(1 − τ)θL
dG(θ) = 0,
because intermediaries have to pay (1 − τ)−1U(θ) if she is supposed to deliver
U(θ) net of taxes to the entrepreneur. Plugging the value for τ∗ we obtain:
∫1
θL
{
θf
(
k∗(θ)
)
π− Rk∗(θ)
}
dG(θ) −
∫1
θL
θ
(w+φ)
θL
dG(θ) = 0
Which by claim 2.10 has a unique solution θL = θP.
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B.1.2. Asset Holdings Proofs
The proofs for claims 2.3, 2.4, and lemma B.1 are analogous to those for the zero
assets case. Fixing the asset level a, the IC constraint across types θ is the same,
but now the limited liability restriction is xi(θ,a) > −Ra. Recall the expected
utility of a type θ entrepreneur with assets a under contract i be Ui(θ,a) + Ra.
Then xi(θ,a) is decreasing in θ and in a competitive equilibrium ki(θ,a) = k∗(θ)
for (almost) all (θ,a) and Ui(θ,a) is nondecreasing in θ
Proof of claim 2.12
Proof. If k∗(θ) 6 a, the entrepreneur can self-finance the project up to the optimal
scale and save the rest, with expected profit θF
(
k∗(θ)
)
π + R
(
a − k∗(θ)
)
, which
is the best possible outcome for the entrepreneur outside the credit market. If
k∗(θ) > a the project can still be started but at a scale lower than the optimal,
concavity of F implies that the best option, conditional on starting the project,
is to invest all the assets in it, which yields θF(a)π. In any case that has to be
compared with the option of not doing the project and getting the return on the
assets.
Proof of proposition 2.13
Claim 2.5 carries over. The proof has to change a little.
Proof. Note that because of the outside option, θ̂f(a)π < Ui(θ̂,a) +Ra must hold.
Also for all θwe have S(θ) > θf(a)π−Rawith equality only for some θa such that
k∗(θa) = a Note that no profits can be made with types θ < θa as those can fully
self finance, hence θ̂ > θa. Suppose the expected profits for some θ ′ > θ̂ > θa such
that ki(θ ′) = k∗(θ ′) are not positive, that is Ui(θ ′) > S(θ ′). S(θ) is still convex.
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Remembering that S(θa) = θaf(a)π− Ra 6 Ui(θa,a), by incentive compatibility:
Ui(θ̂,a) > θ̂f
(
k∗(θ ′)
)
zi(θ
′,a) + xi(θ
′,a) =
θ̂
θ ′
Ui(θ
′,a) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′
xi(θ
′,a)
Ui(θ̂,a) >
θ̂− θa
θ ′ − θa
Ui(θ
′,a) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′ − θa
[
θa
θ ′
Ui(θ
′,a) +
θ ′ − θa
θ ′
xi(θ
′,a)
]
Ui(θ̂,a) >
θ̂− θa
θ ′ − θa
Ui(θ
′,a) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′ − θa
[
θa
θ ′
(θ ′f(a)π− Ra) −
θ ′ − θa
θ ′
Ra
]
Ui(θ̂,a) >
θ̂− θa
θ ′ − θa
Ui(θ
′,a) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′ − θa
[
θaf(a)π−
θa
θ ′
Ra−
θ ′ − θa
θ ′
Ra
]
Ui(θ̂,a) >
θ̂− θa
θ ′ − θa
S(θ ′) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′ − θa
[θaf(a)π− Ra]
Ui(θ̂,a) >
θ̂− θa
θ ′ − θa
S(θ ′) +
θ ′ − θ̂
θ ′ − θa
S(θa) > S(θ̂)
contradicting the expected profits for θ̂. As ki(θ ′) = k∗(θ ′) for almost all θ ′ the
lemma follows.
The construction of the alternative schedule in the proof of claim 2.7 will be pre-
cisely defined here in a more general setting.
Lemma B.2 Let C(θ) =
(
k(θ,a), x(θ,a), z(θ,a)
)
be an incentive compatible contract
schedule with assets a. For any θ̂ ∈ [0, 1], define the contract schedule Cθ̂ by,
Cθ̂(θ) =
(
k(θ,a),−Ra,
f
(
k(θ̂,a)
)
z(θ̂,a) + x(θ̂,a)/θ̂
f
(
k(θ)
) )
Then,
• Cθ̂ is incentive compatible.
• For all θ < θ̂, U(θ,C) > U(θ,Cθ̂)
• U(θ,C) > U(θ,Cθ̂) if and only if for some θ < θ̂ either
x(θ̂) > −Ra, orf
(
k(θ̂,a)
)
z(θ̂,a) > f
(
k(θ,a)
)
z(θ,a).
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The proof of this lemma is analogous to the first steps in the proof of claim 2.7.
Moreover, once the two lemmas have been established, the rest of the proof of
claim 2.7 carries over, completing the proof of proposition 2.13.
B.1.3. Proofs with Unobservable Assets
Then the IC constraint across assets is Ui(θ,a) is nondecreasing in a (recall an
entrepreneur cannot lie and give more collateral than what he has).
Linear loss minimization
We define a procedure to minimize losses for a given set of profitable contracts.
An (expected) profitable contract is one where Ui(θ,a) < S(θ) where S(·) is the
surplus function.
For a fixed asset level a, the promised extra utility Ui(θ,a) curve of an IC contract
with limited liability can only cross the curve S(θ) once1. Define θe(a) as the
solution of Ui(θ,a) = S(θ). Also define f̂z(a) = inf
{
f
(
k∗(θ))
)
z(θ,a) : θ > θe(a)
}
,
this is the maximum slope the contract can have at θe(a).
For all θ < θe(a) the intermediary is making losses. Hence it is in his best interest
to reduce Ui(θ,a) for all such theta. However the IC constraint over θ implies that
Ui(θ,a) > S
(
θe(a)
)
−
(
θe(a) − θ
)
f̂z(a) and the intermediary will try to set that.
Unfortunately, there is also the IC constraint over a, that requires Ui(θ,a) to be
nondecreasing in a. Therefore the loss minimization given some contract θe(a)
and f̂z(a) is achieved by setting:
Ui(θ,a) = sup
{
S
(
θe(â)
)
−
(
θe(â) − θ
)
f̂z(â) : 0 6 â 6 a
}
Zero Profits
Zero profits will still happen but the proof needs to be modified. Below are the
steps.
1There may be another cut, but that has to be below or at the outside option curve O(θ,a)
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1. As before if one intermediary is making profits π, the other can always set a
new contract as the max of the two current offered contracts. After that she
need to increase her offers by an ε small enough such that she would take
over all the market and profits fall just slightly.
2. Because of continuity, the issue is going to be the new entrants. First we
need that for every δ there exists some ε such that the change in θL(a) is less
than δ for a lot of a (meaning we can make the mass of those not bounded
as small as wanted) when we give ε more to everybody.
(a) The new entrants are determined by the slope of the contract on θL(a).
We need a bound for that slope from below that works for every a and is
strictly positive. Unfortunately that is not generally possible. However
we can find a bound for a lot of values, such that the measure of those
not bounded is very small relative to the profits. In what follows we
assume the contract, after the max process has been optimized with the
linear loss minimization described above.
i. There is no need to worry about those a such that θL(a) = 0. In fact
we can disregard all asset levels such that θL(a) < δ. Note that for
the remaining a’s f̂z(a) > 0.
ii. First we deal with those a with positive marginal mass. There can
be only countable many of those. Let the combined mass of all
those ai be M1 6 1. Then there exits finite number of those N1
such that
∑N1
i=1m(ai) > M1 −
π
5w . From now on we will forget about
all other ai with positive mass and take a loss no greater than 0.2π
with all those types with capital ai for i > N1. Now take 0 < f1 =
min{f̂z(ai) : 0 6 i 6 N1}
iii. Take any ā such that S
(
θe(ā)
)
> w Look at the slope of the contract
at θL(ā) after the linear minimization process. We claim that for all
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a ′ > ā the slope of the contract at θL(a ′) is greater or equal than the
minimum between the slope of the contract at θL(ā) and:
S
(
θe(ā)
)
−w
θe(ā) − δ
.
Call that minimum f2(ā). If θL(a ′) = θL(ā) then, by IC over the
assets, the slope of the contract at θL(a ′) has to be greater or equal
than the one at θL(ā). If θL(a ′) < θL(ā) then, by the envelope the-
orem, the slope at θL(a ′) will be f̂z(â) for some ā < â 6 a ′, but all
those are bounded below by the slope of line that goes through the
points (δ,w) and
(
θe(ā),S
(
θe(ā)
))
.
Now, if S
(
θe(0)
)
> w set f2 = f2(0) and then the slopes are all
(but a small measure) bounded by min{f1, f2}. If not, since θe(a) is
nondecreasing it is measurable, so we can pick an asset level ā such
that the mass of assets â such that S
(
θe(â)
)
∈
(
w,S
(
θe(ā)
))
is less
than any positive constant we want.
We are going to allow a bigger loss on those â types. For all of
them the contract offered will be the same as the one for ā, before
the ε increase. This would generate a loss less than S
(
θe(ā)
)
per
entrepreneur, as the contract for ā makes expected losses only on
those θ types that get offered an utility level less than that. Hence we
pick ā such that the mass of â such that S
(
θe(â)
)
∈
(
w,S
(
θe(ā)
))
is less than:
π
5S
(
θe(ā)
) ,
and set f2 = f2(ā).
iv. Now, we have to deal with those â such that S
(
θe(â)
)
= w, let
θP = S
−1(w) then we are talking about those asset levels such that
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θe(a) = θP they form an interval (a0,a1) which may be closed or
open at both ends. Notice for all those the slopes f̂z(â) are increasing
in â because of incentive compatibility w.r.t. â. Now, if inf{f̂z(â)} > 0
then set f3 equal to that infimum. Otherwise, as before, for each
ā2 such that S
(
θe(ā2)
)
= w we can raise the contract of all those
a ′ ∈ [a0, ā2) to Ui(θ, ā2). The loss for that change is the maximum
difference between the original contracts and this new one, which is
bounded by the difference between the line u = w and the line with
slope Ra+wθP . As the marginal mass may be distributed in any way,
the bound will be the difference between the value of that linear
function at θ = 1 and w. So we pick ā2 such that the mass in [a0, ā2)
is less than π5(Ui(1,ā2)−w) and let f4 = f̂z(ā2).
v. Last, we deal with those asset levels (if any) for whichUi(θw,a) < w.
Again, there is a ā3 such that the mass of those a ′ > ā3 such that
Ui(θw,a ′) < w is less than π5(Ui(1,ā2)−w) . Again we will lift all those
ā3 < â < ā2 to Ui(θ, ā2). The loss for doing that is less than 0.2π
and let f5 = f̂z(ā3)
vi. To finish take the minimum of the fi’s. That is the lower bound for
the slope and hence define ε(δ) = δ ∗min{fi : i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. So far
we lost 0.4π with the unbounded types.
(b) After that we need that for each µ there exist a δ such that the mass of
new entrepreneurs is less than µ given a reduction no larger than δ in
θL(a) for all a. Measurability of the contracts imply Ui(θ,a) and θL(a)
are measurable. The new entrants are a subset of U−1i
(
[w − ε,w)
)
⊂[
θL(a) − δ, θl(a)
)
. Now we want to bound the mass of the latter inter-
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vals. For each a there exists some δ(a) > 0 such that
G−
(
θL(a)|a
)
−G−(θl(a) − δ(a)|a
)
< 0.5µ
If the lower bound of those δ(a) is positive that is our δ and we are
done. Otherwise we find a bound for all but a measure no bigger than
π
5w , on which we take losses of w with all the potential entrants, so total
losses wont exceed 0.2π, for the rest take the lower bound which must
be positive.
Proof of claim 2.15
Proof. Suppose that is not the case. Then there exist some positive measure
set B = B1 ∪ B2 such that all types in Bi strictly prefer the contract offered by
intermediary i than the one offered by j. Notice that the point wise average
of two IC contract schedules with ki(θ,a) = k∗(θ) is an IC contract schedule.
This is because utility is linear in zi(θ,a) and xi(θ,a) so the IC constraint will be
inherited from the IC of the two original schedules. We will show this average IC
schedule has to increase profits for one of the intermediaries. For intermediary
i, the newly proposed contract reduces the utility offered to those in Bi because
that is averaged with the one offered by j to those types, which was assumed to
be strictly lower. However types in Bi still prefer intermediary i contract. Outside
B nothing changes since offered utilities were equal there, in Bj types still prefer
intermediary j. Hence intermediary i by offering the average schedule reduces
the surplus given away in the set Bi keeping all other sources of income fixed. If
Bi has a positive measure then her profits strictly increase. Hence the measure of
BI must be zero which implies the measure of B has to be zero.
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Proof of claim 2.17
Proof. Sup θ < θ ′ < θ ′′ are such that θ and θ ′′ are in A(a|b) . Let x(θ ′,b) = −Rc
for some c 6 b, notice that P(a) is strictly increasing in a as it is the slope of the
line passing through (0,−Ra) and
(
θe(a),S
(
θe(a)
))
. Now ,as θ ′ /∈ A(a|b) then
θ ′P(c) − Rc > θ ′P(a) − Ra. If c > a, then P(c) > P(a) and as θ ′′ > θ ′ it follows
that θ ′′P(c) − Rc > θ ′′P(a) − Ra contradicting θ ′′ ∈ A(a|b), analogously if c < a
implies θ /∈ A(a|b) hence c = a and then θ ′ ∈ A(a|b).
If θ ∈ A(a, c) for c > b > a then,
Ui(θ, c) = θP(a) − Ra = sup
06a ′6c
θP(a ′) − Ra ′ > sup
06a ′6b
θP(a ′) − Ra ′ > P(a) − Ra,
which implies θ ∈ A(a|b)
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Appendix C
Appendix to Optimal v. Simple
Financial Policy Rules
C.1. Solution Method
The Matlab code named MPPsolve.m provides the algorithm for solving the model.
The code is divided in seven sections (cells).
Cell 1. Parameter Values sets the parameters values shown in table 10. We use
100 points in the grid for bonds and three states for zT shocks, three states
for news shocks and two states for interest rates shocks. The convergence
tolerance level for the solution of decision rules, as defined in Section 3
below, is set to ε = 1e−5.
Cell 2. . Construction of Markov Chain: This cell builds the Markov Chain for
the exogenous shocks zT , R and news, as well as the debt grid.
i) First, discretize zT shocks using Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method,
implemented in function tauchenhussey.m. The Matlab routine and
other similar ones are available at http://www2.hhs.se/personal/floden/.
The time-series properties of the zT process that the method targets
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are estimates obtained by Bianchi (2011) using data for Argentina,
and the corresponding moments are reported in table 10.
ii) Next, incorporate news shocks according to the formulas in the Sec-
tion 2.3 of the paper. Recall by Bayes rule:
p(zTt+1 = l|st = i, z
T
t = j) =
p(st = i|z
T
t+1 = l)p(z
T
t+1 = l|z
T
t = j)∑
n p(st = i|z
T
t+1 = n)p(z
T
t+1 = n|z
T
t = j)
(C.1)
Hence we can write:
Π(zTt+1, st+1, z
T
t , st) ≡ p(st+1 = k, zTt+1 = l|st = i, zTt = j)
= p(zTt+1 = l|st = i, z
T
t = j)p(st+1 = k|z
T
t+1 = l)
= p(zTt+1 = l|st = i, z
T
t = j)× . . .
. . .
∑
m
[
p(zTt+2 = m|z
T
t+1 = l)p(st+1 = k|z
T
t+2 = m)
]
,
(C.2)
iii) Finally we add global liquidity shocks to construct the entire transi-
tion matrix, assuming zT shocks and global liquidity shocks are inde-
pendent.
Cell 3. Decentralized Equilibrium solves the decentralized equilibrium using the
time-iteration method. Intuitively, this algorithm solves the model by
a backward recursive-substitution of the model’s optimality conditions
written in recursive form. In particular, the algorithm solves for the recur-
sive functionsmN(b, e), cT (b, e), PN(b, e) and B(b, e) that satisfy equations
3.5, 3.6, 3.7 3.8, 3.3 and 3.12 where e is a triple (zT ,q, s) that includes the
realizations of the exogenous shocks to zT , the news signal s, and q (recall
that q = 1R ). Note that in the decentralized equilibrium m
T (b, e) can be
solved separately from (3.11), and it depends only on zT .
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Start the algorithm at an initial point defined by setting K = 1 and define
conjectures for the equilibrium functions at this point, denoted cTK(b, e),
pNK (b, e) and BK(b, e). Then proceed with the following steps:
Step 1. Assume the constraint binds. Rewrite the borrowing constraint as
an function of mN(b, e), mT (b, e), b, zt, q and s. For a given mN,
consumption of nontradables follows from cNt +A
N = zNt m
N
t
αN,
the price of nontradables comes from (3.12). Given cN and pN
the consumption of tradables can be solved from (3.6). Plugging
mT , mN, cT (mN) and pN(mN) into the leverage constraint, we are
left with an inequality on parameters, states, mt (which depends
only on zT ) and powers ofmN. We then use the fsolve root-finding
routine to find themN such that the leverage constraint holds with
equality and set mK+1(b, e) to that value. The same process gives
us a candidate allocation K+ 1 for all other endogenous variables.
Step 2. Compute
U ≡ uT
(
cTK+1(b, e), c
N
K+1(b, e)
)
. . .
−βR(e)Ee
[
uT
(
cTK
(
BK(b, e), e′
)
, cNK
(
BK(b, e), e′
))] (C.3)
If U > 0, the collateral constraint binds and the allocation found
in step 1 is the new guess.
Step 3. If U 6 0, the collateral constraint does not bind. Discard the values
of mNK+1(b, e) and C
T
K+1(b, e) set in Step 1. As in step 1, write c
T
and cN as a function ofmN but in this case solve the Euler equation
C.3 with equality using the fsolve root-finding routine. With that
mNK+1(b, e) in hand, compute P
N
K+1(b, e), c
N
K+1(b, e), c
T
K+1(b, e) as
before and solve for BK+1(b, e) from the budget constraint (equa-
tion 3.3.
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Step 4. The above steps will in general produce a new set of functions
mNK+1(b, e), c
N
K+1(b, e), c
T
K+1(b, e), p
N
K+1(b, e) and BK+1(b, e) that
will differ from the conjecturesmNK (b, e), c
N
K (b, e), c
T
K(b, e), p
N
K (b, e)
and BK(b, e). We thus check the convergence criterion sup |xK+1 −
xK| 6 ε for x ∈ {B,mN, cT ,pN}. If the criterion fails, the conjectures
are replaced with the solutions mNK+1(b, e), c
N
K+1(b, e),c
T
K+1(b, e),
pNK+1(b, e) and BK+1(b, e) and the procedure returns to step 1 us-
ing these new conjectures. If the convergence criterion sup |xK+1 −
axK| 6 ε holds, the recursive functions are a solution to the decen-
tralized competitive equilibrium in recursive form.
Cell 4. Social Planner solves the social planer’s problem. The algorithm is also
a time-iteration code similar to that of decentralized equilibrium. In this
case, to get the planner’s Euler equation, the term uT has to be replaced
by
uSPT = uT + µ
SPψ (C.4)
in (C.3). where µSP > 0, with strict inequality if the collateral constraint
(equation 3.18) binds, and ψ is the externality term given by
ψ =
[
(1 + η)
pNt [(1 −αN)z
N
t m
N
t
αN
)
cTt
]
. (C.5)
Given that the following steps solve the Social Planner’s (SP) problem.
Step 1. Assume the constraint does not bind. In this case µSP = 0 and the
new guessed allocation can be found as in step 3 of the Decen-
tralized Equilibrium (DE). That is, solve for the pN, cN and cT as
functions of mN that solve the updated planner’s Euler equation
and find the debt position from the borrowing constraint. Note
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that in this case mT only depends on zT .
Step 2. Check the borrowing constraint. If it is satisfied, then the previous
allocation is the new K + 1 guess. If not discard and solve the
constrained problem.
Step 3. The main issue with the constrained problem is that it cannot be
reduced to one equation in one unknown, since the size of the
multiplier µSP matters for the input tax subsidies. In this case
mT depends on the endogenous variables. Hence the algorithm
consists on reducing the equilibrium to two equations in mN and
cT to be solved numerically and then use those to generate the
new prices and allocations guess.
i) Take as given the pair (mN, cT ).
ii) Solve cN from cNt +A
N = zNt m
N
t
αN.
iii) pN follows from the marginal rate of substitution constraint
for the planner, (3.19).
iv) With pN, cN, cT , the value of ψ can be solved.
v) Using the nontradales production optimality condition for the
planner, (3.22), solve for the value of µ
SP
λSP
.
vi) Given µ
SP
λSP
, the tradables input mT is solved from (3.23), and
the budget constraint multiplier λSP is solved from equation
(3.21) which is the planner’s Euler equation.
vii) At this point all variables are solved. The two equations left
to use are the leverage constraint and the one setting the
marginal value of tradables consumption for the social plan-
ner, equation (3.20). The numerical routine fsolve.m finds the
pair (mN, cT ) that satisfies this two equations.
Step 4. As before, check convergence by comparing the new guess with
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the old one.
Cell 5. Welfare Calculation takes the optimal policy functions we derived from
cells 3 and 4 of the Matlab code, and iterates until convergence to get
value functions of the private agent and social planer. We then calculate
the welfare gain as in Bianchi (2011).
Cell 6. Optimal Tax calculates optimal macro-prudential tax. With taxes on debt
τt the first order condition in a Decentralized Equilibrium is:
uT (t) − µ
DE
t = (1 + τt)
β
qt
Et [uT (t+ 1)] (C.6)
The optimal tax policy is such that the allocation obtained from the plan-
ner’s problem solves (C.6). But that allocation solves the planner’s Euler
Equation which is:
uT (t) + µ
SP
t (ψt + 1) =
β
qt
Et
[
uT (t+ 1) + µSPt+1ψt+1
]
. (C.7)
Recall we are interested in the optimal macro-prudential tax, the optimal
tax when times are good, i.e. constraint not binding (µDEt = 0).
1 Hence
the macro-prudential tax is:
1 + τt =
qt
β
uT (t)
Et [uT (t+ 1)]
= 1 +
Et [µt+1ψt+1]
Et [uT (t+ 1)]
(C.8)
where the first equality is obtained by solving from (C.6) and the second
replaces uT (t) by (C.7). This is (3.25) in the paper.
The Matlab code named "MPPsimulation.m" simulates the model. The code is
divided in five cells.
1The multipliers for the two problems µDEt and µ
SP
t do not need to be equal. However if for some
allocation the constraint is not binding in the Decentralized Equilibrium, then it will not bind in the planners
problem either
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Cell 1: Loads solver results. Allocates Grids and initial values for simulation.
Randomly draws exogenous variables.
Cell 2: Simulates our model for 201,000 periods. The initial bond position is set
as mid point of the bond grid for both DE and SP economies. The first
1,000 periods are discarded to eliminate initial condition dependence.
Cell 3: Calculates long term moments and displays the top panel of table 11 in
the command window.
Cell 4: Identifies sudden stop events. Crisis is defined as current account goes
beyond two standard deviation and collateral constraint binds in the de-
centralized economy. The crisis moments are obtained by taking average
across all crisis episodes. Displays the bottom panel of table 11 in the
command window.
Cell 5: Perform event window analysis. Finds the surrounding three periods be-
fore and after the sudden stop event. Calculates moments for endogenous
variables in the periods before and after the crises.
The Matlab code "MPPfigures.m" generates figures 21, 22, 23,24, 25 and 26 pre-
sented in the paper,
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